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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Forest Economics 
 
The effects of social and institutional structures on decision-making and benefit 
distribution of community forestry in Nepal 
 
by  
Bhagwan Dutta Yadav 
 
Participatory democracy has been an official part of Community Forestry (CF) since 1989 
when the main policy document, the Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS), was 
introduced in Nepal. However, many problems related to benefit distribution from CF have 
emerged because of the way decision-making is influenced by the social and institutional 
structures present at the community level, particularly in terms of dominance by wealthy and 
caste elite and the inability of poor and disadvantaged households to participate fully in 
decisions. The purpose of the study is to investigate the potential for poor and disadvantaged 
households to have positions on the Executive Committee (EC) of the Community Forestry 
User Group (CFUG), and whether representation of the poor and disadvantaged on the EC has 
any influence on the distribution of CF products or the formulation of distribution rules.  
 
The study used a conceptual approach using elite theory with models that looked at EC 
decisions based on whether there was a single caste in the CFUG or multiple castes, and 
whether only rich households were on the EC or whether a mix of rich and poor households 
were on the EC. Rich and/or high caste individuals, typically identified with EC membership, 
would interact on the EC either as a consensually integrated elite where there was one caste, 
or a plural elite where there was a mix of castes. A mix of rich and poor households on the EC 
was characterised as an organisational elite model, in which the EC organisation provided 
power and influence to members of the EC, including the poor, thus providing a balance to 
the dominance by the traditional elite.  
 
The study uses CFUG-level data from 31 CFUGs in the Baglung district and household data 
from 310 households. The results of the study show that while the usual factors associated 
with wealth and caste are important for selection to EC leadership positions, NGO 
membership was also an important factor EC leadership positions. The importance of NGO 
membership is that it means that NGOs and civil organisations are able to strengthen the 
leadership capabilities of poorer and disadvantaged people or encourage/empower someone to 
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be an EC member through training, workshops and study tours. This finding also supports the 
concept of the organisational elite model. The study also examined the effect of representation 
of the poor and disadvantaged on the EC by studying the factors that determined the relative 
distribution of forest products and the rules of distribution. In both cases, the higher the 
representation of the poor and disadvantage on the EC, the greater the benefits to the poor, 
both in terms of greater quantities distributed and longer distribution or collection periods.  
 
The policy implication of the study is that there is a way to overcome the traditional 
domination of the EC by the local elite through greater activity of NGOs, CBOs and civil 
society organisations. These organisations help the poor and underprivileged households to 
build up capacity to undertake leadership roles and through the organisational elite model 
become part of the elite decision-making.  
 
Keywords: Community forest, Community Forest User Group, Leadership, organisational 
elites, consensually integrated elites, plural elites, proportion of EC, influences, timber, 
firewood, fodder, leaf litter. 
  
 iii 
Acknowledgements 
I am greatly indebted to many people who have helped in this research endeavour. It is almost 
impossible to acknowledge my gratitude and debts to each and every one of them, but I owe 
my sincere gratitude and heartfelt thanks to some people who are worthy of mention. First and 
foremost, my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Associate Professor Dr Hugh H Bigsby, and 
Co-supervisor, Senior Lecturer Dr Ian Macdonald. I am especially grateful to my supervisors 
for their sharp insights, constructive comments and tireless guidance throughout the research 
endeavour. I could not have completed this thesis, without their support, guidance, and 
encouragement and due diligence. I have learnt greatly from their comments and am grateful 
for their help. My studies in the Faculty of Commerce have been memorable due to many 
people, but I must thank Professor Ross Cullen, Head of the Commerce Faculty who 
produced my research proposal to New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Society (NZARES) that has also recognised my contribution with an award. A special thanks 
also to Dr Patrick Adwell, Dean of the Commerce Faculty for providing me prompt support 
and for managing my student visa on the special initiation of my supervisor, Dr Hugh H. 
Bigsby. 
  
I must acknowledge the Community Forest User Group members and DFO, Mr Kedar Nath 
Dahal, his staff, particularly, Yamnath Pokharel who helped me and participated in my 
research in Baglung. I would also like to acknowledge with gratitude to DFO, LFP staff, in 
particular Mr Nirmal Thapa and project coordinator, Mr Vijay Shrestha, Assistant 
Coordinator, Mr Ramu Subedi and LFP Baglung In-Charge, Mr Lila Paudel. Their help, 
open-handedness and hospitality made this thesis possible. I am indebted to Mr Bijay Kumar 
Singh, Professor Dr A. K. Das, Dean of the Institute of Forestry, Nepal, for providing 
valuable advice on the data collection. I extend my sincere thanks to the Secretary, Ministry 
of Forest and Soil Conservation, Government of Nepal, the late Dr Damodar Parajuli, Ex 
Conservator, Mr R.V. Gupta, Regional Director, Mr Ram Paudel, Mr Mohan Dhungel, DFO 
Mr Braj Kishor Yadav, Shekhar Kumar Yadav, Mr Yogendra Yadav and CDO Panchthar Mr 
Janardhan Sharma Adhikari and my intimate friend Tek Ghimire and Yog Narayan Singh who 
encouraged me to undertake this study. I must also thank Mr Dinesh Parajuli, Anil Adhikary 
Yadav, Nirmala Yadav, and Mr Ram Kumar Yadav, former Minister Ram Chandra Yadav, 
MP Raj Lal Yadav and Ram Kishor Yadav for their continuous support. My special thanks 
are also conveyed to Dr Rabindra Kumar, my son, Dr Vinay Adhikari and my childhood 
colleague, Dr Gyanendra Adhikari who provided enormous health support to my 81 year old 
  
 iv 
father while I was in Nepal and back here in New Zealand. He left us and departed for heaven 
at 3.45 pm on 18 September, 2009. 
 
I must acknowledge the Government of New Zealand and Lincoln University for providing 
me an opportunity to study under domestic fees and for helping in the research field. I would 
like to express my heartfelt thanks to Dr Bhubanesowor Dhakal for his advice and his wife 
Urmila Dhakal, for support afforded and their daughters who took care of my son while I was 
in Nepal collecting the research data. Special thanks to go my friend Dr Jagannath Aryal, Mr 
Bhoj Raj Khanal and other Nepalese students and office colleagues for their support in 
numerous ways. I am also grateful to the members of the Nepal-New Zealand Friendship 
Society, Christchurch, and Mr Peter and Mrs Jill Lemon, Dr Eric Scott and Brenda Lord who 
contributed one way or another to my study. 
 
Finally, I express my hearty thanks to my wife Yamuna Yadav for her tireless support as she 
worked long hours to manage the family, who shared my anxiety, provided love, endurance, 
and understanding and gave enormous encouragement throughout the entire duration of my 
study. My son, Vivek Adhikari, who changed my life by motivating me, this work may 
answer his frequent questions about why I used the computer all the times at home and went 
to the office every night and even at weekends.  
 
I dedicate this work to my late father, Sukhadev Yadav and mother, Sajo Devi Yadav, who 
started my academic expedition to this level. 
  
  
 v 
Acronyms 
AD The Anno Domini dating system was devised in 525 by  Dionysius Exiguus,         
who used it to  compute the date of the Christian  Easter Festival, 
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level 
CBDD Community Based Driven Development 
CBNRM Community Based Natural Resource Management  
CBO Community Based Organisation 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism  
CF Community Forestry 
CFMP Collaborative Forest Management Plan 
CFUGs Community Forestry User Groups 
CHHE Caste Hill Hindu Elite 
CTVET Centre for Vocational and Educational Training 
DANIDA 
DLGDP 
Danish International Development Agency 
Decentralised Local Government Development Programme 
DDC District Development Committee 
DFO District Forest Office/District Forest Officer 
DNGOF  Dalit NGO Federation 
DoF Department of Forest 
EC Executive Committee 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FECOFUN Federation of Community Forestry User Group in Nepal 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
ha Hectare 
I/NOG International/Non-Governmental Organisation 
IHDP Integrated Hill Development Programme 
K-BIRD Karnali-Bheri Integrated Rural Development  
KHARDEP Koshi Hill Area Rural Development Programme 
KHDP Koshi Hill Development Programme 
LFP Livelihood and Forestry Programme 
LRMP Land Resource Mapping Project  
m Metre 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
mm Millimetre  
  
 vi 
MPFS Master Plan For Forestry Sector 
NAFP Nepal Australia Forestry Project 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NFI National Forestry Inventory  
NRM Natural Resource Management 
NSCFP Nepal Swish Community Forestry Project 
NTFPs Non Timber Forest Products 
NUCFP Nepal-UK Community Forestry Programme 
OFMP Operational Forest Management Plan 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
OP Operation Plan 
PASRAP Poverty Alleviation in Selected Rural Areas of Nepal 
PF Panchayat Forest 
PPF Panchayat Protected Forest 
PRMCIP-MS Nepal Marginalised Community Empowerment Project 
PVSE Poor, Vulnerable and Socially Excluded 
REDD Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
RIRDP Rapti Integrated Rural Development Programme 
RNRDIP 
RWUDUC 
Rasua-Nuwakot Interpreted Rural Development Programme 
Rural Women Development Centre 
RWSS Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
S/MIRD Seti and Mahakali Integrated Rural Development 
SAGUN Strengthened Actions for Governance in Utilization of Natural resources 
SIRDP Sagarmatha Integrated Rural Development Programme 
TDN Total  Digestible Nutrient 
UK United Kingdom 
UK-DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development 
UNICEF United Nation Children’s Fund 
USA United Stated America 
VDC Village Development Committee 
  
 vii 
Glossary 
Bahun (Brahmin), 
Chhetry, Thakuri and 
Newar 
Elite castes used for this research 
Bari Cultivated land in hills and mountains occurs mostly on slopes 
between 15 and 25 degrees 
Bhari Head load, on average 40 kg 
Birta, Math Forest Land  particularly in Terai provided by King and Rana 
rulers to their relatives and closest persons  
Brahmins or Bahun Primarily priests and one of the elite castes 
Butyan Land in hills and mountains occurs mostly on slopes between 20 
and 35 degrees 
Char kose jhadi Dense forests approximately 12 kilometres wide 
Dalit  Lower untouchable caste 
Dharmasastras The civil and criminal law of the nation 
Jagir Service provided by King and  Rana rulers to their nearest 
persons and relatives particularly in military 
Janjati Middle caste 
Khet Rice land, a cultivated land type. 
Kshataryias Warriors 
Madhesi Populace who live in Terai (Plain area) 
Mulki ain National legal code  
Pahadia Populace who live in hills 
Panchyat 
Raj 
Partiless political system 
State 
Ropani Unit of land area: 20 Ropani =1 hectare 
Shudras Lower Caste artisans and manual labourers 
Tagadhari Wearier of the sacred thread  
Terai Plain area particularly in tropical region in Nepal 
Vaishias Businessman 
Varna Group of people 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 viii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. iii 
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................... v 
Glossary ................................................................................................................................... vii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... xii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ xiv 
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background the Research .................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem .................................................................................. 4 
1.3 Objectives .......................................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Research Hypotheses ........................................................................................................ 6 
Chapter 2 RESOURCE AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW................................................... 8 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Socio-economic Setting of Nepal...................................................................................... 8 
2.2.1 The Mountain Region ............................................................................................ 9 
2.2.2 The Hill Region ................................................................................................... 10 
2.2.3 The Terai Madhesh Region ................................................................................. 11 
2.3 Forest Resources ............................................................................................................. 12 
2.4 Poverty Setting ................................................................................................................ 13 
2.5 Agriculture Milieu ........................................................................................................... 14 
2.6 The History of Forest Management ................................................................................ 16 
2.7 Social Structure of Nepal ................................................................................................ 22 
2.8 CFUG Organisations ....................................................................................................... 23 
2.9 Contributions from Other Studies ................................................................................... 25 
2.10 Conclusions about Resources and the Economic Setting ............................................... 26 
Chapter 3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.................. 29 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 29 
3.2 People’s Participation...................................................................................................... 30 
3.2.1 Forestry Development Programmes Towards Sustainable Livelihoods and 
Poverty Alleviation ............................................................................................. 31 
3.3 Models of Elite Behaviour .............................................................................................. 32 
3.4 Caste and Wealth as an Elite in Nepal ............................................................................ 34 
3.5 Models of Elite ................................................................................................................ 38 
3.5.1 Consensually Integrated Elite Model .................................................................. 40 
3.5.2 Plural Elite Model ............................................................................................... 42 
3.5.3 Power Elite Model ............................................................................................... 44 
3.5.4 Ruling Class Elite Model .................................................................................... 46 
3.5.5 Organisational Elite Model ................................................................................. 47 
3.6 Conclusions from the Review of Elite Models ............................................................... 49 
3.7 Conceptual Model ........................................................................................................... 50 
  
 ix 
3.7.1 Leadership Attributes .......................................................................................... 52 
3.7.2 Rules, Regulations and Practices of Distribution ................................................ 52 
3.8 Chapter Summary............................................................................................................ 53 
Chapter 4 AN EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR THE SELECTION OF LEADERS AND 
BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION FROM COMMUNITY FORESTS ...................................... 54 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 54 
4.2 Empirical Framework...................................................................................................... 54 
4.2.1 Leadership Attributes .......................................................................................... 55 
4.2.1.1 Wealth attributes ................................................................................... 56 
4.2.1.1.1 Landholding Size .................................................................. 56 
4.2.1.1.2 Livestock units ...................................................................... 56 
4.2.1.1.3 Off farm income ................................................................... 57 
4.2.1.1.4 Food sufficiency ................................................................... 57 
4.2.1.1.5 Occupation of household head ............................................. 57 
4.2.1.1.6 Ethnic caste and social status................................................ 58 
4.2.1.2 NGO membership ................................................................................. 58 
4.2.2 Econometric Model for Examining CFUG Leadership ...................................... 59 
4.3 Benefits Distribution (CF amount).................................................................................. 60 
4.3.1 Representation of the Poor on the EC ................................................................. 62 
4.3.2 Agenda Items Raised in the EC and Assembly Meetings ................................... 63 
4.3.3 Frequency of EC and Assembly Meetings .......................................................... 63 
4.3.4 Discussion Hours in EC and Assembly Meetings ............................................... 63 
4.3.5 Involvement of EC and Assembly Meetings in the Preparation of the 
Operational Plan .................................................................................................. 64 
4.3.6 Forest Attributes .................................................................................................. 64 
4.3.6.1 Forest Type............................................................................................ 64 
4.3.6.2 Forest Crown Cover Class .................................................................... 65 
4.3.6.3 Area of Forest per Household ............................................................... 65 
4.4 Rules of Distribution ....................................................................................................... 65 
4.4.1 CF Resource Attributes ....................................................................................... 67 
4.4.2 Proportion of Poor Households on the EC .......................................................... 67 
4.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 67 
Chapter 5 SURVEY AND DATA COLLECTION ............................................................. 69 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 69 
5.2 Reasons for Selecting the Baglung District .................................................................... 69 
5.3 Overview of the Baglung District ................................................................................... 70 
5.3.1 Forest Area .......................................................................................................... 72 
5.4 Survey Instruments.......................................................................................................... 72 
5.5 Sampling ......................................................................................................................... 74 
5.6 Questionnaire Development ............................................................................................ 75 
5.6.1 Household Survey ............................................................................................... 75 
5.6.2 Survey of the Executive Committees of the CFUGs ........................................... 76 
5.7 Data from Secondary Sources ......................................................................................... 77 
5.8 Data Description.............................................................................................................. 78 
5.8.1 Household Classification ..................................................................................... 78 
5.8.2 Food sufficiency .................................................................................................. 80 
5.8.3 Caste and ethnicity .............................................................................................. 81 
5.8.4 CFUG Data .......................................................................................................... 82 
  
 x 
5.8.5 Income of CFUG ................................................................................................. 85 
5.9 Chapter Summary............................................................................................................ 86 
Chapter 6 ATTRIBUTES OF LEADERSHIP ..................................................................... 88 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 88 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................... 88 
6.2.1 Leadership and Wellbeing Category ................................................................... 89 
6.2.2 Leadership and Ethnic Caste ............................................................................... 91 
6.2.3 Livestock Holdings ............................................................................................. 98 
6.2.4 Landholding ...................................................................................................... 100 
6.2.5 Off-Farm Income ............................................................................................... 102 
6.2.6 Occupation of Household Head ........................................................................ 104 
6.2.7 NGO Membership ............................................................................................. 105 
6.2.8 Conclusions from the Descriptive Statistics ...................................................... 105 
6.3 Definitions of the Econometric Variables ..................................................................... 106 
6.4 Leadership Regression Result ....................................................................................... 106 
6.5 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 110 
Chapter 7 RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY FOREST PRODUCTS. 112 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 112 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................... 112 
7.2.1 Average Relative Distribution and Forest Area ................................................ 113 
7.2.2 Average Relative Distribution and Forest Type ................................................ 115 
7.2.3 Average Relative Distribution and Forest Crown Cover Class ......................... 116 
7.2.4 Average Relative Distribution and Agenda Items Raised in Meetings ............. 117 
7.2.5 Average Relative Distribution and Annual Frequency of Meetings ................. 121 
7.2.6 Average Relative Distribution and Discussion Hours in Per Meetings ............ 122 
7.2.7 Average Relative Distribution and EC or Assembly Meeting Involvement in 
the Operation Plan (OP) .................................................................................... 124 
7.2.8 Average Relative Distribution, the Share of EC Positions and Wellbeing 
Category ............................................................................................................ 126 
7.2.9 Average Relative Distribution and the Share of EC positions held by Lower 
Caste .................................................................................................................. 127 
7.3 Conclusions from the Descriptive Statistics ................................................................. 127 
7.4 Regression Results ........................................................................................................ 129 
7.5 Chapter Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 135 
Chapter 8 DISTRIBUTION RULES .................................................................................. 138 
8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 138 
8.2 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................................... 138 
8.2.1 Open Periods for Collecting CF Products ......................................................... 139 
8.2.2 Relative Distribution of CF Products by Wellbeing Category and Open Period141 
8.2.3 CF Products Open Periods and Forest Type ..................................................... 142 
8.2.4 Open Period and CF Area per Household ......................................................... 142 
8.2.5 Forest Crown Cover Class of CF and Open Period by CFUGs ........................ 144 
8.2.6 The Relative Proportion of EC Positions by Poor and Poorest Category of 
Household .......................................................................................................... 144 
8.2.7 Conclusions from the Descriptive Analysis ...................................................... 145 
8.3 Regression Findings ...................................................................................................... 146 
8.4 Chapter Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 151 
  
 xi 
Chapter 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................. 153 
9.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 153 
9.2 Conceptual Model ......................................................................................................... 153 
9.3 Leadership Opportunities for Poor and Disadvantaged Households ............................ 155 
9.4 Effect of EC Membership on Relative Distribution of CF Products ............................ 156 
9.5 Effect of EC Membership on Distribution Rules .......................................................... 156 
9.6 Policy Implications........................................................................................................ 156 
9.6.1 Contribution to knowledge ................................................................................ 157 
9.7 Recommendations for Future Research and Work ....................................................... 157 
References.............................................................................................................................. 159 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................ 182 
Household survey ................................................................................................................... 182 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................................ 189 
Survey for Executive Committee of the CFUGs .................................................................... 189 
Appendix C ............................................................................................................................ 196 
Ethnic caste representation of Chairperson of CFUGs ........................................................... 196 
  
 xii 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 The annual percent decrease in forest and shrubland area in Nepal in various 
time periods ........................................................................................................... 20 
Table 3.1 Integrated national index of governance: the representation of vaarious castes 
in inluential positions in Nepal .............................................................................. 37 
Table 3.2 Summary of the features of elite models ............................................................... 39 
Table 5.1 The distributed amount of CF product by CFUGs in the sampled area ................ 84 
Table 6.1 The relative proportion of Nepalese households at the CFUG and EC level by 
wellbeing category ................................................................................................. 90 
Table 6.2  The t-test ratio matrix of wellbeing at Executive Committee level of 
community forests in Nepal (N=310) .................................................................... 91 
Table 6.3 The proportion of Nepalese households at the CFUGs and EC levels by ethnic 
caste ....................................................................................................................... 93 
Table 6.4 The t statistics of the ratio of Nepalese ethnic caste representation on EC ........... 94 
Table 6.5 EC membership and food sufficiency of Nepalese households............................. 96 
Table 6.6 t-Test ratio matrix of for the food sufficiency category household                                         
representation at the EC level in Nepal (N 310) .................................................... 97 
Table 6.7 The average livestock units for EC and non-EC Nepalese households ................. 99 
Table 6.8 t-Test ratio matrix of livestock numbers of households on EC and non-EC 
member households in Nepal............................................................................... 100 
Table 6.9 Relative own landholding for EC and non-EC members .................................... 101 
Table 6.10 t-Test of relative the comparison of own land between EC and non-EC 
members in Nepal ................................................................................................ 102 
Table 6.11 Average relative off farm income of EC and Non-EC member Nepalese 
households by CFUG ........................................................................................... 103 
Table 6.12 t-Test of relative off farm income of Nepalese EC and Non-EC member 
households ........................................................................................................... 104 
Table 6.13 The occupations of household head and EC positions in Nepal .......................... 104 
Table 6.14 The t-Test ratio matrix of Nepalese households head’s occupation and EC 
position ................................................................................................................ 105 
Table 6.15 NGO experience and EC position in Nepal ......................................................... 105 
Table 6.16 Independent variables for the econometric analysis ............................................ 106 
Table 6.17 The results of the binary logit model for binary choice ....................................... 107 
Table 7.1  The average relative distribution of CF products per  household by forest size . 114 
Table 7.2 The average relative distribution of CF products per  household by forest type . 116 
Table 7.3 Average relative distribution of CF products in Nepal by crown cover class ..... 117 
Table 7.4 The proportion of agenda items raised by various members per EC and 
assembly meetings in Nepal ................................................................................ 118 
Table 7.5 The average relative distribution and agenda items per meeting raised by 
disadvantaged members in EC meetings in Nepal .............................................. 119 
Table 7.6 The average relative distribution and proportion of agenda items raised by 
disadvantaged members per assembly meeting in Nepal .................................... 120 
Table 7.7 The average relative distribution of CF products by annual frequency of EC 
meetings in Nepal ................................................................................................ 121 
Table 7.8 The average relative distribution of CF products and annual frequency of 
assembly meetings in Nepal ................................................................................ 122 
Table 7.9 The average relative distribution of CF products and average discussion hours 
in EC meetings in Nepal ...................................................................................... 123 
Table 7.10 The average relative distribution of CF products per household and discussion 
hours per assembly meetings in Nepal ................................................................ 124 
  
 xiii 
Table 7.11 The average relative distribution of CF products by involvement of EC or 
assembly meetings in the preparation of the OP in Nepal ................................... 125 
Table 7.12 The average relative distribution by share of poor and poorest households on 
the EC in Nepal .................................................................................................... 126 
Table 7.13 The average relative distribution by share of disadvantaged caste on the EC in 
Nepal .................................................................................................................... 127 
Table 7.14 Variables for the regression analysis ................................................................... 129 
Table 7.15 The regression results for the average relative distribution of firewood per 
household in Nepalese CFUGs ............................................................................ 130 
Table 7.16 Regression results of the factors determining the average relative distribution 
of timber per household in Nepalese CFUGs ...................................................... 132 
Table 7.17 The regression results of the factors determining the average relative 
distribution of fodder per household in Nepalese CFUGs ................................... 134 
Table 8.1 The open periods for the extraction and collection of CF products in Nepal ...... 140 
Table 8.2 The relative distribution and Nepalese wellbeing category by open period ........ 141 
Table 8.3 CF product distribution by forest type and open period in Nepal ....................... 142 
Table 8.4  Open days and forest area per household (ha) in Nepal ...................................... 143 
Table 8.5 Open periods and Forest Crown Cover Class by Number of CFUGs in Nepal .. 144 
Table 8.6 The open period and proportion of  EC positions hold by the poor and poorest 
households ........................................................................................................... 145 
Table 8.7 Variables used in the econometric analysis ......................................................... 146 
Table 8.8 Ordered logistic regression results showing determination of open period for      
timber distribution for 14 CFUGs in Nepal ......................................................... 147 
Table 8.9 Ordered logistic regression results showing determination of open period for      
firewood distribution for 31 CFUGs in Nepal ..................................................... 149 
Table 8.10 Regression results of the factors that determine open periods for collecting 
fodder and grass in 31 CFUGs in Nepal .............................................................. 150 
 
  
 xiv 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Map of Nepal showing the three physiographic regions source: (B. D. Yadav, 
1996) ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual models of elite in CFUGs ................................................................... 50 
Figure 5.1 Map of Nepal showing Baglung district with the research areas; Kalika 
municipality and research VDCs, highlighted in red colour. ................................ 71 
Figure 5.2 Average proportion of households by wellbeing on CFUG and EC in 31 
CFUGs in the sampled area ................................................................................... 80 
Figure 5.3 Average percent of ethnic caste household at CFUGs and EC level ..................... 82 
Figure 5.4 Total Income of the Surveyed CFUGs from CF .................................................... 86 
 
 
  
1 
 
     Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background the Research 
Community forestry (CF) in Nepal emerged with the Forest Act 1978 and is based on the 
participatory approach principle. CF was established by the Master Plan for the Forestry 
Sector (MPFS) 1989. It is governed by the Forest Act 1993 and the Forest Regulations 1995. 
It is an example of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). It could be 
a model of community driven development for the successful implementation of 
administrative processes, such as constitutions, operational plans and Community Forest User 
Group (CFUG) Executive Committee (EC) structures and for the conservation of natural 
regeneration of forests (Iversen, et al., 2006). Recent literature suggests that local leadership 
in decision-making has, indeed, become increasingly inclusive of the needs and interests of 
pro-poor (Baland, Bardhan, Das, & Mookherjee, 2010; Dhakal, Bigsby, & Cullen, 2007; 
Fisher, 2007; Springate-Baginski, Blaikie, Dev, Yadav, & Soussan, 2000; Vermeulen, Nawir, 
& Mayers, 2008). However, Jones (2007) found that there may be trade-offs between rich 
and poor households in terms of decision-making, benefit distribution and that the poor 
appear to be further marginalized as a result of community forestry.  
 
Most nations agree that it would be impossible for the world to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals on poverty and environmental protection without addressing access over 
resources for the 1.6 billion people, nearly one third of the planet’s population, who depend 
on forests for their survival (Dach, Ott, Klaey, & Stillhardt, 2006; United Nation, 2005). 
People’s access to resources is more important for poor people in developing countries, 
including Nepal, where land resources are institutionally and geographically limited, to meet 
the basic needs of the people (Chhetri, 2006; National Planning Commission, 2007). The land 
available for many rural households in Nepal is meagre; 47% of the people have landholdings 
of less than 0.5 ha, 60% of farming households have a food deficit and over 20% of farmers 
are landless (National Planning Commission, 2006). As a result, approximately 31% of 
Nepalese live below the poverty line of US $12 per person/per month (National Planning 
Commission, 2007) . About 80% of the working population lives in rural areas and depends 
on subsistence farming for their livelihood (National Planning Commission, 2007; Pradhan & 
Shrestha, 2005). Most households in rural areas have little access to primary health care, 
  
2 
 
education, clean drinking water or air and sanitation services. Life is a continuous fight for 
survival for the most vulnerable groups, ethnic people and women (Dach, et al., 2006; 
Pradhan & Shrestha, 2005). 
 
The idea for the delegation of a certain amount of responsibility and authority over forest 
resources to local communities, in the form of CF, was stimulated by several factors. Among 
them, Larson and Ribot (2007), Pokharel (2002),  Soussan, Shrestha and Uprety (1995) and 
Hobley (1996) articulated three factors: first, failure of the modernization approach that 
started after the end of the Second World War with its large scale and centralistic approach to 
alleviate rural poverty and income disparities in developing countries including Nepal. In 
1957, one of the effects of this centralistic development approach was that the forest was 
nationalised to supply railway sleepers to India and to collect revenue to build infrastructure. 
The Nationalisation Act 1957 alienated people from forest but since the state could not 
protect forest resources from encroachment; this led to fast degradation and collapse of forest 
cover in Nepal (Gautam, Shivakoti, & Webb, 2004; A. L. Joshi, 1993). The second factor was 
the development of the new paradigm of planned intervention, which used a bottom up 
approach with the belief that local residents should play a meaningful role in decisions 
affecting their surrounding forests. Community people are increasingly seeking more say in 
how local forests are managed and used. The third factor was the surge in the demand for 
human rights and the indigenous people movement in the mainstream of development to 
alleviate the poverty of most rural poor. CF is one way in which this desire can be met 
(Banjade, et al., 2006; Brown, Malla, Schreckinberg, & Baginski, 2002; Freeman, 1997; 
Kanel, 2005; Roberts & Gautam, 2003).  
 
Local people often act with greater accountability than other stakeholders in forests, such as 
timber contractors, since the effects of forest management decisions have a more direct 
impact on them (A. Agrawal, 2001). In the context of Nepal, CF is a local-level forestry 
activity, implemented on communal land. Local users participate and collectively make 
decisions in planning, managing, and establishing forests for ecological benefits and 
harvesting forest crops for their basic needs for forest products and for selling surplus 
products for their socioeconomic development. Rath (2006) stated: 
 
"Community forestry, social forestry and rural development forestry are more or less equivalent and 
reflect Abraham Lincoln's view of democracy - government of the people, by the people, for the 
people." (, p.2)) 
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The goals and objectives of CF will vary according to individual community needs and 
aspirations and whether it is a developed country or a developing country. In a developing 
country like Nepal, the aim is to meet the basic needs of the community for such 
commodities as fuel wood, fodder, building materials, medicines and food (A. Agrawal, 
2001; A. Agrawal, Chhatre, & Hardin, 2008; Brown, et al., 2002; B. K. Pokharel, 2002; 
Roberts & Gautam, 2003). The goal of CF in developed countries is to strengthen community 
stability including reducing unemployment, by enhancing sustained economic benefits from 
forestry (Larson & Ribot, 2007). However, in both developed and developing countries, CF 
aims to alleviate poverty and environmental degradation (Mallik & Rahman, 1994). 
 
Appropriate management of forest resources could make a large contribution to poverty 
alleviation, climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation and forest resource 
sustainability. Appropriate management could also generate community income from 
processing and selling forest products and support other development activities. In addition, it 
could also prove to be one potential tool to set up good governance. Consequently, CF could 
serve as a development vehicle in rural societies (A. Agrawal, 2001; B. K. Pokharel, 2002; 
Sunderlin, 2006).  
 
Currently, government policy in Nepal is aimed at achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) for environmental conservation and poverty reduction. The government 
incorporated a Poverty Reduction Strategy in the 10
th
 Five Year Plan -2002 to 2007 (National 
Planning Commission, 2005) and the Interim Three Year Plan (2007-2010) (National 
Planning Commission, 2007). CF can play a significant role in contributing to poverty 
reduction by creating sustainable livelihoods and a stable environment if the government 
makes forest policy, Acts, Regulations and directives to favour the poor and disadvantaged 
people, particularly in the distribution of CF benefits (Acharya & Acharya, 2007; Adhikari, 
2005; Adhikari, Di Falco, & Lovett, 2004; Adhikari, Williams, & Lovett, 2007; Baland, 
Bardhan, Das, Mookherjee, & Sarkar, 2007; Dhakal, et al., 2007; Fisher, 2007; Iversen, et al., 
2006; James & Bruno, 2006; Kanel, 2006; Kanel, Poudyal, & Baral, 2005; Maskey, 
Gebremedhin, & Dalton, 2006; B. K. Pokharel, Stadtmüller, & Pfund, 2005; Vermeulen, et 
al., 2008). Without addressing the problems of CF product distribution, there is little chance 
of using the economic potential of natural resources to reduce rural poverty (Gilmour, Malla, 
& Nurse, 2004; Malla, Neupane, & Branny, 2005).  
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1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Despite the potential of CF to alleviate poverty, results have been mixed. Studies show that 
the CF programme has been successful in increasing forest stocks including conservation and 
regeneration (Gilmour, et al., 2004; Kanel, 2006; Malla, et al., 2005). However, it has not 
been as successful in alleviating poverty (A. Agrawal, 2001; Dhakal, Bigsby, & Cullen, 2006; 
B. K. Pokharel, 2002) and the share of CF benefits has gone to fewer poor households than 
wealthier ones (Adhikari, et al., 2004; Kanel, 2006; B. K. Pokharel, et al., 2005; W. R. 
Rechlin, Hammatt, Burch, & Song, 2002). There are two schools of thought about what is 
preventing CF programmes from benefitting the poor and successfully alleviating poverty. 
One school of thought argues that central government policies might have constrained the use 
of forests under CF in a way that limits the pool of benefits (Adhikari, et al., 2004; Dhakal & 
Bhatta, 2010; Dhakal, et al., 2006; Kanel, 2006; B. K. Pokharel, et al., 2005; W. R. Rechlin, 
et al., 2002). The effect of government policy constraints has been studied by Dhakal et al. 
(2006)  who found that policy constraints can limit the economic benefits from CF and the 
ability of poor households to meet their basic needs from CF.  
 
The other school of thought argues that the social structure of Nepal, with its traditional caste 
and wealth structures, can lead to decision-making, including in forest management that may 
not meet the needs of poor people as they expected (James & Bruno, 2006). The forest policy 
does not dictate how CF members should behave in terms of sharing power (Lachapelle, 
Smith, & McCool, 2004). The organisation of Community Forestry User Groups (CFUGs) 
has led to power relationships that effectively leave the poor out of the decision-making 
processes (Jiaqi, Zachwenuk, & Yongjun, 2004; Malla, et al., 2005). The present social 
structure, in terms of wealth inequality, caste, and regional disparity, influences decision-
making and consequently determines benefit distribution (Rao, 2010). There is a need to 
understand whether social structure affects decision-making in CFUG institutions and the 
benefit distribution of community forests in Nepal. 
 
Previous studies have attempted to understand benefit distribution issues in Nepal at the 
CFUG level. However, there are many limitations with these studies. For example, Adhikari 
et al. (2004) studied household-level factors determining benefit distribution from community 
forests, but did not look at institutional problems at the user group level. Maskey et al.(2006) 
studied institutional effects on benefit distribution at the CFUG level. However, the study 
was based on only one user group. Dhakal (2006) studied institutional characteristics 
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determining benefit distribution of community forests but limited the analysis to charcoal 
distribution, which is a special case. That study did not cover major products such as timber, 
firewood and fodder.  
 
This study attempts to fill the deficiencies in previous studies by examining the social 
structures in CFUGs and how this influences the decision-making of CFUG institutions and 
benefit distribution from community forests. In community forestry, the CFUG is an 
organisation that consists of representative CFUG members who meet periodically as an 
assembly. The assembly forms an Executive Committee (EC) that executes the rules and 
programmes on behalf of the CFUG. The composition of the EC is thus a critical issue in 
terms of decision-making and the sharing of benefits obtained from CF. In principle, the EC 
should have representation from all social structure members such as castes and wealth. The 
EC should include rich, medium, poor and poorest households. It should also consist of the 
elite
1
, Dalit, and Janjati castes. In this way its decisions will reflect the needs and desires of 
all members, particularly socially disadvantaged groups who rely on the forests for their basic 
needs of firewood, timber, fodder and leaf litter. 
 
It is believed, however, that EC members mostly represent the elite caste and wealthier 
households (Jones, 2007; Malla, et al., 2005). The key question is thus whether membership 
of the EC is representative of all social groups’ membership and, if not, what factors 
determine membership of the EC and the benefit distribution derived from CF. In particular, 
the aim of this research is to address the following research questions: 
  
1. What factors determine who is on the EC, and what factors are important for ensuring 
poor and disadvantaged groups are represented on the EC? 
2. Does the structure of the EC affect who gets benefits from the community forest, 
particularly the poor and disadvantaged? 
3. Does the structure of the EC affect the distribution rules of community forest products 
in a way that impacts on benefits, particularly for the poor and disadvantaged?  
 
As explained above, there are two schools of thought about what prevents CF programmes 
from improving the livelihoods of the poor. The first school of thought is the constraint of the 
policy of the central Nepalese Government and the second is internal management issues 
within the EC due to the social structure of Nepalese society (conventional ethnic groups and 
                                                 
1. Elite caste used for this study is Bahun (Brahmins) Chhetry, Thakuri and Newar caste of Nepalese society. 
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castes). However, it not understood how social structure, including the organization of 
CFUGs, might affect the distribution of benefits to poor and marginalised households. This 
study endeavours to examine the role of social structure, including CFUG organisations, in 
distributing the benefits of CF and to fill the gaps in previous studies. Hence, the stated 
objectives for this study are as follows. 
1.3 Objectives 
The general purpose of the study is to identify and analyse the impacts of social structures 
and the decision-making processes of CFUGs and to determine if they are linked to the flow 
of benefits from CF to different sections of the society. This will be done by focusing on the 
following specific objectives. The study will: 
  
 Evaluate the leadership composition of the executive committee of CFUG; 
 Examine the effect of the EC structure on the benefits from the community forest; 
 Examine the effect of the EC structure on the distribution rules for community forest 
products; and, 
 Draw conclusions about the policy interventions necessary at the community level to 
ensure poor households benefit from CF. 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
The research questions will be studied by testing the following hypotheses. 
 
1. There are factors not related to the wealth or caste that increase the likelihood of 
being on the EC.   
2. When the EC has the more disadvantaged groups represented there are more benefits 
distributed from CF, and more benefits to the poor.  
3. When the EC has the more disadvantaged2 groups represented, decision rules are more 
favourable to the poor 
 
Organisation of the Thesis 
 
Following this introductory chapter, there are eight chapters organised as follows. The 
resources and economic panorama of the country are reviewed in Chapter Two. A review of 
                                                 
2. The disadvantaged members referred to in this study are lower caste and marginalised group in Nepalese 
society. 
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theories addressing the research hypotheses is the focus of Chapter Three. Chapter Three 
develops an understanding of how to analyse and evaluate community-based natural 
resources management (CBNRM) and institutional arrangements for more efficient 
connection to the poor and disadvantaged groups for decision-making and benefit 
distribution. The conceptual framework model and community welfare maximization are also 
reviewed in Chapter Three. The empirical framework for analysing the leadership positions 
and decision-making for benefit distribution from CF are reported in Chapter Four. The 
research method for collecting and analysing the relevant primary and secondary data is 
discussed in Chapter Five. The research findings are reviewed in Chapters Six, Seven and 
Eight. Chapter Nine presents the summary of the research with relevant conclusions and 
policy implications. Finally, that chapter also assesses the recommendations of this research 
for policy makers and for researchers working in CBNRM. 
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     Chapter 2 
RESOURCE AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Nepal’s socio-economic setting and natural resources. Social 
structures and institutions are influenced by social hierarchy, deriving from, and subject to, 
the changing economic requirements of evolving societies. This concept will be used to 
derive the hypotheses and research model to address the research problems explained in 
Chapter One. First, the chapter describes the history and characteristics of forest resources 
and their significance for inspiring the livelihood of rural Nepalese society. Secondly, the 
chapter depicts the CFUG institutions and how, at the local level, these institutions manage 
the distributional system and practices for common pool resources. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the economic overview of the country.  
2.2 Socio-economic Setting of Nepal 
Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of US $440 
per annum (World Bank, 2010). It has wide income disparities and poor access to basic social 
services by a large section of the population. It is also one of the few developing non-coastal 
countries of the world. It is situated between China and India with a total area of about 14.7 
million hectares of rectangular shape extending from east to west. The country ranges from 
the lowest point, Kachnakalan, at 70 metres above mean sea level (amsl) to 8,848 metres 
amsl in the north with the highest peak, Mount Everest. Mountains and hills cover over 80% 
of the total land area of the nation. Many rivers and streams originating from the Himalayan 
glaciers cross the country from north to south. Due to its varied topography and elevation, 
annual precipitation also varies greatly from one point to another, ranging from 250 to 4500 
mm. Land use, forest resources and the socio-economic situation of the nation vary with the 
ecological zone (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989). 
 
The country is divided into three broad physiographic regions: the Mountain Region, the Hill 
Region and the Terai Madhesh (Plain) Region (Figure 2.1). These regions run naturally 
parallel to each other, from east to west, as constant ecological belts, occasionally bisected by 
rivers. The physiographical composition of Nepal is described in the following section.  
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Figure 2.1 Map of Nepal showing the three physiographic regions source: (B. D. Yadav, 
1996) 
2.2.1 The Mountain Region 
The mountain region ranges from 1,000 metres to 4,000 metres or more amsl. The natural 
landscape comprises Mount Everest and eight of the world's 10 highest peaks. The snow line 
occurs commonly above 5,000 metres. The landscape of this region is characterized by its 
severe climatic and rugged topography. Human habitation and economic activities are 
extremely arduous to perform. Pastoralism and trading are the common economic activities 
among the mountain dwellers (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989). The populace is very 
sparse throughout the region. The existing farming activity is mostly limited to the low-lying 
valleys and the river basins. This region covers 34% of the total land area of Nepal and about 
13% of the land area of this region is under agriculture (National Planning Commission, 
2005). The main ethnic groups of this region are Sherpas, Dolpas, Lopas, Baragaonlis and 
Manangese (Bistha, 1991). The Sherpas are mainly found in the east in the Solu and Khumbu 
regions; the Baragaonlis and Lopas live in the semi-desert areas of Upper and Lower 
Mustang in the Tibetan rain-shadow area; the Manangese live in the Manang district; and the 
Dolpas live in the Dolpa district of West Nepal, one of the highest settlements on earth, at 
4,000 metres (Gurung, 2005). The main forest species of this region are Pinus wallichiana, 
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Picea smithiana, Abies spectabilis, Juniperus wallichiana, Taxus baccata, evergreen 
(Quercus semecarpifolia, Rhododendron campanulatum), and deciduous broadleaved species 
(Betula utilis, Populus ciliata, Sorbus cuspidata) spreading from 2,400 m up to the tree line at 
4,200 m amsl (Dobremez, 1976; Lillis, Matteucci, & Valentini, 2005). 
2.2.2 The Hill Region  
The hill region is situated between 1,000 and 4,877 metres amsl and includes the major urban 
centres of Kathmandu, Pokhara and Surkhet. This region is the political and cultural centre of 
Nepal, with decision-making power centralised in Kathmandu. Crop agriculture is the 
predominant economic activity supplemented by livestock. This region covers 48% of the 
total land area of Nepal (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989). The main land use pattern of 
this region is categorised as cultivated land, non-cultivated inclusions, grasslands, forestlands, 
shrub lands, and other sorts of land use. Over half of the inhabitants live in the mountainous 
areas and most depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Nearly 33% of its land is under 
agriculture. The ratio of agricultural land to farming population is only 0.12 ha/capita. 
Consequently, the hill residents are forced to seek off-farm employment through both 
seasonal and permanent migration to the Terai and urban areas (Bistha, 1991; Gurung, 2005).  
 
There are multiple castes and diverse ethnicity in the middle hills with a significant number 
of communities belonging to hierarchy single ethnic groups (Hofer, 1979). Some of the main 
castes are Brahmins, Chhetry, Newars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Thakalis, Magars, Rais, Limbus 
and Donuwars. Most of the populace in this region depend on subsistence farming with a few 
other options for livelihood opportunities (Gurung, 2005). Livestock is an integral part of this 
subsistence farming system, which provides a source of protein and drafting power for 
farmers.  
 
The forests of this region are surrounded by cultivated agricultural lands with a few dense 
forests on the top edges of the mountains. All accessible forests have a high potential to be 
managed under community forests (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989). The main tree 
species of this region are subtropical pine forest (1,000-2,200 m amsl). South facing slopes of 
the Siwalik and the mid-hills in the western and central regions are dominated by Chirpine 
(Pinus roxburghii). Lower temperate broadleaved forest occurs from 2,000-2,700 m amsl in 
the west and 1,700-2,400 m amsl in the east. The mid-hills forests with Alnus nitida, 
Castanopsis tribuloides, Castanopsis hystrix, Lithocarpus pachyphylla, Quercus spp. and 
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Alnus nitida, are confined to the river banks of the Mugu Karnali (2,130-2,440 m amsl). In 
west Nepal, Quercus leucotrichophora, Q. lanuginosa and Q. floribunda forests dominate 
with other associated species. Central and eastern parts have Q. lamellosa forest; Lithocarpus 
pachyphylla forest occurs in the east. Lower temperate mixed broadleaf forest (1,700-2,200 
m amsl) is generally confined to the moister north and west-facing slopes, with several tree 
species of Lauraceae prominent (Dobremez, 1976; Stainton, 1972). 
 
Upper temperate broadleaf forest (2,200-3,000 m amsl) on drier south-facing slopes of central 
and eastern parts has Q. semecarpefolia forest. Upper temperate mixed broadleaf forest 
(2,500-3,500 m amsl) is mostly found in the central and eastern regions, mainly on the 
moister north- and west-facing slopes. Acer and Rhododendron spp. predominate here. 
2.2.3 The Terai Madhesh Region 
In contrast to the Mountain and Hill Regions, the Terai Region, also called Madheshh, is a 
lowland tropical region comprising 18% of the total area of the country. This region is a 
subtropical belt of flat, alluvial land stretching along the Nepal-India border parallel to the 
Hill Region. It is the northern extension of the Gangetic Plain in India, which commences at 
about 70 m above sea level and rises to about 1,000 m at the foot of the Siwalik Range. The 
region was formed, and is fed, by three major rivers: the Koshi, the Narayani (India's Gandak 
River), and the Karnali. In the past, this region contained malaria-infested, thick forests, 
commonly known as char kose jhadi (dense forests approximately 12 kilometres wide). The 
Terai was used as a defensive frontier by Nepalese rulers during the British rule (Raj) (1858-
1947) in India (A. L. Joshi, 1993; Metz, 1991).  
 
In terms of both farm and forest lands, the Terai is becoming the richest economic region of 
Nepal. Overall, the Terai Region has a greater availability of agricultural land than other 
regions due to its flat terrain. About 64% of its land area is under agriculture (A. L. Joshi, 
1993). Natural vegetation consists mainly of Sal (Shorea robusta) and associated species 
including riverine forest. In addition, it still has the largest commercial forests (World Bank, 
2006). In the early 1990s, the forests were being increasingly destroyed because of the de-
facto forest policy of the government that clear-felled forests for the settlement of hill 
migrants to provide agricultural land for this populace (Metz, 1991). Migration from the 
mountains to the Terai for expanding agriculture land and settlement is still a problem 
(Chakraborty, 2001).  
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The Terai is the main farming region in Nepal, providing much produce for the rest of the 
country. Rice, maize, jute, tea, tobacco and sugarcane, along with a variety of fruit, are all 
grown here and sent to the major cities and towns in Nepal and even for export (Gurung, 
2005; Lawoti, 2001). In the Terai Region, there are also major differences within the 
agricultural sector. In eastern Terai, 16% of the population are farm workers compared with 
5% in western Terai, with a corresponding higher share of self-cultivators in the west 
(Hatlebakk, 2007).  
 
The main forest species of this region are Dalbergia sissoo, Eucalyptus spp. and Tectona 
grandis (teak), particularly in Sagarnath and Nepalgunj. Plantations in the mid-hills comprise 
Pinus roxburgii, P. wallichiana, P. patula and Alnus nepalensis  (Gilmour, King, Applegate, 
& Mohns, 1990). Tropical moist lowland forest species (between 1,000 and 1,200 m amsl in 
the Churia Hills) are predominantly Sal (Shorea. robusta). Acacia catechu and D. sissoo 
replace Sal in riverine forests. Other riverine forest types include evergreen species, such as 
Michelia champaca, or deciduous species, such as Bombax ceiba. In the foothills of western 
Nepal, Sal forest is replaced by Terminalia/Anogeissus (Ministry of Population & 
Environment, 2004). Dobremez (1976) described that as subtropical broadleaf evergreen 
forest (1,000-2,000 m amsl). Central and eastern parts have Schima wallichii/Castanopsis 
indica forest. (Dobremez, 1976) also explained that, in the riverine forest of toona (Cedrela 
toona), Albizia occurs low down along the valley sides of large rivers (e.g. Arun Khola). 
Alnus nepalensis is widespread along streams and in moist places. Subtropical pine forest 
(1,000-2,200 m amsl) on the south facing slopes of the Siwalik and the mid-hills in western 
and central regions is dominated by Chirpine (P. roxburghii). 
2.3 Forest Resources  
Forest covers about 4.27 million hectares (29%) and shrubs cover 1.56 million hectares 
(10.6%) of a total land area of 14.72 million hectares in Nepal (Härkönen, 2002; Nagendra & 
Gokhale, 2008; National Planning Commission, 2007; World Bank, 2006). The populace of 
Nepal has predictably depended on forests for basic needs, firewood, timber, fodder and non-
timber forest products (NTFPs) (Malla, et al., 2005). The economy of the country largely 
depends on the use of natural resources. The growing population has put huge pressure on 
forests for cultivable land, especially in the Terai Region, which also supports many landless 
migrants from the hills (A. L. Joshi, 1993). The endorsement of the Forest Act 1993 and 
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Forest Regulations 1995 by the government has shifted nationalized forests from state control 
to local communities. 
 
In 2006, there were 16,840 CFUGs with 1,711,097 households in 74 of 75 districts in Nepal 
covering 1,217,172 hectares of forest land, which is over 25% of Nepal’s forest land (Kanel, 
2005). Management of the forests by communities in the form of CF has resulted in the 
creation of community funds raised by selling timber, firewood, NTFPs, CFUG members’ 
fees, penalties and obtaining donor assistance. These funds are used to construct roads, 
bridges and schools, the promotion of drinking water and paying teachers’ salaries  (Dev, 
Yadav, Baginski, & Soussan, 2003). Moreover, CF also contributes to growth in social 
capital by empowering women, weaker castes and oppressed groups towards increased 
participation in decision-making and increasing human capital through workshops and 
training (B. K. Pokharel, et al., 2005).  
 
Nepal largely has a subsistence economy. The GDP of Nepal is US$3,063 million and the per 
capita income is US$440 (World Bank, 2010). Both agriculture and forestry have played a 
central role in the development of the economic and social life of the rural people. The share 
of agriculture, forestry and fishery in the GDP is about 60% with forestry contributing about 
15% (National Planning Commission, 2007). At present, there is a need for an 
environmentally sensitive approach to agricultural development in Nepal. Because of the 
growing deterioration of ecosystems, the scarcity of fodder and fuel, the loss of soil fertility 
and its impact on household food and energy security, the approaches to be promoted must be 
carefully selected (S. P. Yadav, 2004). The next section explains the poverty setting within 
the Nepalese economic panorama. 
2.4 Poverty Setting 
Many factors contribute to chronic poverty in Nepal’s steep and mountainous areas. 
However, one factor associated with poverty is the deeply entrenched and complex 
phenomenon of 240 years of feudal kingship. Approximately 31% of Nepalese live below the 
poverty line of US$12/person/month (National Planning Commission, 2007). Most 
households have little or no access to primary health care, education, clean drinking water or 
sanitation services. Rural communities are generally illiterate, have large families, and are 
landless or have only very small landholdings. Small, fragmented subsistence farming is 
characteristic of Nepalese agriculture; the average landholding is only 0.8 hectares (Dhakal, 
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et al., 2006). Life is a constant struggle for survival. The most vulnerable groups are the 
lowest social castes, indigenous people and women. 
 
Poverty, lack of economic growth and increasing marginalization has resulted from 10 years 
of political unrest and violence in Nepal. A Maoist rebellion that began in 1996 in the remote 
hill districts of the mid-western region later intensified and spread across large parts of the 
country. Over 14,000 Nepalese were killed in the conflict and about 600,000 were internally 
displaced or made homeless (Baral & Heinen, 2005; National Planning Commission, 2006; 
M. A. Rechlin, et al., 2007). In addition, over two million people were believed to have fled 
to India. Fighting occurred largely in rural areas so agricultural production was jeopardised. 
Many rural and remote regions have been kept isolated. Agricultural production declined 
severely and business investment ground to a halt. Overall, the conflict wreaked havoc on the 
country’s economic performance (National Planning Commission, 2007). Following a 
ceasefire in April 2006, steps have been taken to bring the decade-long conflict to an end. 
 
Social discrimination, both in Madesh Terai and the hills, plays a significant role for most 
disadvantaged, poor and marginalized citizens in Nepal (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001, 
2009; B. K. Pokharel, 2002). Small farmers, landless labourers, lower castes, indigenous 
people and women are further forced into discriminated-against groups in Terai (Chaudhary, 
2006). Discrimination on the grounds of caste is officially illegal in Nepal but is, in fact, 
widespread, especially in rural areas (Bode, 2009; Gurung, 2005). Members of the lowest 
caste (Dalit or untouchable) are the most disadvantaged group (Bistha, 1991). Most people in 
the Dalit caste work as wage labourers for higher-caste farmers.  
2.5 Agriculture Milieu 
Agriculture dominates the Nepalese economy. Although only 20% of the total land area is 
under agriculture, in the late 1990s, agriculture was the main source of livelihood for more 
than 85% of the inhabitants (A. L. Joshi, 1993). Nepal obtains, on average, about 60% of its 
GDP from agriculture (National Planning Commission, 2007; K. Singh, 1988). Low 
production and fluctuations in yield have been major hurdles in the agricultural sector. The 
main challenge is to commercialize conventional agriculture with up-to-date mechanisation 
and industrialisation of agricultural production (National Planning Commission, 2007). The 
main obstacles are government policy and the traditional beliefs of leaders. Any government 
that obtained power after a shift from one political system to another usually attacked 
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agricultural land, in particular the fragmentation of agriculture land into smaller sizes, in 
Terai, in the name of modernisation of agricultural policy and revolutionary reform in 
agriculture (Metz, 1991). To become popular, politicians bank votes from the poor and 
landless people with the agenda of distributing agricultural land and settling them in the 
Terai’s high yielding forest land to develop agriculture to sustain their livelihoods (A. L. 
Joshi, 1993; Metz, 1991). These politicians have never accepted the wisdom about 
infrastructural development or scientific land reform that preferred larger land sizes to handle 
modern agricultural tools and equipment to capture optimum products and to revolutionize 
the agricultural sector. The Federal Government of Nepal has developed an Agricultural 
Perspective Plan (1997-2016) that focuses on increasing agricultural production, controlling 
irrigation, meeting the demand for fertilizer, and amending the Act to abolish the dual system 
of ownership throughout the country so that ownership is provided to all tenants (National 
Planning Commission, 2007). However, the current Agriculture Perspective Plan relies too 
much on growth as the engine for addressing poverty and does not address a mechanized land 
reform system. It means that farms, in fact, are very small in that they serve simply as family 
havens where a few vegetables and cereals can be cropped (Thiesenhusen, 1991). The 
Nepalese policy makers have not decided to unite the fragmented land and start farming with 
machinery and equipment to broaden the economic gains of the nation. There are three types 
of private agricultural land in Nepal: 
 
Rice Land (Khet): Khet land is clearly defined cultivated land. It is invariably put under rice 
cultivation during the monsoon. At altitudes below 2,000 m amsl, rice is grown on suitable 
land where some irrigation is available (Land Resource Mapping Project, 1986). Rice land is 
at least partially irrigated during the monsoon. 
 
Cultivated Land (Bari): Bari land in the hills and mountains occurs mostly on slopes 
between 15 and 25 degrees (27 to 47%). It is not unusual to observe slopes of over 30 degrees 
(about 60%) brought under cultivation (Land Resource Mapping Project, 1986). The Bari 
lands on the slopes are constructed as outward sloping terraces with the intention of draining 
excess water throughout the monsoon. Bari land is the dominant practice in the hills and 
mountainous regions with an area of 1,708,000 hectares of drained agricultural land in Nepal, 
which amounts to approximately 65% of the total cultivated land (Land Resource Mapping 
Project, 1986). Maize is the dominant crop of Bari land followed by cereals, pulses or 
mustard, or mixed crops, such as millet mixed with potatoes, particularly at higher altitudes. 
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Cultivated land (Butyan): The Butyan land in the hills and mountains occurs mostly on 
slopes between 20 and 35 degrees (35 to 58%). This is suitable for tree species, particularly 
for fodder, firewood, and horticultural crops (Land Resource Mapping Project, 1986; 
Stainton, 1972). This land is inappropriate for cultivation of crops such as wheat, rice or 
cereals. 
2.6 The History of Forest Management 
Human beings and forests have always had a multifaceted relationship. Humans have 
depended on forests as long as people have inhabited the planet. They provide clean air to 
breathe, food and water to survive, fuel for energy and shade for shelter. Humankind's past is 
linked to the forest and it is easy to perceive how its survival will map our future (Stainton, 
1972). Currently, it requires significant inputs to provide for the requirements of human life 
in developing counties such as Nepal. Forests can provide both direct and indirect livelihood 
benefits including products and services for the “sustainable livelihoods” of farmers. Forests 
and trees are an integral part of the farming system. Farmers must have access to forests and 
trees for leaf litter, fodder, animal bedding and firewood, as well as timber for the 
construction of buildings and agricultural equipment. Forest management has gone through a 
process of development in Nepal over the last few centuries. There have been various forest 
policies and legislation to manage forests and solve the needs of local people. The approaches 
implemented can be broadly divided into the periods 1769-1957, 1957-1976, 1977-1988 and 
post 1988 (Gautam, et al., 2004; A. L. Joshi, 1993; Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989). 
 
From 1769 to 1957 
 
Before the Shah King of Gorkha united Nepal in 1769, the land was divided into a number of 
kingdoms. Each kingdom had its own administrative rules and practices (Metz, 1991). As the 
populace was small and forest lands were abundant, the earlier rulers had great opportunities 
to expand agricultural land after clearing the forest. The underlying reason for deforestation 
was because there was no provision to collect revenue from forest land whereas federal rulers 
collected tax from agricultural land (Gautam, et al., 2004). Therefore, they encouraged 
individuals to convert forests into agricultural land. One school of thought was to protect, 
manage and utilize privately owned forests. Consequently, the forests were snatched by the 
rulers from their traditional owners. The forests of Terai were re-distributed to royal family 
members, relatives, army officers and other employees as gifts and the Birta, Math, Jagir and 
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Terai people, who were the traditional forest owners of those forests were compelled to work 
as forest tillers (Metz, 1991). By 1950, 75% of Birta forest was converted into agriculture and 
ownership transferred to higher caste Rana (A. L. Joshi, 1993) and royal families (Metz, 
1991).  
 
Due to malaria in the Terai, people from the hills did not want to migrate there (Metz, 1991; 
Stainton, 1972) . Therefore, federal rulers tried to shift hill people to the Terai by providing a 
number of incentives/facilities to people who wanted to migrate. For example, the federal 
rulers developed the tax holiday system for the immigrants whereby taxes could be avoided 
in three different ways (Metz, 1991; Salamat, 1989; K. Singh, 1988). Firstly, if a farmer 
chose to convert forest into agricultural land, he could enjoy a three-year tax holiday. 
Secondly, a farmer could obtain a Jagir (be employed in the Public Service), which was an 
assignment to the military. The compensation for the Jagir was the right to the taxes from 
particular land. Jagirs were necessary because of the uncertain political climate in Nepal 
(Metz, 1991). The military was financed almost entirely by land and labour taxes. These 
appointments were renewed annually and provided for insecure land tenure. Thirdly, a farmer 
could obtain a birta, which was an assignment of a piece of land as a bonus for some work 
done for the king. Despite this, Gautam et al. (2004) argued that Terai forests were not 
widely disturbed until the late 1920s when the government started to expand the agricultural 
area by clearing forests and extracting timber for export to India in order to collect revenue. 
The Department of Forests (DoF) in Nepal was established in 1925 with the main objectives 
to administer timber exports to colonial British India and to allocate wood and capital to the 
ruling king
3
 and the Rana families
4
 (Kanel, et al., 2005; K. Singh, 1988). The government 
hired an experienced British forester (J.V. Collier), with long working experience in India, 
who provided a report to the government in 1928 recommending the cutting down and 
removing of all trees from the Terai forests and converting the land to agricultural land and 
settlement (Graner, 1997). 
 
From 1957 to 1976 
 
The government nationalised all private forests in 1957 through the Private Forest 
Nationalisation Act. Its main intention was to reclaim the Birta land that had been given as 
presents to individuals for special services to the kings. The Forest Act 1957 led to 
                                                 
3. An autocratic monarch ruled Nepal from 1769 to 2008. 
4. An aristocratic family that ruled Nepal from 1846 to 1951. 
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tremendous controversy affecting the management of forests (Metz, 1991; K. Singh, 1988).  
Hobley (1996) and Messerschmidt (1993) argued that this nationalisation destroyed the 
indigenous management of private forests in the hills and deprived the local people of rights 
and authorities to a share of the benefits obtained from forests. This meant open access to 
forests. However, due to the shifting of the management system from one pattern to another, 
there was a need for efficient forest officers and leaders to implement the aims of the Act 
(Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; A. L. Joshi, 1993). However, due to inefficient and insufficient 
manpower in the forestry sector, the forest land could not be removed from the royal family 
and Rana relatives in the Terai. In 1960, the juvenile democracy was replaced by the 
Panchyat party-less political system by King Mahendra. The Forest Act 1961 was 
formulated with a special feature that prescribed several types of penalties (A. L. Joshi, 
1993). In an attempt to further strengthen the role of forest officials and the forest department 
in controlling deforestation, the Protection (Special Provision) Act 1967 was promulgated (A. 
L. Joshi, 1993). This Act contained a strong rider and intense penalties for any person who 
entered forests for even a small forest product without official permission. None of the Acts 
and Regulations of the government was able to produce the desired results for the sustainable 
management of forests.  
 
In 1962, the Operational Forest Management Plan (OFMP) was developed by the Department 
of Forests (A. L. Joshi, 1993). However, it was never implemented due to a lack of political 
commitment and the inability of foresters in the Department of Forest (DoF) to convince the 
politicians and local communities to implement it even though the OFMP was favoured by 
local communities (A. L. Joshi, 1993; K. Singh, 1988). The removal of malaria in the Terai 
throughout the 1950s and the 1960s encouraged a huge migration of people from the 
mountains and hills to the Terai in search of fertile agricultural land (Gautam, et al., 2004). 
From 1950 to 1980, a total of 103,968 ha of forest in the Siwaliks and the Terai were cleared 
under settlement programmes (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989).  An additional 
100,000 ha were illegally encroached on during the same period by powerful landholders in 
the hills and mountains in the name of the Sukumbashi (homeless and landless) (A. L. Joshi, 
1993). The intention of those settlement programmes was to settle the political elite who 
supported the party-less system of King Mahendra (K. Singh, 1988). In practice, the policy 
indirectly encouraged illegal encroachment of forests for cultivation (W. J. Jackson & Ingles, 
1995). The people encroached on the forest land with the hope of registering the land as 
private property once the land was cleared and cultivated (Baland, et al., 2007; Wallace, 
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1981). Consequently, all factors for the degradation of Nepalese forests, including 
encroachment and settlement, came together quickly. Between 1947 and 1976, Nepal’s forest 
cover declined from 57% to 23% of the national area (Upadhyay, Sankhayan, & Solberg, 
2005). 
 
From 1977 to 1988 
 
After a series of international meetings, the Seventh World Forestry Congress meeting was 
held in Buenos Aires in 1972 with the theme “Forest for Socio-Economic Development” 
(Food & Agriculture Organisation, 1978). It placed emphasis on forestry for increasing 
agricultural production, supply of energy, and generation of employment by creating a 
sustainable ecosystem. Similarly, the Eighth World Forestry Congress meeting in 1978 
concluded with the outcome “Forest for People” that guided the Nepalese Government to 
recognise the need for people participation in rural development, including forestry projects, 
with the emphasis on a “bottom up” approach to overall planning and implementation. The 
following statement illustrates the importance of forestry for rural development  
 
“Forest development will be consciously directed towards the rural development and 
eradication of poverty…governments should lend support to institutionalise self-
reliant mechanism…based on endogenous decision-making and the full participation 
of rural people” (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 1980, p.9). 
 
In 1978, the World Bank projected a similar vein in the “Theory of Himalayan 
Environmental Degradation” stating that hills and Terai (plain) forest of Nepal would be 
entirely depleted within 15 to 25 years (Devkota, 2005). The national forestry inventory 
(NFI) of 1998 with the previous land use study - 1978-1979 Land Resource Mapping Project 
(Land Resource Mapping Project, 1986) led to the conclusion shown in Table 2.1 that forest 
cover decreased at an annual rate of 1.8% and shrub land decreased 0.5% between 1978 and 
1994. 
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Table 2.1 The annual percent decrease in forest and shrubland area in Nepal in various 
time periods 
Region Category of area Decreased area (%)  Period 
Terai  Forest   1.3 1978-1979  to 1990-1991 
Hills Forest 2.3 1978-1979  to 1994 
Average Forest 1.8 1978-1979  to 1994 
Terai Forest and shrub together 0.8 1978-1979  to 1990- 1991 
Hills Forest and shrub together 0.2 1978-1979 to 1990-1994 
Average Forest and shrub together 0.5 1978-1979 to 1990-1994 
 
Sources: (Acharya & Dangi, 2009; Devkota, 2005) 
 
The reasons behind this forest loss were population growth and increased demand for forest 
products. According to the 10
th
 population census conducted in June 2001 the population of 
23,214,681 was an increase of 5 million since the 1991 census, with an average annual 
growth rate of 2.3%. The annual per capita consumption of firewood in mountains was 
estimated at 640 kg, but the average in Terai was 479 kg (Devkota, 2005). The per capita 
consumption of timber was estimated 0.11 m
3
 in Nepal (Ministry of Population & 
Environment, 2004).  
 
Okley (1987)  advocated that rural people are not only the solution and resources but they are 
also an asset for Natural Resource Management (NRM). More importantly, some factors led 
to the failure of industrial forestry in Nepal and led to socio-economic deterioration and an 
increasing rate of deforestation. On the other hand, because rural people had been preserving 
indigenous skills and knowledge for forest management; giving people responsibility for 
forest management by promoting natural and artificial regeneration and sustainable use of 
woodlots would enhance the institutional capacity of people (Johann, 2007; Kagoda, 
2009).These were the causative factors that developed the concept of people participation in 
forestry management in Nepal. 
 
While traditional forestry management approaches and gap analyses were presented in the 
debate at the National Forester Conference, which all District Forest Officers (DFO) and 
senior foresters of the Ministry attended, one District Forest Officer of Sindhuplanchauk (the 
adjoining district to Kathmandu), T.B.S. Mahat, presented his experiences and shared with 
the conference members ideas that were quite revolutionary in the history of forest 
management in Nepal (Mahat et al., 1987). The district forest programme was supported by 
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the Nepal Australian Forestry Project (NAFP), in which local communities were involved in 
protection and management. The community involvement outcomes were quite encouraging 
in terms of forest protection, afforestation and the establishment of plantations.  
 
After careful consideration of the outcomes of the Sindhuplanchauk DFO, the conference 
eventually led to the formulation of the National Forestry Plan 1976. This plan became a 
foundation for the revision of the Forest Act 1961, which was amended in 1977. It accepted 
the involvement of local communities with various categories of forest management schemes 
including Panchayat Forest (PF), Panchayat Protected Forest (PPF), leasehold forestry and 
private forestry. The government developed a plan that recognised the role of local 
participation in forest management (B. K. Pokharel, 1997). It can be claimed that CF in Nepal 
was officially legalised by the Nepalese Government in 1978. The government of Nepal 
invited international donor agencies to support the CF programmes. As a result, many 
agencies including the World Bank, FAO/IBRD, DANIDA, and GTZ, agreed to support the 
forestry programme, including rural development activities like KHARDEP in the east and 
KBIDP in the west of Nepal. 
 
In addition, forests were handed over to local leaders who represented the powerful 
Panchayat leaders. The main forest users, such as the poor and women, were unaware of the 
whole process so were excluded from it. In addition, the Panchayat was only between local 
politicians and the officer in-charge of the District Forestry Office (DFO) whose real interest 
was in the production and sale of commercially important timber rather than sustainable 
management to meet local needs. Such commercial interests could not be met by these forests 
under such policies (Springate-Baginski, Dev, Yadav, & Soussan, 2003). 
 
Despite the Forest Act, regulations and forest officials with a similar judicial role to police, 
the Forest Service remained ineffective in managing forests. The service was neither able to 
protect the existing forests nor was it able to place the forests under sound technical or active 
management. Consequently, the Master Plan of the Forestry Sector was developed in 1989. 
 
1989 onwards 
 
The Master Plan of the Forestry Sector (MPFS) was developed in 1988 and adopted in 1989 
to legalize the participation of local people. The main attributes of the MPFS were to meet 
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the basic needs for forest products by local people through CF. The other objectives of the 
master plan were to:  
 Hand over accessible forests to users and empower Community Forest User Groups 
(CFUGs) to manage the forest resources; 
 Give CFUGs all benefits from the handed-over forests; and 
 Convert the entire forestry staff to work as facilitators and solicitors of CF.  
 
This was a turning point in the history of forest management in Nepal, with the Forest Act 
1993 and the Forest Regulations 1995 allowing the implementation of community forests. 
The Act and Regulations do not only recognize the CFUGs as legal institutions but also 
recognize participatory management of the CF as a means to satisfy the subsistence needs of 
CF products and generate cash to foster community-led local development (Kanel & Kandel, 
2004). However, the Department of Forest (DOF) issued a circular forbidding the extraction 
of any forest products from CF, even for subsistence needs, unless a forest inventory was 
performed (Gautam, et al., 2004; Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 2003). Recently, the Forest 
Policy Amendment Act 2001 imposed a 40% tax on forest products that were sold by CFUGs 
for commercial purposes. In 2003, the government introduced a Collaborative Forest 
Management Plan (CFMP) for the Terai, inner Terai, and Churia hill forests. A large forest 
block of Terai’s valuable timber species would be managed under the CFMP whereas barren 
land, shrub land, and isolated forest patches would be handed over for CF (Acharya & 
Acharya, 2007; Gautam, et al., 2004). Several opposition groups such as lawyer groups, the 
Federation of Community Forest Users in Nepal (FECOFUN) (particularly) and others, were 
strongly opposed to the government’s policy. Many researchers and scholars have also 
criticised the new policy (Gautam, et al., 2004; Luintel & Chhetri, 2008; Springate-Baginski 
& Blaikie, 2003). Hence, in 2009, the government had to retreat from the CMFP and came 
with commitments to hand over the forests to local users. 
2.7 Social Structure of Nepal 
Social structure and stratification are sociological terms for the hierarchical arrangement of 
social classes, castes and strata within a society (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 2000). Nepal 
is a heterogeneous society with a complex ethnic mix, overlain by disparities in social and 
economic opportunities. The social organisational working concept of Nepalese society is 
based on a culture and castes that heavily affect modernisation of the nation (Gurung, 2005). 
Pradhan and Shrestha (2005) and Bistha (1991) observed that the castes, women and the gaps 
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between rich and poor, high caste and low caste, untouchable and pure, are especially 
retarding Nepal’s effort to develop and are, in fact, increasing the economic disparity among 
different sections of the people. Several governmental, non-governmental and social 
organizations cannot separately perform their activities beyond these structures in society.  
 
Nepali society is based on legal hierarchical structures and the social exclusion of the ‘lower’ 
castes, women, ethnic communities, and non-Nepali speaking communities from state 
administration and land since 1814 AD (Bistha, 1991; Pradhan & Shrestha, 2005). These 
structures include Hindu religious law and, increasingly, customary law. Several ethnic 
groups have been more discriminated against by the elite, especially the dominant 
Parbatiyas
5
 (Pradhan & Shrestha, 2005).  
 
The caste and class system in Nepal itself imposes further constraints on the ability of people 
to keep contractual relations because of collective pressures that compromise the ability of 
people to perform responsibly. The services of the lower castes always accede to the demands 
made by people of higher status than themselves (Bistha, 1991). Lower castes and women 
form a disadvantaged group whereas men of higher castes have all the power. This makes the 
participation of people in development activities and the sharing of benefits of development 
much harder for low caste groups and women (Banjade, Luintel, & Neupane, 2004). These 
conventional practices are rooted in every social organisation. In the management and control 
of natural resources in Himanchal Pradesh in India, Hunt (2006) found that social-political 
status through stratification of castes within village populations needed to be understood in 
order for policy-makers to establish local institutions for rural development. Local institutions 
have previously shaped how the rural populace responded to environmental conservation and 
Natural Resource Management (NRM). They are also the mechanisms that translate the 
impact of future external interventions to facilitate adaptation to NRM. Because adaptation to 
NRM is local, it is critically important to understand the role of local institutions in shaping 
adaptation and improving the capacities of the most vulnerable social groups (Baland & 
Plateau, 1996). The next section explains the contribution of local institutions. 
2.8 CFUG Organisations 
After the massive deforestation in tropical countries and the collapse of the Californian 
sardine fishery and other ocean fisheries, a scholarly consensus emerged that successful local 
                                                 
5. Parbatiyas is a group of castes (Bahun, Thakuri and Chhetry) who originally spoke the Nepali language. 
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level organization of stakeholders is necessary to resolve problems and to derive management 
plans for Common Property Regimes (Ostrom, 2001). Institution refers to groups of people, 
players and similar interested groups of people who come together for a common goal and 
purpose or to achieve specific objectives (Barney, 1986; Bromley, 1989).  
 
Community-based management of forests, in the form of conventional or indigenous systems, 
has a long history in Nepal (Arnold & Campbell, 1986; Fisher, 1989; Gilmour, 1990; 
Messrschmidt, 1993). This institution is known by various names according to regions. For 
example, the Kipat system of forest management was well established in eastern Nepal, 
particularly in the Koshi Hills (A. L. Joshi, 1993). Similarly, in the west, the Talukdar and 
Jimbal Mukhiya systems of forest controllers were recognized, particularly in the Dhaulagiri 
zone (Fisher, 1989). The Birtabal and Raikar systems were well known in Terai region of 
Nepal (Metz, 1991). 
 
In contemporary CF, the Community Forestry User Group (CFUG) is an institution that has 
an executive committee (EC). The composition of the EC is a critical aspect of the process 
(Messrschmidt, 1993). In principle, it must comprise a good representation of all sectors of 
the users or stakeholders (Fisher, 1989; Gilmour, 1990). It must be active and the members 
must believe that it serves a purpose. It comprises a chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, 
treasurer and several members. It is a team of 7 to 11 members, or sometimes more, 
depending on the population and hamlets of users. The configuration, position, and method of 
selection of the EC (of the CFUG) members reflects their selection and election by the users’ 
assembly. However, the present institutions encompass political party members and the elite 
and wealthier who are selected for the EC of the CFUGs; very few social workers, women 
and poor members are selected as representatives of these groups (Bartley, Andersson, 
Jagger, & Van Laerhoven, 2008; Brown, et al., 2002). The committee comprises the elite and 
powerful people of the society who can easily influence the decision-making of the CFUGs to 
share benefits with the poor and disadvantaged. Malla et al.(2005) argued that different 
approaches are needed in order to address these organisational issues of the CFUGs and the 
limitations of the community as a vehicle for empowering the poor. It is not at all clear, at 
present, which of the various alternatives put forward could be more effective and successful 
in distributing benefits to the poor from CF.  
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2.9 Contributions from Other Studies 
Many governments in the developing world and stakeholders are working for common 
property regimes expecting that local level institutions can perform a better role in the 
regeneration, restoration and protection of natural resources (Chakraborty, 2001). The value 
of local institutions is more important for developing countries, including Nepal, where land 
resources are institutionally and geographically limited, to meet the basic needs of the people 
(Food & Agriculture Organisation, 2002). Campbell and Shackleton (2001) argued that 
“social stratification such as race, status, caste, class and gender are outcomes of local 
institutions”. Institutions also include social systems including economic, legal, political, 
cultural and other systems (Giddens, 1979).  
 
Scholars working for participatory management of forests have studied these contexts. The 
study findings that are relevant here are as follows. Most studies done so far in common 
property issues have focused on the factors determining the success of common property 
management (Chakraborty, 2001). For example, Adhikari et al. (2004) studied poverty, 
property and collective action; the distributive aspects of common property resource 
management at household level factors determining community forest benefit distribution. 
This study examined broad concerns by investigating whether the recent policy shift toward 
CF resource management in Nepal had increased households’ access to resources. This study 
also concentrated particularly on distribution problems at the household level. Maskey et al. 
(2006) studied the amount of household participation in the decision-making of a forest user 
group that was then analysed for benefit distribution. Bajracharya (2008) studied the 
institutional factors that influenced the access by the poor to forest benefits, legal customary 
rights and the network of lower castes. Her findings were based on a case study of some CF 
and Leasehold Forestry regimes that emphasised the development of networks and the active 
participation of the poor and lower castes in CF and leasehold forestry programmes.  
 
Iversen et al. (2006) studied whether the handover of forests to the local community in Terai 
was suitable. The underlying cause was that Terai forestry resources are extremely valuable 
and the Department of Forests has been reluctant to allow CF there because of the loss of a 
valuable revenue source. This research was conducted in the Nawalparashi and Rupadehi 
districts in mid-western Terai with a small sample size and, on purpose, qualitative data were 
collected to explore the impacts of site contrasts on forest condition, forest values, and the 
role of NGOs in group formation within the buffer zone. Jones (2007) examined three 
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community user groups to meet the objectives of the buffer zone concept surrounding the 
Chitwan National Park. His findings explained that the national policy did not create an 
appropriate environment to achieve downward accountability, transparency and fairness. 
 
The effects of social and institutional structures in determining decision-making and benefit 
distribution to the poorer and underprivileged groups of society have not yet been studied. 
This study attempts to explain the problem of social structural factors at the household level 
to determine leadership positions and institutional factors in the CFUG institutions that  
determine benefit distribution particularly to the poor and underprivileged groups of the 
society. The study may also identify some issues in benefit distribution of common property 
for further study. The benefits of common property are valuable for the livelihoods of many 
people. 
2.10 Conclusions about Resources and the Economic Setting 
Land use, forest resources and the socio-economic situation of the nation vary in each 
ecological zone. In Nepal, forest covers about 4.27 million hectares (29%) and shrub covers 
1.56 million hectares (10.6%); the total forest and shrub cover is 39.6% of a total land area of 
14.72 million hectares (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 1989). In Nepal in 2008, there were 
16,840 CFUGs with 1,711,097 households in 74 out of 75 districts covering 1,217,172 
hectares of forest land (A. Paudel & Weiss, 2011). Nepal largely has a subsistence economy.  
 
Social structures and stratification are the hierarchical arrangement of a society. Lower castes 
and women form a disadvantaged group; men of higher castes have all the power. This makes 
participation of people in development activities and the sharing of benefits of development 
much harder for low castes and disadvantaged groups (Banjade, et al., 2004).  
 
Humans and forests have always had a multifaceted relationship. Various forest policies and 
legislation to manage forests and solve the needs of local people have been produced. 
However, they are neither able to protect the existing forests nor place the forest under sound 
technical or active management. Nepal’s forest cover has declined from 57% to 23% of the 
national area (Metz, 1991). The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) was officially 
implemented in 1989. The main attributes of the MPFS were to meet the basic needs for 
forest products by local people through CF, hand over accessible forests to users, and 
empower CFUGs to manage the forest resources. In contemporary CF, the CFUG is an 
institution that has an Executive Committee (EC). 
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The main problems of the leaders are the elite who favour decision-making attributes that are 
rooted in Nepalese social structure. They comprise the CFUG as a “grass roots” level 
institution to form a participatory democracy. All CFUG members meet once every two years 
to elect/select members of the EC who are responsible for CF products and the distribution of 
other benefits, implementation of the CF operational plan, managing the forest protection 
scheme, managing harvest operations, working with the line government and NGOs/CBO 
agencies’ personnel when needed. The EC also has a responsibility to manage the 
expenditure for local development and be user friendly, particularly to the poor and 
underprivileged users of the CFUG. However, in practice, the elite and powerful people of 
the society can easily influence the decisions about benefit distribution by simply being 
selected for the EC of the CFUGs. Adhikari and Di Falco (2009), Agrawal (2001) and 
Sapkota and Oden (2008) claimed that there has not been equitable distribution of the 
benefits of forest products and other benefits from CF. 
 
In contrast, where the NGOs have strengthened local communities at a grass roots level, 
particularly disadvantaged households, through motivation, training and workshops, poor and 
marginalised households have greater participation in the EC (Balooni, Lund, Kumar, & 
Inoue, 2010; Ojha, Cameron, & Kumar, 2009; Thoms, 2008). They argued that NGOs, using 
a multi-pronged approach that involves analysis and self-reflection about the capacity of the 
poor to voice their opinions and choices in decision-making, brings a fundamental change in 
a CFUG organisation. When the voice of the poor can be heard through membership on the 
EC and equal participation in decision-making processes, they are able to claim equitable 
benefits from CF (Adhikari, 2005; Naidu, 2009).  
 
These factors underpin the focus of this thesis on the role of the poor in decision-making in 
CFUGs. The key factors that need to be studied are:  
 
 Whether there are factors not related to the wealth or castes that increase the 
likelihood of being on the EC. 
 What the effects are on the benefits flowing to the poor when the EC has the more 
disadvantaged members represented in decision-making.  
 
  
28 
 
In order to study these factors and to address the research hypotheses, an analytical 
framework that incorporates the relevant theories about the behaviour of decision-makers is 
required. This is covered in the next chapter. 
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     Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction  
As explained in the previous chapter, it is not well understood whether the social and 
institutional structure of CFUGs constrains decision-making and the distribution of benefits to 
poor and underprivileged households. This chapter endeavours to formulate a conceptual 
framework to examine the hypotheses described in Chapter 1.  
   
Societies are composed of social groups including class, caste and ethnicity, with diverse 
religious, social and cultural attitudes, beliefs, identities and values that determine power 
relationships to access and control resources (Bistha, 1991). Social exclusions and 
discrimination depend on social structures, norms, values and leaders’ behaviour. Social 
leaders play critical roles by exercising their power and influence in societal and institutional 
decision-making processes that might exclude certain groups from full participation in the 
society. The role of social and institutional decision-making processes leads to exclusion and 
the deprivation of poor and lower castes when the leaders of the elite with wealth, often 
linked to their caste; do not address the needs of poorer people. For example, Bennett (2005) 
found that Janjati and Madhesi presence in parliament in Nepal is limited and does not match 
their proportion in the population. Dalit, however, are almost entirely absent from parliament 
and have had only one representative during the multi-party period 1990 to 2005. Bennett 
(2005) further asserted that the domination by the elite caste (Bahun, Chhetary) has also 
increased in the civil service in Nepal from 70% to 90% between 1985 and 2002.  
 
Over the last three decades, it has become understood that the social structure and its 
composition with class configurations are correlated with decision-making and benefit 
distribution from the CBNRM (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Ostrom, 2007). Decision-making 
processes and benefit distribution can be analysed in various ways. Local CBNRM 
institutions carry out their functions through rules, regulations and working practices largely 
formulated by a small group of decision-makers who influence social organizations with 
regard to the distribution of the benefits of CBNRM (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 2009). 
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The elite have dominated decision-making in Nepal for centuries. The Community Forestry 
Programme in Nepal is based on people’s participation (Master Plan for Forestry Sector, 
1989). The main principle of the participatory approach was to involve the poor and 
underprivileged people in the decision-making process so that it could lead to proper benefit 
distribution from CF to those households (B. Bhattarai, Dhungana, & Kafle, 2007). The 
purpose of this research is to assess whether the poor and disadvantaged households have 
been able to participate in decision-making and whether this is linked to the benefits derived 
from CF. In other words, this study attempts to determine whether the CF programme has 
changed the traditional system of elite power.  
 
Similarly, the Forestry Development Programme has also rapidly changed between the 1950s 
and 1970s to focus community development on poverty alleviation, largely in the context of 
social and economic development. However, currently, the community development strategy 
is also addressing the active participation of poor people in community development 
programmes for sustainable livelihood and poverty alleviation at the community level 
(Brocklesby & Fisher, 2003; Department for International Development, 2000, 2003; Food & 
Agriculture Organisation, 1980). Thus, it is important to understand what is meant by 
people’s participation.  
3.2 People’s Participation  
The concept of the participatory approach emerged towards the end of the 1980s with the 
notion of Participatory Development or Participation in Development (Oakley, 1995). Oakley 
(1995) advocated participation regarding rural development as follows: 
 
“Participation includes people’s involvement suggested in the key stages in the participation processes, 
decision-making, implementation programmes and sharing in the benefits for the development programmes, 
and the involvement in efforts to evaluate such programmes” (, p.8). 
 
The major development agencies, like the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World 
Bank, and United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have “latched on” to the concept of 
participatory development and have begun to see it as an, “antidote to the woes which befall 
their development programmes” (Oakley, 1995, p.7). Participation is perceived as a key 
indicator of a socially healthy, engaged, and equal society (Perkins, Hughey, & Speer, 2002). 
In contemporary rural development, participation has provided an emphasis on the capacity 
building of rural people based on community-based initiatives and partnerships (Oakley, 
  
31 
 
1995). People’s participation involves empowerment of the rural people for the contribution 
to and sharing of benefits from the development activities through local organisations such as 
forest user groups, co-operatives, farmers’ associations, irrigation management committees, 
drinking water committees, and health committees (Oakley, 1991).  
 
Collectively, these concepts emphasize a new paradigm of community participation to engage 
rural people, including the poor and underprivileged groups, in a dialogue about power, 
inequality and oppression. Priorities and actions are decided by local people themselves rather 
than outsiders, which empowers them for collective decision-making (Brocklesby & Fisher, 
2003; Chambers, 1983). 
 
Asian Development Bank (1999) explained that, over the last four decades, a series of 
bilateral projects and international NGOs have supported the Nepalese government with 
projects like the Koshi Hills Development Programme (KHDP) and its successor the Koshi 
Hills Area Rural Development Programme (KHARDEP). The UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) has supported the forest sector of Nepal since 1979 
through different projects, including the Livelihood and Forestry Programme (LFP). Other 
bilateral projects such as the Sagarmatha Integrated Rural Development Programme (SIRDP), 
Rasua Nuwakot Integrated Rural Development Programme (RNRDIP), Rapti Integrated Rural 
Development Programmes (RIRDP), Karnali Bheri Integrated Rural Development 
Programme (K-BIRD), Integrated Hills Development Programme (IHDP), Seti and Mahakali 
Integrated Rural Development (S/MIRD), World Bank, Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
have been working for the inclusion of the poor and underprivileged groups of society as 
equal participants in decision-making and equitable access to forest resources (Amatya, 
1989). Despite the introduction of the participatory approach four decades ago, its desired 
effect of involving the poor, women and disadvantaged groups of the CFUGs in the 
management of forest resources and the decision-making process has not been as expected.  
3.2.1 Forestry Development Programmes Towards Sustainable Livelihoods 
and Poverty Alleviation  
Forestry development programmes have also consciously been directed towards sustainable 
livelihood to alleviate poverty. Many studies have provided evidence on the roles of forests in 
rural livelihoods. The governments of developing countries have also recognised the 
livelihood needs of rural people with forestry development activities that focused on the 
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alleviation of poverty through CF, social forestry and joint forest management activities. 
Currently, projects related to the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) and Payment for Environmental Services (PES) are important for 
developing programmes for sustainable livelihoods and poverty alleviation worldwide (Blom, 
Sunderland, & Murdiyarso, 2010). Similarly, in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
programme conducted by UNDP, attention has been more focused on the possible link 
between poverty alleviation and income from forest products (Yemiru, Roos, Campbell, & 
Bohlin, 2010). The main policy document in Nepal, the MPFS 1989, is guided by the 
participatory approach. It is a commitment by the Nepalese government to ensure the 
participation of poor people in decisions. The government has also formulated various laws 
such as the Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulations 1995, and given several government 
directives towards the implementation of forest management activities through the full 
participation of local communities.  
 
A CFUG serves as a local organisation for community forest management. It has been 
designed to make equal participation of people from all sectors of a stratified society in 
decision-making for the distribution of the benefits derived from CF (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 
2009; Dayton-Johnson & Bardhan, 2002; Malla, et al., 2005). However, in practice, it is 
believed that collective action is exercised by the wealthy and caste elite leaders of the CFUG 
rather than all members. The CFUG organisations are formed with certain rules, regulations 
and norms, however, the way these are put into practice might have been influenced by the 
elite. They usually dominate positions and exercise their power and influence on decisions. In 
order to understand how the elite behave and manage institutions it is useful to look at models 
of elites and how they are correlated with institutions like CFUGs.  
3.3 Models of Elite Behaviour 
Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, Italian political scientists and sociologists, are well 
known as pioneer spokesmen for elite theory (Malesevic, 2010). Both recognized that, in the 
history of modern society, there is a perpetual domination of the disorganised large group by 
an organised small group. Small group domination of the large group in society is known as 
elite orientated social stratification (Bottomore, 1964; Coleman, 2001). The different ranking 
of humans is a fundamental phenomenon of the social system. Coleman (1986) further 
explained that elite theory makes a possible connection about how social systems might be 
shaped by human will as:  
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“The functioning of the society as well as the engine of social change could be grounded in the 
purposive actions of the individual, taken in the particular institutional and structure setting that 
shaped the incentive and thus the actions” (Coleman, 1986, p.1310).  
 
Higley (2010) claimed that the origin of elite theory was seen most clearly in the writing of 
social and political philosophers of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, such as Gaetano Mosca (1858-
1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Robert Michels (1876-1936) and Max Weber (1864-
1920). Mosca (1939) highlighted the ways in which small minorities out-organise and 
outsmart large majorities. Higley (2010) explained that the political elite “usually have a 
certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” ( p.161). Pareto suggested that there 
is an unrestricted social mobility in a society whereby the elite would consist of the most 
talented and deserving individuals (Higley & Burton, 2006).  
 
Though individual behaviour (cognition) is fairly well understood, group or cooperative 
behaviour (social/cultural) is an active area of research in order to find solutions to the benefit 
distribution problems of public goods (Giddens, 1976; Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). 
The theories of society and human social action include social rules and processes and how 
these rules and processes develop and organise people in society (Bruins, 1999; Coleman, 
2001; Vromen & Collin, 2010). The functions of institutions are supposed to be strongly 
related to the welfare of society (Ostrom, et al., 1994; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 2005; 
Sztompka, 1994).   
 
Elite theory is used to examine how power relationships are composed, how the exclusion of 
non-elite social groups from decision-making positions occurs and the way in which elite 
groups’ influence is exercised (Chandler, 2007; Farazmand, 1999). Scholars have developed 
various definitions of elite on the basis of function and background. Some pertinent 
definitions of the elite are discussed below. 
 
Elite is from the Latin eligere, "to elect" (Korvenoja, 1993). The concept of elite was 
developed by Mosca (1896) who introduced the term classe dirigente or ruling class to 
describe the power of the ruling minority (Scott, 2008).  
 
The elite are represented by a small group of individuals from society at large (Brannelly, 
Lewis, & Ndaruhutse, 2011; Dahl, 1957, 1958; Farazmand, 1999; Higley, 2010; Mills, 1956; 
Mosca, 1896, 1939; Pareto, 1935, 1968, 1973, 1991; Porter, 1955; Putnam, 1971, 1976) . The 
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dimensions of their decisions are based on their interests and preferences and they influence 
decisions that affect outcomes. It means that a class of a few people rule a more numerous 
class of people who are ruled, directed and controlled by the few.  
 
The elite concept can be applied to the context of this research, since caste and wealth are 
inherent characteristics of the elite in Nepalese society. The Bahun, Chhetry, Newar and 
Thakuri are identified as the elite who comprise 25% of the population and dominate the rest 
of the population (Lawoti, 2003; K. K. Shrestha, 2009; Toffin, 2008). They manipulate the 
societal apparatus including policies, the constitution and social values, and control resources 
(Bistha, 1991; Lawoti, 2003). In the next section, the role of the caste elite linked to wealth 
and the wealthy elite created social structure institutions are reviewed. 
3.4 Caste and Wealth as an Elite in Nepal  
One of influencing social institutions is the caste system, which is common, particularly in 
South Asia including Nepal and India. The word “caste” is derived from the Portuguese term 
‘casta’ which means breed or race (Bistha, 1991). It is a group of people characterised by 
endogamy, hereditary membership and a specific style of life and is usually associated with 
ritual status in hierarchical systems based on purity and pollution (Dirks, 2001). According to 
Hindu spiritualism, the caste system is classified into four main Varna, i.e. groups of people; 
Brahmins
6
 (primarily priests); Kshataryias
7
 (warriors); Vaishias
8
 (businessmen) and Shudras
9 
(lower caste artisans and manual labourers). The untouchable people lie outside this caste 
system; they cannot perform ritual activities because they are considered impure (polluted). 
According to Dirks (2001), the division stands beyond Hinduism. Though the caste system 
gives a connotation of a hierarchy of a ‘ritual and pollution’ status, in reality it was an 
ethnicity-based division of hierarchical roles in society. Hence, the caste system has an 
important role in India and Nepal in terms of the exact nature of each caste and its 
relationship to the others. A person’s caste status impacts on his/her activities in variety of 
fields. For example, Stuart (2007) found that only two of 27 presidents in India were of lower 
caste; hence the lower caste is under represented at the leadership level. Bennett (2005) found 
                                                 
6. "Scholarly community," includes the gurus, priests, scholars, teachers, law specialists, ministers, and diplomats. 
7. Kshatriyas - "high and lower nobility" includes kings, noblemen, soldiers, and administrators. 
8. Vaishyas - "mercantile and artisan community" includes merchants, shopkeepers, businessmen and farm owners. 
9. Shudras - "service-providing community" those who provided other services to 9 Shudras - "service-providing 
community" those who provided other services to society including, but certainly not limited to, manual labour. 
 Source: Dirks (2001). 
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that, during 1990-2005, there was only one member in the Nepalese parliament from Dalit. 
Wealth and social power made a difference in capacity between castes to participate in and 
influence social the decision-making processes. 
There are some conflicts in policy principles and social practices. On the one hand, Nepal 
stresses multicultural and diverse ethnicity, but, on the other hand, there is societal conflict 
between the higher castes (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Newar and Thakuri) and the lower castes 
(Dalit: untouchable). Similarly, there is also conflict and spiritual and domestic injustice 
between Hindu and Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim, and the Pahadiya (hill people), and 
Madheshi (plains people).  
  
The caste system has forced many ethnic groups (e.g. Dalit, Janjati and Madhesi) into lower 
social status and poverty (A. Shrestha, 2002). The Dalit and lower castes are basically 
shunned from society (Rao, 2010). For example, Dalits find it very difficult to get a public 
job, and, if somehow they get one, they are forbidden from holding the job because an 
untouchable caste is a person with basically no rights (Rao, 2010). Another rule within the 
caste system is that Brahmins are not supposed to marry outside their caste. This notion may 
be one of the factors that maintain poverty in Nepalese society. The main reason could be that 
Nepalese society is structured to keep this tradition going. Rao (2010) explained that the 
inability to marry a person from the untouchable caste further traps those people within their 
poverty. Furthermore, due to the caste system, Dalit and several lower castes such as 
blacksmith, goldsmith, tailors, shoemakers, fishers and cleaners are assigned to low income 
jobs. Often in Nepalese society under the Halia Pratha (landlord system) lower castes and the 
poor are forced to work as servants for their landlord (Nepali & Subba, 2005).  
There are many other reasons why Dalit and lower castes in Nepal are trapped in poverty. For 
example, due to a lack of sufficient education, very few teachers belong to the Dalit and lower 
castes. Dalit children often find it difficult to gain a good education. In some communities, 
teachers who belong to higher castes (Brahmin, Chhetri, Newar, and Thakuri) do not pay 
attention to their Dalit and lower caste pupils. For example, Dalit pupils are not allowed to sit 
next to a higher caste pupil in their class (A. Shrestha, 2002). Rao (2010) explained that when 
Dalit pupils are interested in buying food at school they have to stand in separate queues. The 
same sort of separation occurs in other social development activities for the Dalit and lower 
caste households in Nepal. Rao (2010) also found that when good officials try to address the 
requirements of the Dalit then they are often insulted by their colleagues and seniors. The 
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effects of the caste system in social development programmes are slowly being exterminated, 
but changes are still met with a rigid stance in many parts of the country.  
 
Most citizens from the underprivileged socio-cultural groups are excluded from almost all the 
significant realms of society in Nepal (Lawoti, 2001, 2003; Nepali & Subba, 2005). Table 3.1 
shows the exclusion of the Madhesi, an indigenous people, and the Dalit from all influential 
realms of policy and institutions (parliament, judiciary, cabinet, constitutional commissions, 
administration, security, media, human rights and business and industry sectors).  
For example, the caste Hill Hindu Elite (CHHE) representation was 30.89% in the 2001 
census but, on average, they occupied two thirds of the different elite positions, which 
represents more than double their proportion of the population. In the top positions of the 
public service, judiciary, security forces, education and leadership, over 75% are dominated 
by CHHE. Non-elite groups face exclusion in every influential sphere. On average, 
indigenous people (Mangol, Kirat: Rai, Limbu, Sherpa) represent 7.1% of positions in 
Nepalese institutions (population share 22.2%) and Madhesi represent 11.2% (population 
share 30.9%). The Dalit were not even represented at the 1% level although they are 8.7% of 
the population. The Dalit are less than 2% of the Upper House. Likewise, not a single position 
is occupied by Dalit in the public service, constitutional commission and the science and 
technology sector of Nepalese institutions.  
 
In summary, it can be seen that social structure in Nepalese society plays a crucial role in 
gaining power. The elite caste and wealthier households are able to influence decisions, 
access public resources and capture influential institutions such as parliament, the judiciary, 
cabinet, constitutional commissions, administration, security, media, human rights, and 
business and industry sectors. The disadvantaged and poor groups are generally excluded 
from significant realms of institutions, policies, norms and systems. In order to understand 
how elite power structures form, the effect this might have on CFUG governance and whether 
there are opportunities for non-traditional elite or leadership roles to emerge that might help 
the poor and disadvantaged, it is important to look at the theories of elite. This includes 
models of elite and how those models explain the role of poor and disadvantages members to 
receive greater benefits from public goods. 
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Table 3.1 Integrated national index of governance: the representation of vaarious castes in inluential positions in Nepal 
 
Institutions CHHE Dalit Madhesi Newar Indigenous Other Total 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %  
Judiciary, Supreme, Appellate, 
District 
181 77.0 0 0.0 18 7.7 32 13.6 4 1.7   235 
Constitutional Commissions 14 56.0 0 0.0 3 12.0 6 24 2 8   25 
Cabinet 20 62.5 0 0.0 5 15.6 3 9.4 4 12.5   32 
Parliament lower and upper 159 60.0 4 1.5 46 17.4 20 7.6 36 13.6   265 
Public service and Security force elite 190 77.6 0 0.0 9 3.7 43 17.6 3 1.2   245 
Central committee of National Party 97 58.8 0 0.0 26 17.8 18 10.9 25 15.2   165 
DDC Chair/Vice, Mayor, Deputy 106 55.5 0 0.0 31 16.2 30 15.7 23 12   191 
Industry commerce leadership 7 16.7 0 0.0 15 35.7 20 47.6 0 0   42 
Educational leadership 75 77.3 1 0.0 7 7.2 11 11.3 2 2.1 1 1 97 
Cultural ;leadership 85 69.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 22 17.9 6 4.9   123 
Science /Technology Leadership 36 58.0 0 0.0 6 9.7 18 29 2 3.2   62 
Civil Society Leadership 41 75.9 0 0.0 4 7.4 8 14.8 1 1.9   54 
Total 1,011 66.5 5 0.3 170 11.2 231 15.2 108 7.1 1 0 1,5 
percentage (a) 66.5  0.3  11.2  15.2  7.1  0 100 
Population percent  (b) 31.6  8.7  30.9  5.6  22.2  0 100 
Difference percent (a-b) + 34.9  -8.4  19.7  9.6  -15.1  -1  
Domination ratio (a/b) 2.1  0.03  0.3  2.7  0.3    
 
DDC= District Development Committee. %=Percent 
 
Source: (Lawoti, 2003) 
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3.5 Models of Elite  
Sociology scholars have provided different visions about the behaviour of elite and their roles 
in an organisation. Due to various socio-economic, religious, ethnic, symbolic and political 
cultures, people’s behaviour, ideas, interests and preferences have been presented differently 
in the institutions established by society. One phenomenon that is common in all societies is 
the emergence of economic and social elite. In order to study the behaviour and effect of elite, 
theorists have developed a varied set of elite models that relate the notions, behaviour and 
decision-making power of individuals.  
 
Theorists about the elite start from a common definition: the elite are a powerful group of 
people who either outline or persuade decisions that influence the groups and national 
outcomes (Farazmand, 1999). These scholars have produced various definitions of elite for 
formulating and developing conceptual frameworks to examine and interpret elite behaviour. 
Power is an important attribute of all areas of society and institutions in modern societies that 
are correlated in one or another type with elite models. One of the earliest models of the elite 
was the political elite model devised by Guttsmann (1951). The political elite is a small group 
of people who influence state power through politics (Higley, 2010). Examples of political 
elite of modern states are the president, prime minister, ministers, state governors, and heads 
of government structures, regions, territories, diplomatic groups and organisations.  
 
Higley and Moore (1981), building on the earlier work on the political elite by Guttsmann 
(1951), and subsequent work by Main (1961) and Whitt (1979), divided the political elite 
model into four models of the elite - consensually integrated, plural, power and ruling. These 
models are mainly based on two dimensions. The first is the inclusiveness of personal 
interaction among the top position holders and major elite groups. The second is the structure 
of the interaction contacts between these individuals and groups. Working from the four elite 
models identified by Higley and Moore (1981), Farazmand (1999) developed a fifth 
‘organisational elite model’. In this model, the elite develop through organisations that 
provide power and control. The models are summarised in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of the features of elite models   
 
Circumstances Consensually Integrated Plural Power Ruling Class Organisational 
Type of network Comprehensive interaction network of 
formal and informal communication 
with all formal organisational top-level 
position holders. 
Simple interaction network 
among top level of elite 
policy makers as well as 
common people 
Simple interaction 
network is small and 
among the uppermost 
national level  elites only 
Simple interaction with 
small group of central 
level present in most 
significant decisions 
 
Comprehensive interaction 
network depending upon 
the characteristics and unit 
of organisation. 
Size of group Group relatively small and clearly 
centralised.  
 
Larger groups based on 
different decision 
locations. 
Small group centrally 
located.  
Small group both policy 
makers and 
implementers 
 
Small or large group 
depending upon the nature 
and entities of 
organisation.  
Frequency of 
interaction 
Frequent level of interaction Less frequent level of 
interaction 
Frequent level of 
interaction. 
Less frequent level of 
interaction 
Frequent level of 
interaction 
Type of 
interaction  
Cooperation and negotiation to form 
new elite, originate through dramatic 
and sudden changes in situation and 
attitude of the key group 
 
Formal cooperation for 
policy making  
Cooperation between 
uppermost level elite and 
operational level elite for 
implementation the 
directions of former one  
Cooperation between 
apex level of elite and 
second stratum elite for 
translation of policy. 
However, conflict occurs 
if contradict in ideology. 
Close cooperation between 
uppermost level elite and 
the operational elite. 
However, sometimes 
conflicts occurs to 
maintain elite cohesion by 
building consensus 
Characteristics of 
elites 
Complex family background, heredity 
power structural group united by 
ideology 
Different social, economic, 
cultural, symbolic and 
linguistic family 
background such as 
hereditary, hierarchy and 
endogamy. They join with 
one another to form 
organisations or groups for 
their common interests. 
Different family 
background that comes 
from biased mobilisation 
of social structure 
privileged for leadership 
through interclass 
marriage 
Family back ground is 
hegemony of political, 
social and symbolic 
sphere, patrimonial, and 
traditional elite 
Family background is 
radically different for 
people involved in apex 
level and local level 
organisation working for 
rural development such as 
forestry, drinking water 
schemes, health, irrigation 
and similar organisational 
context. However, local 
organisations are directed, 
controlled and dominated 
by the few local elite. 
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In the context of CF, a CFUG is subject to the influence of the elite who can exercise their 
power and dominate the organisation. In Nepal, the poor and disadvantaged members may 
find it difficult to challenge the decisions made by the elite because they depend heavily for 
their labour on farms owned by the elite (Kumar, 2002). There is also evidence that the CF 
rules made by elite weigh against the poor and disadvantaged members of the CFUG (Kumar, 
2002; Malla, et al., 2005). The models of elite behaviour and organisation thus have the 
potential to describe the role of the elite in CFUGs in Nepal. Each of the elite models will be 
discussed in detail and their application to the context of CFUG organisation in Nepal 
examined. 
3.5.1 Consensually Integrated Elite Model 
In the consensually integrated elite model, the elite comprise a comparatively small and 
noticeably centralised group in society. The decision-making powers are dispersed among 
various elite or, sometimes, the elite mutually access the power centres to influence decision-
making and achieve their objectives. There is a comprehensive interaction network with 
frequent formal and informal communication between the position holders and members. 
They come from a multifaceted family background, hereditary power structure group, and 
they are united by a similar ideology, attitudes and objectives that provide them opportunity 
for moving towards to close cooperation and negotiation to form new elite. 
 
In the consensually integrated elite model, the elite are characterised by being a 
comparatively small and centralised group, and who show situation-specific behaviour. In 
this model, the elite are assumed to share a largely implicit consensus about the rules and 
codes of political conduct, which gives them a reserved membership. Hazán (2001) found 
that the elite are interconnected by ideology. Higley and Moore (1981) and Cammack (1990) 
found that in consensually integrated elite model, power is dispersed among numerous elite 
groups. The elite have mutual access to power centres that account for controlled competition 
for power that leads to stability (Burton & Higley, 1987).  
 
An interaction network is a powerful set of tools or ways of describing and flowing messages 
about the characteristics of individuals and collective actors (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). 
Higley and Moore (1981) defined the consensually integrated elite model as that where “there 
is an inclusive network of formal and informal communication, friendship, and influence-
wielding among top position holders in all major elite groups (i.e. business, trade union, 
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political, governmental, mass media, voluntary association and academic elite)” (p.584). In 
the interaction network, there is a set of inherent assumptions about important issues 
including the micro and macro relationships between individuals, society and social activities 
(Higley, Hoffmann-Lange, Kadushin, & Moore, 1991). In the consensually integrated elite 
model, the interaction network is the ground where the related elite leaders, politicians, 
organisational chiefs and subordinates raise and produce their agendas for interaction in 
relation to the control and maintenance of power elite positions.  
 
The members of the elite group are integrated after a long process of frequent interaction 
among their members and come to conclusions by consensus for unification and settlement. 
The personal interactions and the consensus on values are the main attributes that are 
positively correlated for integration and to the fraction of the national, sector and local level 
elite. Elites are strongly integrated through a dense overlapping network that provides them 
satisfaction about access to most central decision makers (Hazán, 2001). 
 
Higley and Moore (1981) indicated that the consensually integrated elite model is suitable 
where the integration of the elite has occurred after a long process of fragmentation. The 
consensual elite model is suitable where there is a central social circle because the members 
of these circles influence policy formulation through interaction within the social circle. In 
both central social circles and national political subculture a unique subculture develops 
where the core subgroup can unify and interrelate.  
 
The consensual elite generally create a stable representative regime in which the elite 
compete for power in a representative body through elections. Cooperation and negotiation 
are the factors that integrate the consensually elite to form a new elite to resolve issues and to 
avoid conflict. Henderson (2010) found that indigenous variables, particularly family 
background, heredity, and the power structure of the reputable family in the society, were 
important in the formation of the consensual elite. Duffy, Binder and Skrentny (2010) stated 
that social movements and social change might be important factors for the emergence of the 
elite.  
 
The consensual leader believes his working pattern, ability, education and plan provides 
services to the citizens (Cammack, 1990). When the regimes are conducted in such a way that 
power is concentrated in the hands of one group or family and where opponents are 
suppressed, it leads to fragmentation of the consensually elite because the power located in a 
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representative body is transferred between factions through elections (Steen, 2002). 
Additionally, the polarisation of the consensual elite depends on infrequent interactions 
across factional or sector boundaries. Higley and Moore (1981) argued that separation of the 
consensual elite occurs if they are institutionally distinct, socially disparate or politically 
diverse. Separation can also be along religious lines and possibly geographical location 
(Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). 
 
In summary, in the consensually integrated elite model, powers are dispersed among the 
various elite. The elite have mutual access to power centres that account for controlled power 
competition to achieve their objectives. Cooperation and negotiation are the factors that 
integrate the consensually elite to form a new elite to resolve issues and to avoid conflicts. In 
this model, the elite comprise a comparatively small and centralised group in society. The 
separation of the consensual elite occurs if they are institutionally distinct, socially disparate, 
politically diverse or religiously split. In context of CF management, the consensually 
integrated elite model may be relevant because there are different elite groups in terms of 
wealth, outside employment or income, but who would otherwise have the same basic norms 
and beliefs as members of the same caste. 
3.5.2 Plural Elite Model 
The plural elite model assumes that many groups control the power structure. They come 
from different economic, social, cultural, symbolic and linguistic family backgrounds such as 
hereditary, hierarchy and endogamy (Anderson, Anderson, Friedrich, & Kim, 2010). The 
interaction network is also not centralized to one specific group. When individuals are 
capable of expressing their interests, they join with one another to form organisations or 
groups for their common interest. They may have different modes of thought, integrated with 
different concepts of the relations between individuals and the community since they reside 
on different locations.  
 
The plural elite model suggests both a convergence and differentiation of powers between 
members of the elite. Convergence is the tendency of elite to grow more alike in structures, 
processes and performance. The differentiation refers to the fact that the elite diverge from 
each other in terms of policies, processes and performance for their own interests (Giddens, 
1972; Parkin, 1972). The plural elite model helps to develop models of social systems 
characterised by hierarchical or oligarchical structures. There are two main ways that the 
plural elite situation is formed: one is in the context of traditional elite and the other in the 
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context of a new elite. The traditional plural elite are formed by the coexistence of 
distinguishing ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences between members of the 
elite (Stock, 2008). The traditional elite is the person, born in the upper class, who inherits the 
gifts of privileged culture and capital (the person can attend private school and operas) that 
enable him/her to reproduce the elite culture and specific status in society (Ahmad, 2010).  
 
The new elite are those who may have earned economic, social and culture capital but who 
does not have symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is an accumulation of economic capital that 
can be converted from one elite to another elite, ultimately in order to gain advantage in the 
form of additional wealth, power, allies and marriage partners (Bird & Smith, 2005). 
Symbolic capital can be referred to as the resources available to an individual on the basis of 
prestige or recognition. The new elite can gain such symbolic capital through performance in 
society.  
 
Like the consensually elite model, in this model the leaders of all the sectors, organisations 
and interest groups present themselves in interaction networks. The main attributes and 
promise of this model are that members represent the policy-making authorities from 
different decision locations and no single group of elite dominates the structure (Farazmand, 
1999; Higley & Moore, 1981). The interaction among the plural elite group is not consciously 
centralised in an “inner circle” or “core” group. The interaction between intrasector and 
intersector elite is considerably less frequent and is based on specific issues. The intrasector 
elite are located in different decision centres at the regional level whereas intersector elite are 
prominent leaders who participate in the interaction network at the core or central circle. The 
intrasector elite interaction is greater than the intersector interaction because of the sector 
autonomy; intersector interactions occur only in the government political elite.  
 
Farazmand (1999) and Higley and Moore (1981)  referred to the plural elite model in which a 
privileged minority, a small group of elite people who have more power, social standing, 
wealth or talent than others in the society and, whether they have a distinct ethnic, religion, 
linguistic and culture, they put their decisions into effect through different decision centres 
and not just a central one. Collectively, the elite who present an interaction network at 
different decision locations connect with each other for their impact behaviours joined by 
common interests (Etzioni-Halevy, 2003). Kreps (2010) argued that the plural elite 
connection and consensus have limited the impact of their public beliefs because of less 
frequent linkage with their regional leaders. 
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The plural elite model is based on the premise that there is not a single elite group dominating 
power. The plural elite are not centralised in an inner circle or with core groups. Each group 
has different modes of thought that integrate them by different conceptions of the relations 
between individuals and the community (Breton, 1978). The interaction networks are located 
at different decision centres for debating related issues. The plural elite work together when 
required on behalf of all other elite groups for their mutual interest. 
 
In the Nepalese social context, Nepal is considered to be a typical plural society including 
cultural diversity of religions, castes, languages and ethnic groups, regionally categorised into 
different indigenous people. Presently, 101 ethnic caste groups and subgroups and 93 living 
languages with eight religions (Hindu, Buddhist, Islam, Kirat, Jain, Sikh, Christian and 
Bahai) have been recognized (H. P. Bhattarai, 2004). The plural society stresses the 
relationships among race, ethnicity, language, religion and culture, but these differences are 
socially, culturally, politically and historically structured in the process of interaction (D. L. 
Shrestha, 2004). The plural nature of Nepalese society means that the plural elite model may 
also explain the behaviour of those who manage CFUGs, since it is able to capture the 
interaction of groups who come together only for issues of mutual interest, but who otherwise 
work and live separately. 
3.5.3 Power Elite Model 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the power elite model is based on a clear hierarchy of power and 
influences that exist among uppermost elite groups. The idea of the power elite model begins 
with the concept that power is exercised by a relatively small group of powerful people who 
use their power to dominate policy-making (Domhoff, 2009). The interaction network for the 
power elite model is small and concentrated, with frequent contact between the elite (Lukes, 
1974; Ruostetsaari, 2006). Power elites emerge through the exercise of power. 
 
Power is the kind of social ability of an individual that provides confidence to the person to 
control outcomes. Scholars have defined power in various ways depending on the situation, 
perspectives and objectives. Weber (1978) defined power as actual influence over others. 
Lammers, Stoker and Stapel (2010) said that power is an influential term and “because 
powerful individuals who possess more social and financial resources than they require, they 
are relatively free to do as they please” (p. 545). Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2010)  claimed 
that “in its most generic sense, power is a causal force that produces external effects and 
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consequences” (p.328). The term power elite refer to a group of people who have a tendency 
to dominate policy making through exercising their individual power. This includes 
bureaucratic, corporate, intellectual and governmental elite who can control the principal 
institutions and whose opinions and actions influence the decisions of policy makers. Power 
is formed by the ability of the actors who have to facilitate several processes (Barnett & 
Duvall, 2005; Brian, 2008). The formation of power is always involved in competition, and 
the winners mostly exercise the power and losers are struggling to achieve it.  
 
The interaction network of the power elite model is “not as inclusive of all major elite groups 
as the consensually integrated and plural elite models” (Higley & Moore, 1981, p.584). The 
interaction network for the power elite model is small and concentrated frequently only 
among the uppermost layer of the elite. The interactions in the power elite model are informal 
in that power is clearly hierarchical and influence exists among the elite group. Farazmand 
(1999) and Higley and Moore (1981) stated that at the apex of the hierarchical power in the 
power elite are structures such as business and, perhaps, political elite groups. Mills (1956) 
asserted that, in the beginning, the power elite and their unity rested on coincidence of 
interests for the business, economic and political activities. Weston (2010) argued that the 
power elite are centralised and coherent in their view of power. 
 
The connections of the power elite exist at two levels. The first level is at the core and 
uppermost level. The second level is the operational power elite who act as implementers of 
the decisions taken by the former. Lindsay (2008)  asserted that the connections of power 
elite are based on the interests/needs of those who occupy commanding power in society. The 
separation of the power elite varies according to the situation. Some power elite are more 
autonomous than others. The factors that generally play a vital role in separating the power 
elite are the type of political system, kinds of economic systems, the bureaucratic structure of 
society and the level of development (Arslan, 2006). Business elite, military elite and 
political elite, in particular, have greater autonomy from each other. 
 
In summary, the power elite comprise a relatively small well-knit group of people who act at 
a central level. The interaction network of the power elite model is narrow and frequently 
concentrated among only the uppermost layer of the elite. In the context of Nepal, there are 
powerful informal networks where the power elite interact with their own hierarchical 
powerful leaders and government elite who belong to the caste and wealth elite (Parajulee, 
2010). Lachapelle et al. (2004) found a similar power set-up in the context of CFUGs. Power 
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is based on past debts, usury (money lending) and kinship. The power elite model may have 
relevance to behaviour in CFUGs; however, it appears to be most relevant to regional and 
national levels of interaction. 
3.5.4 Ruling Class Elite Model 
In the ruling class elite model, the elite comprise the apex hierarchy and are controlled by 
some of the political ruling class. The ruling elite are recruited from a small group of people 
with specific family backgrounds including patrimonial, traditional and symbolic spheres of 
the society (Adams, 1994). The general concept of the ruling class elite model is that society 
is stratified with the masses of common people at the bottom and the ruling class elite at the 
top (Cock, 2010; Dahl, 1958; Higley, 1984; Higley, 2010; Higley & Moore, 1981; Mills, 
1956). The elite belonging to this ruling class are rich and well educated, share beliefs and 
use their influence to dictate top level public policies particularly in political issues. They 
delegate less powerful positions to the secondary elite group of people (operational decision 
makers) whose functions include the transformation of policy preferences and the adoption of 
policy choices that do not deny of the choices of the apex level policy makers of the ruling 
class (Farazmand, 1999; Woods, 1998). The interaction network is designed for less frequent 
interaction at the uppermost level predominantly of a triumvirate (three powerful economic, 
political and military groups) that is administrative in nature.  
 
The ruling class is a social formation based on heritage and social ties (Domhoff, 1975). The 
apex of the hierarchy of the ruling class model is occupied by the business class and some 
political ruling classes. Hence, both the ruling class and power elite models are roughly the 
same in configuration. The significant differences between the ruling class model and power 
elite model arise at the “level of interpretation rather than of description” (Higley & Moore, 
1981, p.585).  
 
The main feature of this model is that the ruling class elite, who explicitly represent the 
uppermost layer, are present in most significant decisions (Farazmand, 1999). The numbers 
of people who exist in this circle is very small and perform top level decisions. They delegate 
less powerful positions to the secondary elite (implementers and operational decision makers) 
(Farazmand, 1999). Dahl (1958) and Higley (1984) argued that ruling elite require not only 
control of important resources and networks but also the achievement of unity and 
cohesiveness among the members. 
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Cock (2010) explored how the ruling class elite have managed to endure in the context of 
minor political and economic changes that might have been expected to undermine the basis 
of its power. The key factors were the patrimonial attributes of the state, the interlocking 
between state leaders, the emergence of the ruling elite class and sometimes external forces 
such as foreign aid groups and agencies that contributed to the promotion of policy. For 
example, Housden (2010) showed that Nepal is still primarily patrimonial where power in 
Kathmandu remains locked within a tiny circle of ruling elite. 
 
The ruling elite is formed by the preferences of a small powerful group that regularly 
interrelates for key political issues, particularly most significant decisions (Dahl, 1958; 
Farazmand, 1999; Mills, 1956; Myhre, 2008; Rock, 2010). Ruling class cooperation with 
other sectors in order to broaden their privilege structure is rare. The monopolization of 
power by the ruling elite for themselves is the main factor that separates them from the non-
elite and other parties (Higley, 2010; Zetterberg, 2003).  
 
The main characteristic of the ruling class elite model is that the ruling class elite is a small 
group that represents the uppermost layer of society and power, and that participates at the 
top level in most significant decisions. In the context of CFUGs in Nepal, the ruling class 
elite model is not really relevant because the Nepalese ruling elite represents a small number 
of elite castes and wealthier groups that function at a national level. It could be argued that 
the caste system presents opportunities for the ruling class elite model to be present in the 
form of hereditary rights to privilege in a community based on family and caste; however, 
this is not directly linked to political or economic power.    
3.5.5 Organisational Elite Model 
Organisations are social entities that are directed by definite goals, structure and coordination 
systems that link to the external environment (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Tsang, 1997). In the 
context of pluralism, an organization is a society where diversified social groups, including 
racial, religious, ethnic and cultural, reside together in the same society (Alder, 1983). An 
organisation is also a framework within which actors can pursue their self-interest 
(Farazmand, 1994) . The interests of people are socially constructed on the basis of societal 
norms and values rather than derived naturally (Lewis, et al., 2003). Organisations define 
what these interests are, how they are acquired, and how they are internalized by the 
individual (Jentoft, 1997; McCay & Jentoft, 1998). 
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Farazmand (1999) developed the organisational elite model because, “plural, power, ruling 
and consensually integrated elite operate organisationally in an organisational context” 
(p.335). The organisational elite model is based on the notion that organisations are directed, 
controlled and dominated by a small number of people who influence the overall goals of the 
organisation (Farazmand, 1999).  
 
The central assumption of this model is that individuals can create and exercise power 
through institutional mechanisms. Higley, Burton and Field (1990) and Farazmand (1999) 
explained that the organisational elite have control over the organisation and that gives them 
power to influence the organisation, both implicitly and explicitly. Consequently, the main 
underlying assumptions of the organisational elite model are that the ideals and interests of 
the elite affect the entire organisation and its members as well as the goals and direction of 
the organisation.  
 
Each organisation is formed by people, but only few people control and dominate the 
organisation once it is created. The organisational elite are formed from the evolution of 
social, economic and bureaucratic organisations (Heydebrand, 1977; Weber, 1947). As 
organisations do not emerge in a vacuum, they have roots in the social and economic life of 
the society (Kukolev, 1997). Hence, the formation of the organisational elite is associated 
with all strata of society. The interaction level is frequent or complex depending on whether it 
is small or large, private or public, national or international level organisation. 
 
Organisational performance is directly related to the elite’s values and influences that impact 
on behaviour and actual accomplishments of the organisation (Hage 1965). Organisations 
have developed various profiles of collaboration, combinations of experience, skills, 
knowledge, access and status (Moore, 2006). Ruostetsaari (2006) stated that the 
organisational elite model interaction networks can be considered as devices endorsing and 
reinforcing attitudinal cohesion through courses of action by social leaders. Farazmand 
(1999) asserted that organisational connections and control are achieved through a multitude 
of elite managerial, supervisory and structural mechanisms (Haas, 1993; Hage 1965). The 
organisational elite are connected by virtue of processes such as administrative 
accountability, budgetary processes, and the process of administrative actions. 
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In summary, in an organisational elite model the key points are that the CFUG is created by 
government mandate, the organisation has power, its executive forms the elite in the 
community and those who fill positions in turn attain a form of elite power. This makes it 
relevant to CFUGs because the poor have an opportunity to participate as elite if they can get 
executive positions in the CFUG. 
3.6 Conclusions from the Review of Elite Models 
The previous sections have reviewed the elite models proposed by Higley and Moore (1981) 
and Farazmand (1999). These models provide a basis to shape a conceptual framework for 
this study. As was discussed earlier, the key characteristics of the elite in small, subsistence 
farming communities in Nepal are linked to wealth and caste. In this context, the models that 
best characterise the elite in CFUGs are the plural, consensual and organisational elite 
models. The power and ruling class elite models are less relevant to these communities.  
 
The consensually integrated elite model is likely to fit the context of a CFUG where the 
executive is composed of individuals who are wealthy and of the same caste. In this case, 
common caste and economic status mean that the EC members are more likely to interact 
outside the CFUG context and, when they do meet for CFUG business, they are more likely 
to reach consensus on decisions due to their common beliefs.   
 
The plural elite model is also likely to fit the context of a CFUG where the executive is 
composed of individuals who are wealthy and of different castes. In this case, the difference 
in caste is going to mean that the EC members are unlikely to interact outside the CFUG 
context and, when they do meet for CFUG business, there will be a greater difference or 
plurality in objectives due to differences in beliefs created by caste. However, a common 
wealth status means the executive is more likely to agree on CFUG decisions.  
 
The organisational elite model fits a situation where power is created by the organisation, 
rather than by the wealth or caste status of the individual. In this sense, an individual becomes 
part of the elite by becoming part of the EC. The key for the poor and disadvantaged is how 
they gain a position on the EC. One way that this can happen is when individuals gain 
experience and training in leadership through NGOs or CBOs. This experience provides 
direct skills that are important to CFUG management, making these individuals valuable 
members of committees, as well as providing confidence to individuals to make themselves 
available for leadership in a CFUG.  Examples of local NGO/CBOS in Nepal include PAF 
  
50 
 
(Poverty Alienation Fund), RWSS (Rural Water Supply and Sanitation), MEDEP (Micro 
Enterprises Development Programme), LISP (Local Initiative Support Programme), RUPP 
(Rural Urban Partnership Programme), PASRAP (Poverty Alleviation in Selected Rural 
Areas of Nepal) PRMCIP-MS (Nepal Marginalised Community Empowerment Project), 
PVSE (Poor, Vulnerable and Socially Excluded), RWUDUC (Rural Women Development 
Centre), SAGUN (Strengthened Actions for Governance in Utilization of Natural resources), 
DLGDP (Decentralised Local Government Development Programme), DANIDA (Danish 
International Development Agency, DNGOF (Dalit NGO Federation), FECOFUN 
(Federation of Forest User Group, Nepal), NGOFN (NGO Federation of Nepal), CTVET 
(Centre for Vocational and Educational Training), DLGSP (Decentralised Local Government 
Support Programme), NSCFP (Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project), and LFP 
(Livelihood and Forestry Programme). These organisations may have a key role in enhancing 
the capacity of poor and lower castes through the implementation of specific activities such 
as training, workshops, study tours and so on, that help them to participate in decision-
making and strengthen their capacity (Jha, Prasai, Hobley, & Bennett, 2009). These 
initiatives make the poor able to work more equally with the local elite.  
3.7 Conceptual Model  
The consensually integrated, plural and organisational elite models are relevant to a study of 
how elite configurations and interactions affect the structure and function of the CFUG. 
These models provide a means to develop a conceptual framework specific to the function of 
the CFUG. The conceptual model will help to deal with specific problems that pertain to 
Nepalese social structure and institutions in the context of CF in Nepal. The key elements of 
the elite models in the CFUG context, caste and wealth, form the basis of the conceptual 
model shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Community Caste Structure 
One caste Many castes 
Wealth 
Status of 
EC 
Members 
Rich Only 
Consensually 
integrated elite model 
Plural elite model 
Rich and Poor  
Organisational elite  
model A 
Organisational elite  
model B 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual models of elite in CFUGs 
 
The top left represents a situation where the EC is composed of rich people in a community 
with one caste. In this case, the elite would be expected to behave like the consensually 
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integrated elite model where the elite have similar norms and status, and form separate, fluid, 
groups that reform into new groups as necessary. Top of the right represents a situation where 
the EC is composed of rich people in a community with many castes. In this case, the elite 
would be expected to act like the plural elite model since they will naturally form separate 
groups due to caste but be required to work together with other wealthy elite from other 
castes. 
 
The participation of the poor is of the two forms related to the organisational elite model; in 
both cases the organisation can create the opportunity to be part of the elite or to create an 
elite group. When the poor are of the same caste as the rich, then the only issue they have to 
overcome to participate on the executive is their wealth status. This is called organisational 
elite model A, as in Figure 3.1. When there are many castes or ethnic groups, then the poor 
have to overcome issues related to their caste as well as their wealth. This is the 
organisational elite model B, as in Figure 3.1. 
 
The major assumptions of the conceptual model of elite in CFUGs (Figure 3.1) are as 
follows. First, in a community where the EC is structured like the consensual elite model, one 
would expect to find only one caste and the rich dominating the EC, and this would be 
reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that favoured the rich. Second, in a 
community where the EC is structured like the plural elite model, one would expect to find 
more than one caste and a mixture of the caste elite and the rich dominating the EC. This 
would be reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that favoured the caste elite and 
rich. Third, in a community where the EC is structured like the organisational elite model A, 
or where the EC has a large proportion of poor, one would expect to find only one caste but 
the rich would not be dominating the EC, and this would be reflected in the distribution and 
rules of distribution that favoured the poor. Fourth, in a community where the EC is 
structured like the organisational elite model B, or where the EC has a greater proportion of 
poor or low caste, one would expect to find greater representation of low caste and the poor 
on the EC, and this would be reflected in the distribution and rules of distribution that 
favoured the low caste and the poor.   
 
The conceptual model in Figure 3.1 provides an understanding of how caste and the wealth 
elite characterise themes of decision-making and formulation of rules, regulations and 
practices. In a community where the EC is structured like the consensually integrated or 
plural elite models, the domination of the EC by the rich would be reflected in distribution 
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amounts and rules of distribution that favoured the rich. In a community where the EC 
reflected the organisational A or B situations, it would be expected that the amounts produced  
and rules of distribution would be more favourable to the poor. The conceptual model 
provides the basis for examining the three research questions, which deal with the attributes 
that make leadership selection more likely, the amount distributed with representation of the 
poor on the EC, and the rules of distribution with poor representation on the EC. 
3.7.1 Leadership Attributes  
The attributes that determine leadership are an important dimension in the model. One of the 
hypotheses of this study is that the balance between elite, and poor and disadvantaged 
households in leadership of CFUGs determines CF management and benefit distribution 
decisions. Thus, it is important to determine what factors facilitate the representation of the 
poor and disadvantaged groups on the EC. This hypothesis is in the context of Nepalese 
society where the elite emerge due to caste and wealth. Wealth related factors include land 
holding size, livestock holdings, off-farm income and food sufficiency. The elite castes 
include (Brahmins, Chhetari, Thakuri and Newar) influenced the selection of leadership and 
benefit distribution from CF. The Dalit (lower caste or so-called untouchable) and the poor 
would be expected to participate in leadership, as in organisational elite A or B models, only 
if something other than the assets of the household, income and individual caste influenced 
the selection of leaders. The hypothesis is that a factor like leadership or organisational skills 
developed outside of the CFUG, such as with an NGO organisation, is important for being in 
a leadership position in a CFUG.  
3.7.2 Rules, Regulations and Practices of Distribution 
Leadership attributes are believed to be reflected in the rules of distribution for CF products. 
It is assumed that government policy about CF benefit distribution practices are not 
deliberately against any household. However, the lack of holistic rules and practices for the 
distribution of benefits and the lack of control over resources by the poor in communities is 
believed to lead to discrimination against poor households. To alleviate poverty, rules and 
practices should enable poor and low socioeconomic households to improve their own 
livelihoods. The hypothesis is that the rules, regulations and practices of distribution 
determined by the EC affect the level of production and distribution by the CF. The rules and 
regulations are, in turn, influenced by the type of decision-making, in this case whether the 
consensually integrated, plural, organisational elite A or organisational elite B models in 
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Figure 3.1 dominate decision-making. The rules and regulations of the CFUG may not reflect 
the preferences and requirements of poor and lower castes, if the consensually integrated elite 
or plural elite situations exist. 
 
A number of factors are important to distribution. The longer the open period, the more 
benefits flow to poor households. This is because the poor and disadvantaged households do 
have not labour resources to collect sufficient products in a short period. Typically, they have 
to manage their household labour force to work for elite farms, farm their own properties and 
collect CF products. EC members control the CF open period and regulate the allocation of 
forest products in terms of collection days for timber, firewood, fodder and grass and leaf 
litter. The structure of the EC affects the benefit and rules of distribution particularly to the 
poor and low caste household that if the organisation elite models exist. 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
This review has resulted in a conceptual model that explains how two key attributes of social 
structure in Nepal, caste and wealth, can explain the structure of and decisions made by the 
EC of CFUGs, and the effect this has on benefits received by the poor and disadvantaged 
households from CF. If organisational elite models A and B were employed, the poor have an 
opportunity to participate as elite if they can get executive positions on the CFUG 
organisation that in turn benefits to them. The conceptual model provides the basis for an 
empirical analysis of the research hypotheses. The structure of the empirical analysis is 
outlined in Chapter 4. 
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     Chapter 4 
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR THE SELECTION OF 
LEADERS AND BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION FROM 
COMMUNITY FORESTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Based on the conceptual model outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter describes an empirical 
research model to address the hypotheses of this study. It is believed that the selection of 
community leaders determines the structure of power sharing in a CFUG  in the Chapter 3  in 
Figure 3.1 and that this has an effect on the distribution of benefits from local forests and 
rules of distribution. The literature review of elite models provided a background about the 
power structures that emerge due to caste and wealth. Lachapelle et al. (2004) found that both 
leadership and power emerge due to the caste and wealth structure in Nepalese society and 
that they then used this to obtain some public goods. Poteete and Ostrom (2002), Fisher 
(2007), Agrawal (2001), Agrawal and Ribot (1999) and Ostrom (1999) noted that power is 
the ability to influence processes by which individuals create rules, make decisions and 
implement them to affect the outcome of a decision-making process. This implies a genuine 
role in decision-making and not just as a token input in the form of consultation. This means 
that it is important to determine how power structures that include the poor and 
disadvantaged groups can be created. This chapter outlines the empirical framework 
associated with the attributes of community leaders, and factors that influence the rules and 
regulations of benefit distribution. 
4.2 Empirical Framework 
Households’ benefits from CF depend not only on the stock of CF resources but also on 
access, which is affected by local decision-making. Key factors affecting households’ 
benefits distribution are: (a) the type and attributes of leaders present on the EC and whether 
the consensually integrated elite, plural elite or organisational elite models apply; (b) the 
rules, regulations and practices made by the EC; and (c) the forest resources attributes. These 
factors form the empirical framework in Figure 4.1. The leadership attributes are one of the 
important components of the empirical model because, leaders are believed to be selected on 
the basis of certain household attributes. The leaders are elected from the community as EC 
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members of the CFUG. Once they have access to EC as leaders, the CFUG provides them 
with power to influence the formulation of rules for the distribution of CF benefits. The CF 
attributes such as forest area, forest type and crown cover class, also determine the types of 
products and amounts obtained from CF. Thus, the components in the empirical framework 
for modelling community forestry decisions are linked to the distribution of CF benefits. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  The empirical framework for modelling community forest decisions in Nepal 
 
4.2.1 Leadership Attributes 
This section looks at the correlation between household attributes and leadership selection. 
Depending on the community, this in turn influences which of the four elite models is 
relevant in a community. One of the hypotheses of this study is that the leadership in the 
CFUG determines community forest management and benefit distribution decisions; thus it is 
important to have representation from the poor and disadvantaged groups. In the context of 
the empirical framework, household attributes are the important factors when community 
members select a leader. As discussed earlier, the people with wealth and elite caste attributes 
are often selected as leaders. Based on the literature review, the probability of being selected 
to a leadership position is determined by ethnic caste, wealth, social status, and leadership 
experience outside the CFUG, such as with an NGO. There are three main attributes: (i) 
wealth, (ii) caste and (iii) outside leadership experience that needs to be developed. These are 
elaborated below. 
EC Structure 
CF amount distributed 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Rules of distribution 
(Hypothesis 3) 
CF resource attributes 
Leadership attributes 
(Hypothesis 1) 
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4.2.1.1 Wealth attributes 
 
Wealth has a kind of power that can provide greater assurance of social status in society. The 
hypothesis is that wealthier household members who have assets like a bank balance, food 
sufficiency and maintain a life style with more than adequate material provisions have an 
influence in the selection of leaders. Wealth is a plentiful quantity of valuable resources or 
material possessions. It has either a positive or a negative influence in decision-making. 
Wealthier, high power and social status groups are more able to be selected as leaders and so 
influence the decision-making process (Lachapelle, et al., 2004). Power through wealth 
reduces the opportunities for poor households to be selected to leadership positions (Hansen, 
2007). Lebel, Daniel, Badenoch, Garden and Imamura (2008) stated that wealthier 
households influence the selection of leaders in CBNRM in Asia. The wealth attributes 
correlated with CFUG leadership in Nepal are landholding size, livestock units, off farm 
income and food sufficiency. Each of these is elaborated below. 
4.2.1.1.1 Landholding Size 
 
Landholding is believed to be an important factor in selection for leadership. There is 
evidence of a positive correlation between private land endowment and the use of public 
goods and resources. For instance, Adhikari (2005) found that large land endowments 
directly affected the ability to appropriate resources from community-based resource 
management. The social status of large landholders endows these people with more 
opportunities for leadership and influence over the executive decision-making process. 
Sangameswaran (2008) and  Poteete and Ostrom (2002, 2008) observed that large landholder 
farmers in India benefited from the Watershed Development Projects through control over 
community decision-making. The economic value and social capital, like large landholding 
size, appear to play crucial roles in deciding leadership positions and promoting management 
of forests in Joint Forest Management (JFM) in India (Behera, 2009). Maskey et al. (2006) 
found that households with a large landholding participated considerably more in decision-
making in CF management in Nepal. Hence, landholding could be positively correlated with 
selection as a leader. 
4.2.1.1.2 Livestock units 
 
Livestock holding is one of the indicators of social power and CF is an important source of 
feed for livestock (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 2005; Malla, et al., 2005; Sekhar, 
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1998). Households with bigger livestock holdings (or less poor households) are expected to 
benefit proportionally more from CF because the management regime of CF is often oriented 
to the production of fodder products for livestock for forest users (Richards, Kanel, Maharjan, 
& Davies, 1999). The difference in the use of local forests may be associated with the number 
of livestock units raised by households. Wealthier households, with larger herds and more 
land, have greater need for animal fodder and agricultural compost (Varughese, 1999), which, 
in turn, creates farmers who would be interested in a leadership position (Sekhar, 1998). 
4.2.1.1.3 Off farm income 
 
The hypothesis is that there is a higher probability of being a member of the EC if a 
household has enough off-farm income. A. Agrawal (2001) found that low income 
households have the lowest levels of leadership positions.  
4.2.1.1.4 Food sufficiency 
 
Food sufficiency can play a role at a local level, particularly in the selection of leaders in a 
CFUG in Nepal (A. Agrawal & Goyal, 1999; R. Pokharel, 2009). The hypothesis is that there 
is a higher probability of being a member of the EC if a household has food sufficiency from 
its own farmland. Food sufficiency in this study is classified into 12 months and more, 
harvested from the household’s own land, enough food for 12 months, 9 months, 6 months, 3 
months or less than 3 months. 
  
4.2.1.1.5 Occupation of household head 
 
Among other factors that determine the selection of leaders, the occupation of the household 
head plays an important role. Compared with households with the head self-employed in 
agriculture, agricultural occupational households depend more on forest resources and 
households in non-agricultural occupations depend less and are likely to have access to other 
sources for forest resource use (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 2009). Hence, agricultural occupation 
households are expected to pay more attention to leadership positions in CFUG than 
households in non-agricultural occupations. It is hypothesized that business owners and 
teachers will be less likely to seek leadership in the CFUG. This is because need for other 
occupation households to access forest resources would be less since they are less likely to be 
interested in leadership positions on the CFUG (A.  Agrawal, 2007).  
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4.2.1.1.6 Ethnic caste and social status  
 
Ethnicity and social status play important roles in the selection of leaders for CFUGs. The 
disadvantaged groups depend more on forests for forest products and other local services to 
satisfy their basic needs compared with the elite ethnic caste (Acharya & Gentle, 2005). 
Meinzen-Dick, Pandolfelli, Dohrn and Athens (2006), Acharya and Gentle (2005) and 
Weinberger and Jutting (2001) found that in the exclusive Dalit group, CFUGs provided 
more opportunity for the poor to choose a position of leadership. For example, Nemarundwe 
(2004) and Bourdieu (1984) found that social stratification with an elite caste allowed elite 
people to succeed or rise to powerful positions over management structures as well as having 
a crucial say in who was elected into which position and which leaders got more respect in all 
key decision-making and village meetings. The elite castes often use their position to ignore 
rules put in place by other leaders due to their higher status. Timisina (2002), Pradhan and 
Shrestha (2005)  and Meinzen-Dick, Brown, Feldstenin, Quesumbling and Agnes (1997) 
found that lower castes have fewer opportunities to be leaders. Disadvantaged groups (Dalit 
and lower castes) are less likely to be chosen as leaders. Due to the deeply rooted caste and 
social stratification systems, particularly the higher caste and lower caste with unequal power 
relationships in Nepalese society, it has been demonstrated that the elite caste and wealthy 
powerful households are selected for positions as EC members of CFUGs in Nepal and India 
(Adhikari, et al., 2004; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; A. Agarwal & Ostrom, 2001; A.  Agrawal, 
2007; A. Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; A. Agrawal & Goyal, 1999; A. Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; 
Iversen, et al., 2006; Lachapelle, et al., 2004; Maskey, et al., 2006; Nagendra & Gokhale, 
2008; Ostrom, 2011; Thoms, 2008). 
 
4.2.1.2 NGO membership 
 
The basic hypothesis is that if a person is a member of an NGO, then there is a higher 
probability of being selected as a member of the EC. Participation in an NGO might have 
developed a person’s leadership capacity or motivated them to be a leader. NGO personnel 
have increased empowerment and the inclusion of Dalit, Janjati and disadvantaged groups, 
particularly in developing leadership capacity, increased the benefits from rural development 
activities (Jha, et al., 2009). Ui et al. (2010) found that the role of local NGOs is critically 
important in influencing the community representatives in participation for sustainable health 
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development in Cambodia. Hence, if poor and oppressed lower castes have the opportunity to 
develop their leadership capacity, they could be represented more in the EC. 
4.2.2 Econometric Model for Examining CFUG Leadership  
This research hypothesises that the selection of an individual (Yi) in a leadership position of 
the CFUG is a function of household attributes as follows: 
 
Leadership (Yi) = f (Landholding size, Food sufficiency, Livestock units, 
Occupation of household head, Wealth status, Off farm income, NGO 
membership, Ethnic caste)                                                              4.1                                                                               
The attributes of leaders are examined by analysing a regression model. The variable whether 
a member (Yi) is in a leadership position on the EC is binary (Yes/No). For the econometric 
application, the variable Yi can be coded as one if the individual is selected for the executive 
committee and zero otherwise. The independent variables are landholding size, wealth status, 
livestock units, off-farm income, food sufficiency, NGO membership, family size of the 
household, ethnic caste and education. 
 
For discrete choice analysis, there are two commonly used econometric models: the logit and 
probit models (Agresti & Finlay, 2009). The logit model consists of the logistic normal 
distribution of the error term whereas the probit model holds a cumulative normal distribution 
of error term (Agresti, 1990). The choice between models depends on the best fit of the data. 
The simplest approach, in order to choose the better model, is the robustness of R-square 
value.   
 
The distribution of the data of this study supports a logit model. The logit model is based on 
probability theory that examines the probability of being in a leadership position. In the logit 
distribution, the estimated probabilities are constrained between 0 and 1 (Agresti, 1990; 
Agresti & Finlay, 2009). 
 
eBXappLn  ]1/([            or                                                4.2 
 
Where:  
p is the probability that event Y occurs, p(Y=1); 
p/(1-p) is the “odds ratio”; and 
)exp()]1/([ eBXapp 
  
60 
 
ln [p/(1-p)] is the log odds ratio, or “logit” and all other components are similar to the linear 
model.  
 
The analysis of the relationship of several independent variables to a dichotomous dependent 
variable is the selection of leadership positions on the EC of CFUG, which leads to a binary 
dependent variable (yes or no) and the use of the logistic regression (Agresti, 1990).  
 
Logit (P) = a + bX                                                                                            4.3 
 
Where P = Logistic, which is assumed to be linearly related to X. The logistic regression 
equation for predicting leadership is shown in equation 4.2. The underlying model is, 
therefore, that a leadership role (Yi) will be some function of particular social attributes (X): 
eXY
n
j
ijji  
1
0 ln                                                                                    4.4 
Where Yi is the leadership status of individual i. o  is the intercept,  j is the coefficient for 
the explanatory variable for Xij for attribute j for individual i and e is the error term. The error 
term of the binary logistic model is assumed to have a logistic distribution with mean zero E 
)(  =0 and variance ( ) =π2/3.
 
 
4.3 Benefits Distribution (CF amount)  
The quantity of CF products distributed is determined by rules and practices that are 
formulated and implemented by the decision makers of the CFUG as well as forest attributes. 
Formal and informal resources management and the distribution of benefits rules have been 
found to be crucial for collective decision-making action (Baland & Plateau, 1996; Berkes, 
Feeny, McCay, & Acheson, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). The CFUG organisational body (the EC) 
forms these rules and regulations as well as the practices of resource distribution. It is 
hypothesised that CFUG rules, regulations, norms and practices will be formulated to 
maximise benefits from CF for those who dominate the EC. Blaikie (2006) and Yadav, Dev, 
Baginski and Soussan (2003) found that there is a lower level of satisfaction with benefits 
distributed from CF in small and landless households. They argued that forest products 
distribution systems do not meet their needs and they lack participation in the decision-
making processes. It is believed that, if the rules, regulations and practices are devised with 
full participation of the poor and underprivileged members of the society and in favour of 
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them, then the distribution of forest products including firewood, fodder, leaf litter and timber 
will be equitable.  
 
To analyse the distribution of benefits from CF, a linear regression model was constructed to 
identify the relationship between the distribution of forest products from CF and a range of 
explanatory variables. The dependent variables are the relative distribution of firewood, 
timber and fodder. Relative distribution was used because of unequal forest endowments 
among CFUGs. The relative distribution of CF products was calculated by dividing the 
quantity of a product distributed to a household by the average relative amount distributed to 
each household in that CFUG, which means that absolute amounts distributed will vary 
between CFUGs. Since what is important here is the relative amount received by each 
household compared with other households in the CFUG, relative distribution is the better 
measure. If the relative distribution is 1 it means that the household gets the average 
distribution. If the relative distribution is more than 1 then it means that the household gets a 
disproportionately larger share of the distribution, and if it is less than 1 it means that the 
household gets a disproportionately smaller share of the distribution. In the context of this 
research, relative distributions that are greater than 1 for the rich or less than1 for the poor are 
undesirable. 
 
The independent variables are the rules, regulations and practices of distribution, and the 
forest characteristics. The rules, regulations and practices for this research are the frequency 
of EC and assembly meetings, the discussion hours per meeting in the EC and assembly, the 
agenda items raised by various members in the EC assembly meetings and the involvement of 
the EC and assembly meeting in the preparation of the Operation Plan (OP). The forest 
resources variables included area per household, crown cover class and forest type. Following 
Adhikari et al. (2004), the distribution model is as follows: 
 
Relative distribution per household in a CFUG = f (frequency of EC and 
assembly meetings, discussion hours per meeting in EC and assembly, agenda 
items raised by poor and disadvantaged in EC and in assembly meetings, 
involvement of EC and assembly meeting in preparation of operation plan, area 
of forest per household, crown cover class, CF type, share of EC position held 
by the poor).                                                                                             4.5 
 
  
62 
 
Linear regression is preferable because the dependent variables are continuously distributed. 
The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation and the log likelihood 
function for the relative distribution of CF products. The following section starts with a 
description of the dependent variables. 
iY = o + i
z
ij
n
j
z
ij
i eX 
2
                                                                 4.6 
 
Where Yi = the relative distribution of CF products to individual I, j = timber, firewood, and 
fodder, Xij represents the set of explanatory variables and ie  is the error term for the linear 
regression model with a mean of zero and a variance of one (ε ≈ N (μ = 0 and σ2 = 1). 
Therefore, an appropriate computation of standard error (S.E.) is estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method. 
4.3.1 Representation of the Poor on the EC  
It is assumed that if the majority of members of the EC represent the poor wellbeing 
category, the decisions made by the EC will be more favourable to poor households. Katz and 
Kahn (2005) and Adhikari et al. (2004) found that in many forest resource systems, poor 
household members who have a majority in decision-making, made decisions that met their own 
needs. Moreover, Jones (2007) and Pfaff (2000) found that a considerable level of decision-
making power was retained by the elite members of the user committee and that they 
dominated the decisions. They argued that the leaders are able to devise their own 
management policies based on their vested interests and this did not represent the lower 
castes and poor and ignored the needs and voices of those people in society. Similarly, 
Sunam and McCarthy (2010) and Hobley (2007) found that the issue of the needs of the poor 
were rarely discussed in EC meetings and in the decision-making forum where elite were in 
the majority.  
 
The proportional representation of the poor among EC members is an important determinant 
for benefit distribution in common land (Hansen, 2007; Ostrom, 2005, 2008; Vedeld, 2000). 
The elite mostly made the distribution rules and regulations on the basis of their interests 
(Hansen, 2007). Brahamin, Chhetry, Thakuri and Newar (elite castes) are wealthier (rich) 
households that are influential and well off in society. They have influence in the allocation 
of open days for their own demands (Bistha, 1991; Gurung, 2005; Pradhan & Shrestha, 
2005). Therefore, it is expected that if there is greater representation on the EC by the poor, 
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there is a greater probability of having higher relative distribution in favour of poor 
households.  
4.3.2 Agenda Items Raised in the EC and Assembly Meetings 
In order to conduct a well organised and efficient meeting, agenda items are important tools 
that can influence the outcome of the meetings. In the different stages of the decision-making 
process at the community level, contributions are made at several levels by local users. 
Acharya and Gentle (2005) found that when poor households raised a larger number of 
agenda items in meetings, they got proportionally more CF products. It is assumed that if the 
poor and disadvantaged members could raise more agenda items, they would collect 
relatively more firewood, timber and fodder. This would be consistent with the organisational 
elite model where increased participation by the poor through the structure of the 
organisation provided them with power to change the outcomes of decisions. However, many 
difficulties lie within the fact that the Nepalese CFUG structure is based upon a patron-client 
relationship (Hansen, 2007). The usual hierarchical structure supports the consensual elite 
and plural elite models and does not give much opportunity for the poor and disadvantaged 
people to be heard in raising agenda items since they do not have equality (Arnold & 
Campbell, 1986; Baland & Plateau, 1997; Bartley, et al., 2008; Jones, 2007).  
4.3.3 Frequency of EC and Assembly Meetings 
Dhakal (2006) asserted that there is a greater probability of addressing the issues of the 
underprivileged and women with an increase in the frequency of EC meetings and CFUG 
assemblies. The assumption is that if more EC and assembly meetings are organised by the 
CFUG organisational elite where consensually integrated elite and plural elite feel free to 
provide a greater opportunity for the poor and disadvantaged to raise their needs. The reason 
behind this is that frequent meetings could allow sufficient time for the EC and assembly 
meetings to think and discuss many agenda items including benefits for the deprived group. 
The groups with more frequent meetings could have a positive relationship with the relative 
distribution of CF products to the poor (Dev, et al., 2003).   
4.3.4  Discussion Hours in EC and Assembly Meetings 
The influence of discussion hours is one of the important factors when observing the 
relationship between dominance and speaking time (Mast, 2002). With shorter times for 
discussion in meetings, individuals are strongly driven to dominate others for their own goals. 
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The effect of more discussion hours would be to enable disadvantaged groups the opportunity 
to discuss their problems. If the discussion time is shorter, they could be penalised (B. 
Agarwal, 2009; Kubo, 2009). Hence, longer discussion time in the EC and assembly 
meetings is believed to provide more opportunities for the poor to raise their concerns and 
obtain benefits from CF in Nepal.  
4.3.5 Involvement of EC and Assembly Meetings in the Preparation of the 
Operational Plan 
The involvement of EC and assembly meetings is an important procedure in the preparation 
of the operational plan (OP). It is hypothesised that the involvement of assembly meetings in 
the preparation of the OP provides more benefits to the poor and disadvantaged people. The 
assembly meeting is more relevant than the EC meeting in contributing to a positive impact 
in the preparation of the OP and management of the CF. This is because, when the majority 
of EC members belong to the elite and wealthier households, the EC will not reflect the needs 
and aspirations of the poorer and socially disadvantaged members in the preparation of the 
OP (Thoms, 2008). Jones (2007) and Nayak and Berkes (2008) found that most people 
belonged to general households in assembly meetings and there was less chance of elite 
dominance of the meeting. Hence, involvement of the assembly in the preparation of the OP, 
including forest management, harvesting, protection and sharing of benefits, gives a greater 
chance of fairness compared with the involvement of only the EC in the preparation of the 
OP. 
4.3.6 Forest Attributes 
The forest attributes included here are forest type, forest area per household and forest crown 
cover class. These attributes have an effect on the forest quality and the types of products 
available from the forest (Alkan, et al., 2008; Franco-Lopez, Ek, & Bauer, 2001). The detail 
of forest attributes is elaborated in the following section. 
4.3.6.1 Forest Type 
 
Broadleaf forests produce multiple products. Poor households are likely to benefit in CFUGs 
with a mix of broadleaf forests (A. Agrawal, 2005). Huang, Wang, and Yan (2007), Zerbe 
and Kreyer (2007) found that broadleaf forests provide more intermediate harvesting with 
multiple products and sustain longer open periods than conifer forests. Broadleaf forest 
provides more firewood than conifer forest. It is believed that poor households are likely to 
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maximise their benefit with a mixed forest or broadleaf forests rather than conifer forests 
because the conifer forests areas are acidic and there is little chance to grow broadleaf fodder 
species and lawn grass (A.  Agrawal, 2007; J. K. Jackson, 1994).  
4.3.6.2 Forest Crown Cover Class 
 
Crown cover of the forest represents the land covered. Crown cover class is expressed as the 
percentage of crown area projected on to land area. If crown cover is dense and rich, it 
denotes that biological materials such as grasses, trees and crops are very high but if crown 
cover is poor or thin, it denotes that biological materials are poor on the ground. Crown cover 
percentage is the central element in forest management particularly for the estimation of yield 
(Gautam, et al., 2004). Thapa and Chapman (2010) and Maraseni, Shivakoti, Cockfield and 
Apan (2006) found that a high crown density, primarily the shade-tolerant hardwood species 
(maples, yellow birch), allowed longer open periods than those of lower crown density. It is 
hypothesized that a higher proportion of crown coverage, the greater are the number of open 
days for the community forest as a distribution rules.  
4.3.6.3 Area of Forest per Household 
 
Larger areas of forest per household mean more resources. It is hypothesised that the larger 
the area of forest per household the longer the open period for the collection of the CF 
products. Resource scarcity problems with benefit distribution could be negatively related to 
forests of small area (and resources). Nagendra, Pareth, Sharma, Schweik and Adhikari 
(2008), Lawrence, Paudel, Barnes and Malla (2007) and Ostrom (1990) stated that the 
quantity of CF resources is directly related to the amount of CF land area necessary for 
growth and yield. If the area is small, the volume of products is also small and this may cause 
the decision-makers to enforce shorter open periods. 
4.4 Rules of Distribution 
In this component of the conceptual model, the rules of distribution are analysed. In highly 
devolved structures, one of the main challenges is how to design institutions, elect leaders 
and make rules so that leaders have an incentive to support local users to distribute the 
benefits obtained from CF on an equitable and equal basis (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; 
Mudgal, Morrison, & Mayers, 2004). The rules of distribution are specific times for open 
periods for the distribution of forest products (Domencich & McFadden, 1975). It is believed 
that wealthier households need fewer open days to meet their needs and that poorer 
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household need a longer period to meet their needs. It is also believed that the more poor on 
the EC the longer the opening period and the greater the benefits to the poor. 
 
Adhikari and Lovett (2006) found that if CFUGs had a short open period of the community 
forest there was a potential problem for poor household members to collect enough firewood 
compared with the rich and elite households. They argued that the rules and regulations were 
shaped by EC members based on the personal interests of the individuals in terms of fixing 
the harvesting periods for CF products. This is due to both the economic interests to fix a 
time period and the individual interests of EC members (Malla, et al., 2005; Stræde & Treue, 
2006). Shorter extraction periods of forest products have less chance of fulfilling the demands 
of the poor and low socio-economic groups in CBNRM (Nagendra & Gokhale, 2008; N. S. 
Paudel, Banjade, Ojha, McDougall, & Prabhu, 2006; Rendón-Carmona, Martínez-Yrízar, 
Balvanera, & Pérez-Salicrup, 2009). Poor people do not manage to collect sufficient CF 
products in a shorter harvest period.  
 
The open period for distribution of CF products is the dependent variable. The hypothesis is 
that, if there are more poorer represented on the EC, the opening period will be longer. The 
independent variables included for the study of distribution rules are forest type, CF area per 
household, forest crown cover classes, relative proportion of EC positions by the poor. This 
relationship is shown in equation 4.7. 
 
Number of days for opening CF = f (Relative proportion of EC position held by 
the poor and disadvantaged, forest type, forest crown cover classes, forest area per 
household)                                                                                            4.7 
 
In this model, the hypothesis is that CF product distribution rules have been developed in a 
way that reflects the composition of the EC. Three regression models are used based on the 
number of days the community forest is open for harvesting and distribution of timber, 
firewood and fodder. This relationship is shown in Equation 4.8: 
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Where 
z
iY  represents the number of open days for the distribution of timber, firewood and 
fodder per year for the CFUG; j = timber, firewood, and fodder; Xij represents the     
explanatory variable for the ith CFUG; and the error term is
ze .  
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Discrete Choice Ordered (Ordered Logit model) regression is preferable because the 
dependent variable is the open period and the responses assume discrete values of 0, 1, 2 or 3. 
The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation and the log likelihood 
function for observed choices (Greene, 2000; Scott & Freese, 2006; Small, 1987). 
Independent variables are discussed below. 
4.4.1 CF Resource Attributes 
The forest attributes described in section 4.3.6, particularly forest type, area of forest per 
household and forest crown cover class, are also used for the analysis of distribution rules. 
4.4.2 Proportion of Poor Households on the EC 
The proportion of poor households on the EC could also play a role in the open period. It is 
assumed that the higher the proportion of the poor households on the EC the longer the 
number days for the CF open period. The argument is that the voices and issues concerning 
minority groups (poor and lower caste) could easily enter into the collective decision-making 
when they are represented on the EC (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 2009; Laerhoven & Ostrom, 
2007). Therefore, if poor households have a proportionately higher representation on the EC, 
there is a higher chance that this would lead to longer open periods of the CF, which helps 
poor households. 
 
One can raise the question that if there is a longer open period of the CF, it could affect the 
sustainable harvesting of CF products. The problem here is that even if allocation of the CF 
products is fixed in a sustainable design, poor households will not have enough resources and 
time to extract the allocated product in the fixed short open period of the CF whereas the rich 
can extract their allocated portion from the forest. It is a fact that a higher representation by 
the poor on the EC reflects the organisational elite model, where the poor are empowered by 
the CFUG institution. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The attributes of a person in leadership are important in the empirical model. One of the 
hypotheses of this study is that the composition of leadership and decision-making in the 
CFUG determines the benefit distribution from CF. This hypothesis is in the context of an 
empirical model whereby household attributes are one set of assets available to a household 
in being selected as a leader. Typically, ethnic elite castes, social status, food sufficiency, off-
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farm income, landholding size, livestock units and occupation of household head mean that 
the traditional elite in a community have a greater likelihood of selection as leaders on the 
EC. In this case, decisions follow the behaviour outlined by the consensual and plural elite 
models. However, for poor and disadvantaged group members, experience in external 
leadership positions, such as in NGOs, is also believed to increase the likelihood of selection 
on EC positions of CFUGs. This would be reflected in the presence of the organisational elite 
model.   
 
The distribution of CF products to households is also believed to be correlated with the 
attributes of the EC that in turn affect the outcome of the decision-making process of the 
group. The hypothesis is that the social structure of the EC determines the distribution of 
benefits, which may disadvantage poor households and benefit the elite wealthier households. 
However, in the proposed conceptual model with the organisational elite model, poor and 
disadvantaged members would participate on the EC and help formulate rules, regulation and 
practices. The dependent variables are relative distribution of firewood, timber and fodder. 
The independent variables are frequency of EC and assembly meetings, discussion time per 
meeting in the EC and assemblies, agenda items raised by poor and disadvantaged members 
in the EC and assembly meetings and the involvement of the EC and assembly meetings in 
the preparation of the OP, area per household, crown cover class and CF type.  
 
How the rules of distribution are determined by the leaders on the EC is one of the main 
challenges in designing institutions, electing leaders and making rules so that leaders have an 
incentive to support to poor and disadvantaged groups in distributing CF products. The 
distribution rules are measured as open periods for the distribution of firewood, timber and 
fodder. As hypothesised, caste and wealth elite households need fewer open days and poor 
households need more open days for collecting CF products. The independent variables are 
proportion of poor and poorest households represented on the EC and the physical constraints 
of the CF resources, CF area per household, forest type and crown cover class.  
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     Chapter 5 
SURVEY AND DATA COLLECTION 
5.1 Introduction 
Statistical data are very important in any research. The accuracy of the findings depends on 
features of the data that affect their quality or “fitness” for processing and analysis. The 
CFUGs chosen for this study are spread throughout a district where there are diverse socio-
economic classes and castes. When selecting the study area, several factors such as 
constraints on resources, timeframe and the choice of methods for data collection were 
considered. More importantly, personal security during the field survey was a major factor to 
be considered. Security issues concerned the presence of armed rebels who were active 
during the fieldwork. Because of poor security, the Siraha and Panchthar districts had to be 
omitted limiting the fieldwork to Baglung.  
 
In the previous chapter, the conceptual, empirical and econometric models for community 
welfare were explained. This chapter presents the reasons for selecting Baglung district, gives 
an overview of the research site, a household survey, and describes the instruments and data 
used. Finally, a conclusion ends the chapter.  
5.2 Reasons for Selecting the Baglung District 
The Baglung district is one of the middle hill districts of Nepal where the community forestry 
programme has been conducted since 1990. This district is considered to be a very active 
district among the mid hills districts, particularly in the management of CF. Also, the existing 
species composition of the forest in Baglung is similar to the mid hills throughout Nepal. The 
Nepal UK Community Forestry Programmes (NUCFP) conducted by the Department for 
International Development (DFID), UK, has supported the development of CF since 1991. 
Currently, it is conducted by the Livelihood and Forestry Programme (LFP). The main 
contribution of the programme has been to support the District Forest Office (DFO) in 
strengthening and developing the institutional buildings, including developing a database of 
CFUGs regarding CF. Hence, relevant secondary data are easily available from the CFUGs 
and district forest office records. In addition, many studies have been conducted on other 
aspects of CF management, particularly for the pro-poor programme to raise the livelihoods 
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of poor households through CF, which is new in other regions of the country. The district 
headquarters are easily approachable and a wide range of CFUGs are available for study. 
 
One of the objectives of this research was to study the effect of social structure on benefit 
distribution from CF. As stated previously, Nepal is a country of diverse social structures 
particularly in religion, culture and ethnicity, and Baglung itself is also diverse in religion, 
culture, ethnicity, altitude and temperature, like other mid hills and mountainous districts in 
Nepal. Hinduism and Buddhism are the major religions. Brahmin, Chhetry, Newar, Magar, 
Gurung, Chhantyal and Thakali are the main ethnic groups in a population of 268,938 
(Gurung, 2005). Hence, the district represents a typical hill region of the country so that the 
findings could be applied widely to other hill and mountain districts of Nepal. 
5.3 Overview of the Baglung District  
Baglung lies in the mid hills area of the western development region of Nepal. The study area 
comprises Bhakunde, Titang, Resh, Malika, Payunpata, Sigana, and Palakot Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) and Kalika municipality, which is 72 kilometres south-
west of Pokhara, headquarters of the western development region of Nepal (Figure 5.1). This 
district is supported in the implementation of CF activities by the Livelihood and Forestry 
Programme (LFP), which is the part of the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) project. 
 
The geographical position of the district is between latitude 28.2667′ N to 28.037′ N and 
longitude 82.000′ E to 83.036′ E. The district is characterized by mountainous topography 
ranging in altitude from 583 m to 4,690 m above amsl (District Development Committee, 
2004). It covers 1841.29 square kilometres. The climate is humid warm temperate to humid 
cool temperate with an annual range of mean temperatures from 12
0
 to 18
0
C (District 
Development Committee, 2004). The district receives a mean annual rainfall of 2200 mm 
(District Development Committee, 2004). 
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Figure 5.1 Map of Nepal showing Baglung district with the research areas; Kalika 
municipality and research VDCs, highlighted in red colour. 
 
Agriculture is the main subsistence source for rural people. The main crops are rice, wheat, 
maize, millet and mustard. There are four types of land for crop production, Bari (non-
irrigated), Karbari (non-irrigated for trees, fodder and horticultural crops), Khet (irrigated 
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land) and Butyan, particularly for trees and grasses. Bari land is generally used for cultivating 
maize and millet whereas Khet land is for cultivating rice, wheat and, occasionally, maize. 
From the household survey and group discussions carried out for this thesis, over 30 varieties 
of cereal crops were identified including rice, potatoes,  maize, mustard,  wheat,  and finger 
millet. The research sites in Bhakunde, Titang, Resh, Malika, Payunpata, Sigana, Palakot 
VDCs and Kalika municipality are considered to be good areas in the mid hills for CF 
management and crop production. Conventionally, agricultural land, especially Khet, does 
not generally contain trees. However, a few indigenous and exotic trees, and horticultural 
crops are being planted in Kharbari and Bari land. Traditionally, farming households keep 
livestock such as buffalo and cows for milk production, sheep and/or goats for meat, and 
oxen or bull-buffaloes for draught power.  
5.3.1 Forest Area 
The total forest area of the Baglung district is 98,046 ha of which 17% is coniferous forest, 
52% is hardwood forest, 23% is mixed forest and 8% is shrub land. According to the District 
Forest Office (DFO) statistics of Baglung, 17,574 ha of forest have been handed over to 407 
CFUGs comprising 56,790 households (District Forest Office, 2009). The community forests 
surveyed for this research contain conifer forests, particularly on south facing slopes between 
1,000-2,200 m that are dominated by chirpine (Pinus roxburghii), in high altitude with Blue 
pine (Pinus wallichiana) and broadleaf forests composed of Shorea robusta, Schima 
walichaii and Castanopsis indica. Riverine forests with toona (Cedrela toona) and Albizia 
procera also occur in mixed forests associated with broadleaf or conifer forests (District 
Forest Office, 2009). The per capita forest area is 0.36 ha in Baglung whereas, at the national 
level, it is 0.27 ha (Oli & Shrestha, 2009).  
5.4 Survey Instruments 
The data required for the empirical models includes a number of household and CFUG 
attributes. This data was collected using surveys. The survey instruments needed to provide 
valid, unbiased and complete results. The data were collected from different sources. The 
survey instruments used were: (1) a survey of household heads; (2) a survey of the members 
of the Executive Committee; and (3) secondary sources.  
 
Field data collection is the most reliable way to get comparable data with the best validity. 
However, more observations do not always result in a more representative sample. Trade-offs 
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between the quantity of observations and geographic width affect both the research analysis 
and the validity of the data (Poteete & Ostrom, 2008). There are also constraints on resources, 
timeframe and the choice of methods for data collection. Hence, it has been considered that 
effort focus on balancing high quality data with the need to achieve the goals and objectives 
of the research.  
 
According to the social structure of Nepalese society and its practices, women are usually 
responsible for the management of household activities and men manage the work outside 
their house and in the community. Hence, women possess more household information 
regarding the household management such as cooking resources, vis-à-vis firewood, fodder 
and grass to feed livestock. Men are accountable for creating the environment for their 
partner to access these resources. Hence, to standardize the survey, both women and men 
were interviewed.  
 
The survey team comprised eight members including the principal researcher. The team was 
administered and oriented with in-house training particularly about the survey method, survey 
techniques and the objectives of the survey. A pilot survey was carried out on both small and 
large size households inside and outside the survey area to obtain validity and information 
about how well the draft questionnaire performed. The pilot test was conducted in 10 
households comprising rich, medium, poor and poorest households in two CFUGs, one 
outside and one inside of the survey CFUGs. Members of the survey team participated in the 
pilot test and all interviews involved in the test. The pilot test provided an excellent training 
experience for the interviewers regarding the design, question settings and information 
provided by households and an estimate of the amount of time needed to complete the 
questionnaire. This test also provided ideas, information and exposed flaws in the 
questionnaire. As the questionnaire was translated into the Nepali language further ideas 
about errors, accuracy, sequence, clarity of the content conveyed and any differences between 
the English and Nepali language questionnaire due to loss or change of data due to translation 
were also provide by the interview team. The pilot test not only gave idea about translation 
pitfalls of the draft questionnaire a check for the overlooked problems but also provided the 
entire field work plan, including the supervision methods, editing and modifying some 
questions, and testing of the entire process so that the team could be assured that the survey 
was ready for implementation.  
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The interview team provided information about the objectives of the survey to the 
respondents and set out the meeting time beforehand to conduct the real survey so that most 
respondents had the opportunity to attend an interview. Attendance rates for interviews were 
over 95%.  
 
Before the survey, meetings were organised with key informants, executive committee 
members of CFUGs, government officials including the District Forest Officer of Baglung, 
local non-governmental organizations and interest groups (e.g., associations, forest traders 
and craftsmen). The aim of these meetings was to get a general overview of the conduct, 
governance and performance of the CFUG programme and compile a list of participating 
CFUGs from which the interviewees were selected. There were CFUGs member meetings in 
each of the selected CFUGs to inform them about the objectives of the survey, how the 
survey operated at the CFUG level, and how to compile household lists from which 
households were selected by stratified random sampling for the survey. 
5.5 Sampling 
Household level data were collected by stratified random sampling from 10 households in 
each CFUG representing rich, medium, poor and poorest household heads. There were 310 
households surveyed from 31 CFUGs. It was determined that at least two households be 
selected from each wellbeing category and two households were selected from any category 
depending upon the availability of household heads. Very few households had a woman as a 
household head. Hence, it was also decided to select women as far as applicable and available 
for interview. 
 
Households were also selected to represent community social structures and ethnic caste 
composition. Most peasants in rural area have a low standard lifestyle. Each CFUG identified 
and collected information about household income and expenditure as well as a wide range of 
demographic information from individual households including the wellbeing categories of 
user households included in the composition of the CFUG. In reference to the DFO Baglung, 
household income was defined as the sum of the gross income received by each household 
member aged 18 years or over from following sources: 
1. wages and salaries, including payment for piecework for the previous 12 months of 
earning; 
2. self-employment income (defined as the tax profit/loss of the business);  
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3. work and income benefits and pensions; and  
4. income from investments (including interest, dividends, rent (net of expenses) and 
royalties).  
Hence, the survey team followed these identified wellbeing categories compiled by the 
CFUGs in selecting a household for interview. The description of the questionnaire 
development is given in the next section. 
5.6 Questionnaire Development 
The main sources of data were the household survey and the CFUG-level survey conducted 
in seven Village Development Committees (VDCs) and one Baglung municipality between 
August and October 2007. A team of eight members, including the principal researcher, 
administered the household and EC member interviews in 31 CFUGs in Baglung. The 
CFUGs were randomly selected based on the information from the DFO and District Level 
Community Forestry User Group Federation (FECOFUN) of Baglung. The survey was 
approved by the Human Ethics Committee of Lincoln University, New Zealand. The 
questionnaire was also verified by the Senior Social Researcher and social foresters and 
pretested in Nepal. The questionnaire was administered by a survey team under the guidance 
of the principal researcher. The following section describes the household survey. 
5.6.1 Household Survey 
A household survey was carried out by generating a list of the household heads and the list 
was also verified with the constitution of CFUGs. The survey included information about 
household attributes and private endowments. A structured questionnaire was prepared for 
the household survey. The questionnaire was divided into four parts. The first part covered 
general information about household demographics such as livestock holdings, land holdings, 
off-farm income and the education of the household head. Livestock information included the 
numbers of buffaloes, cows and goats/sheep. Off-farm income included cash income from 
jobs, business and sale of products. Wellbeing category was confirmed with the CFUG 
information. Landholding included areas of Khetland (irrigated), Bari land (non-irrigated) 
Kharbari and Butyan land. The respondents were also asked whether their food production 
was over 12 months food sufficiency, 12 months food sufficiency, 9 months food sufficiency, 
6 months food sufficiency, or 3 months and less food sufficiency.   
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The second part covered social structure information including ethnicity, caste, religion, 
language, age, marital status, household size and occupation of household head.  
 
The third part of the survey covered the leadership selection process and experience as a 
leader. All respondents were asked whether they had ever been an executive committee 
member in the CFUG and/or been a leader in a NGO. They were also asked about the 
structure of EC and its role in the decision-making process for the distribution of CF 
products.  
 
Finally, they were also asked about the CF resources and the amount and distribution of 
products obtained from CF. The survey included the amount of CF products collected by 
households from the community forest. Respondents were also asked the distance from their 
household to the community forest, the involvement of the household in various roles and 
activities of the CF establishment and development. The complete household survey 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix A.  
5.6.2 Survey of the Executive Committees of the CFUGs 
This survey was conducted specifically to gather data about the CFUGs as whole. The main 
respondents for this survey were the key EC members including the chairperson, vice-
chairperson, secretary and treasurer. As previously stated, it was hypothesised that the open 
periods of the forest for extraction of CF products determined the choices for distribution and 
production. Therefore, the number of days for extraction of CF, amount of distribution of CF 
products and the different parameters in the process of decision-making were the focus of the 
survey.  
 
The CFUG questionnaire was divided into four sections. The first part sought general 
information about the CFUG, The EC members were asked about name, address of the 
CFUG and number of households in the rich, medium, poor and poorest categories in the 
CFUG. The data collected about the ethnic representation in the CFUG were number of elite 
caste, Dalit and Janjati households in the CFUG. The second part sought resources 
information. EC members were asked about the total area of the CF including timber area and 
grazing area, and forest types (pine, mixed and broadleaf). The third section covered the 
structure of the EC. The EC members were asked the occupation and education of the 
chairperson of the CFUG. They were also asked about the representation of EC members 
from various wellbeing and ethnic caste households in the CFUG and about the rules, 
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regulations and practices of the CFUG for benefit distribution from CF. The EC members 
were asked to provide information about the income and expenditure of the group. The main 
sources of CFUG income are the trading of timber, firewood and other forest products, both 
inside and outside the CFUG. The survey of the EC members of the CFUGs is presented in 
Appendix B.  
 
Both CFUG and households interviews were conducted without significant problems. Most 
CFUG members who attended the interviews were willing to sacrifice 2.5 to 4 hours to be 
interviewed. In many interviews particularly at household level, the spouse and other 
members of household were also present and they had discussions with the interviewee 
before deciding the answer. The discussions produced more refined data before being noted 
on the questionnaire sheet. 
5.7 Data from Secondary Sources 
The data that could not be obtained directly from interviews were collected from various 
sources like the FECOFUN, DFO and LFP offices of Baglung District. This included for 
example, feed requirements per livestock unit data, fodder value in terms of Total Digestible 
Nutrient (TDN) and livestock productivity. The main sources of information were as follows: 
 
 Coniferous, broadleaf and mixed forests for the selection of the CF were identified 
from the records available from FECOFUN, DFO and LFP of Baglung District. 
 Landholding patterns within the selected area and Baglung district, particularly for 
agricultural crop production, were collected from (Gurung, 2005) for comparison with 
the information from the research site.  
 Household wellbeing categories were obtained from the research site and data 
compared and verified with Malla (2000). 
 The fodder and feed requirements per livestock number; the livestock types were 
benchmarked as livestock units by using conversion factors such as cattle (0.5), 
buffalo (0.5) and sheep/goats (0.20) (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 2005; Sekhar, 
1998). Fodder and crop residues are the main feed of these animals. The nutritive 
values of these residues vary. The fodder values are in terms of TDN. The Master 
Plan of the Forestry Sector (1989) explained the crop residues’ productivity, their 
nutritive values and information on livestock feed requirements. Tree fodder 
productivity data were collected for this study. 
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 Timber and firewood productivity information. 
5.8 Data Description 
As described above, data were from main three sources: (a) the household survey; (b) the 
survey of the ECs of CFUGs; and (c) from secondary sources. The main purpose of this 
section is to summarise key information from the surveys provide an overview of CFUGs in 
the study, and to explore how the data links to the study objectives. This includes the 
leadership composition of EC, the effect of EC structure on the distribution rules of CF 
products. 
5.8.1 Household Classification 
Wellbeing and income categories are used to classify households. Wellbeing is a measure of 
the broader social and economic status of households in in a community and contains 
elements of social and economic indicators. Most household members in a CFUG are ranked 
in terms of wellbeing through a participatory approach. In a participatory wellbeing ranking 
process, a CFUG member who participates is ranked into a wellbeing category based on 
socioeconomic factors. The staff of bilateral projects like the Livelihood and Forestry 
Programme (LFP), NGOs, CBOs, District Forest teams and the FECOFUN work as 
facilitators to inform all the participants about the wellbeing ranking, its objective and 
usefulness to conduct the wellbeing ranking of the group. The leading socioeconomic and 
social status factors selected for wellbeing ranking were more or less same in each CFUG. 
The factors determining the household categories were landholding size, sufficiency of food 
grains, livestock holdings, education level of household family members, employment in 
public service, NGO service, remittance from overseas and India, family size, off-farm 
income, and physical properties such as house, machinery, tractors, buses, taxis and trucks 
ownership. This categorisation of wellbeing ranking by wealth and social status through the 
participatory approach is well recognised in rural development projects and most government 
line agencies, and NGOs have replicated it in their own initiatives (Malla, et al., 2005; Sollis, 
1992) .  
 
However, in rural Nepal, the identification of the wellbeing category is still a subjective and 
onerous process (National Planning Commission, 2006, 2007). A rich household in one 
community may be poor in another community and a woman belonging to a high income 
household may have a higher workload than a woman in a household with a low income  
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(Dhakal, 2006). Details of what constitute rich, medium, poor and poorest households are 
outlined below: 
 
Rich: In this category, households have houses made of bricks, some livestock, at least one 
member of the family in a public job, engaged in business or with some other secure off-farm 
income, able to lend money to the others and having a lot of trees on their own land. They 
have the capacity to use mechanised tools for agricultural production. Those who earn off-
farm income are mainly in government service, teachers, persons working abroad and 
servicemen in the Indian, Brunei or British armies. They all have a communication device 
including mobile phones, radios, televisions, digital cameras, movie cameras or cassette 
players. 
 
Medium: These households have medium-size houses built with slate, tin and second class 
brick. They have their own agricultural land and employ farm labour. They have the 
capability to use chemical fertilizer and improved seeds as a semi-mechanised farmers. They 
have medium off-farm income or a small business, and are able to send their children to a 
medium type of school and college. They have 3 to 4 livestock. They may have some type of 
communication accessories such as digital cameras, video cameras or televisions. 
 
Poor: Mostly illiterate or with limited access to education. They have medium-sized thatched 
houses. Most have poor quality, small land holdings, and 1 to 2 livestock. They cultivate 
other farmer’s land on a sharing basis. They are mostly engaged as wage labourers by rich 
and elite farmers and send their children to local government schools. They have no trees  on 
their farm and rely on the CF for their basic forest product needs. They usually do not have 
any communication devices except a radio.    
 
Poorest: They have insufficient livestock and land for their basic needs. They have no other 
source of income. They have to work as daily wage labourers for rich and medium 
households. They are unable to send their children to school. Almost all have no trees on their 
own farmland and they depend on the CF for their basic forest product needs. They do not 
have any communication device.  
 
The average wellbeing of the households of 31 CFUGs are presented in Figure 5.2. On 
average, rich households were 22%, medium 43%, poor 28% and poorest 9% in the CFUGs  
of the surveyed area. There were 37% of households in the poor and poorest categories that 
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represented a large proportion of the CFUGs. National data show that these categories of 
wellbeing households are 41.8% nationally (World Bank, 2008). Thus there is a lower 
percentage of poor and poorest households in surveyed area compared with the national level.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Average proportion of households by wellbeing on CFUG and EC in 31 
CFUGs in the sampled area  
 
The average percentage of households represented on the EC from the categories were rich 
59%, medium 21%, poor 17% and poorest 4%. This result indicates that rich households 
were considerably over represented on the ECs of CFUGs compared with the same categories 
representation in the communities. The medium, poor and poorest households were under 
represented on the ECs of CFUGs. 
5.8.2 Food sufficiency 
For this thesis another measure of wealth is food sufficiency. This was categorized on the 
basis of food production from farmer’s own land in a year.  
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Over 12 month food sufficiency with surplus: This category refers to households having 
sufficient food for over 12 month, with a surplus that can be sold and 20 to 30 Ropani
10 
of 
good quality of their own farm land including khet and Bari. 
12 month food sufficiency: Sufficient food for 12 months, and some surplus that may be 
used to buy other household needs, and 10 to 20 Ropani of their own farmland. 
9 month food sufficiency: Household with sufficient food for 9 months from own farmland, 
and 7 to 10 Ropani of their own farmland. 
6 month food sufficiency: Sufficient for 6 months, and 5 to 10 Ropani of their own 
farmland. 
3 month food sufficiency: Sufficient food for 3 months or less, and with less than 5 Ropani 
of farmland or landless.  
5.8.3 Caste and ethnicity 
Community social structure is highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and caste. The main 
ethnic castes are Brahmin, Chettri, Thakuri, Newar, Magar, Kami, Sarki, Pariyar and Majhi. 
Majhi are indigenous people living around the Baglung municipality of the Ramrekha 
Community Forestry Users’ area. The Majhi is the least socio-economically developed ethnic 
group in the research area. Most are illiterate. They have neither registered land nor cattle. 
However, they have small huts on non-registered land, usually around the Ramrekha CF. 
They spend much of their time fishing in the Kaligandaki River, collecting vegetables, and 
working for others as labourers.  
 
The average representation of ethnic caste households at the CFUGs and EC levels are 
presented on Figure 5.3. The representation of elite caste, Janjati and Dalit households were 
67%, 16% and 17%, respectively, at the communities level but elite caste households were 
79%, Janjati 10 % and Dalit 11% on the ECs of CFUGs. This finding indicates that elite 
caste households were over-represented on the EC compared with Janjati and Dalit 
households.  
 
                                                 
10.  20 Ropani is equal to 1 hectare  
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Figure 5.3 Average percent of ethnic caste household at CFUGs and EC level 
5.8.4 CFUG Data 
CF products of timber, firewood, fodder and leaf litter are very important products for 
households for their basic needs. The CF area (ha), amount of timber (cft), amount of 
firewood (Bhari
11)
 and Leaf litter (Bhari) distributed by  the CFUG are shown in Table 5.1. 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, 10 CFUGs had less than 10 ha of CF, 7 CFUGs had between 10 
and 20 ha, 6 CFUGs had between 21 and 30 ha, 6 CFUGs had between 31 and 75 ha, 2 
CFUGs had more than 75 ha of CF.  Table 5.1 shows that many CFUGs produce no timber 
while others produced a large amount. For example, one CFUG with 8.70 ha of CF extracted 
650 cft for distribution whereas another CF with an area of 291 ha had extracted 552 cft of 
timber. It is also apparent that the CF area is not the sole reason for the extraction of timber.  
 
Several factors affect the harvesting of timber, firewood, fodder and leaf litter. The 
experience of the researcher as a District Forest Officer shows that extraction of timber is 
based on the condition of the forest. Malukapatal CFUG has juvenile forest whereas 
Mauribhid has a mature forest. Similarly, firewood collection is also based up on the type of 
species, condition of forest and the demand by the local households. For example, 
Chhaharedhara Kailampokhari Baglung CFUG has only 5.54 ha of CF but collected 1000 
Bhari of firewood while Sunakhari had 75.75 ha of CF but collected only 700 Bhari of 
firewood. Comparing the amount collected of those two CFUGs, Chhaharedhara 
Kailampokhari CFUG had 180 Bhari per ha and Sunakhari 9.24 Bhari per ha.  
                                                 
11  Bhari 1=40kg 
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As observed by the researcher, the CF of Sunakhari had a forest with Pinus wallichiana 
whereas Chhaharedhara Kailampokhari had a bushy and mixed plantation forest with 
broadleaf species that could provide higher amounts of firewood. 
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Table 5.1 The distributed amount of CF product by CFUGs in the sampled area 
 
Sn 
 
CFUG name 
 
Area (ha) 
 
Forest type Amount of 
timber(cft) 
Amount of 
Firewood(Bhari) 
Amount of 
Fodder (Bhari) 
Amount of Leaf 
litter (Bhari) 
12     Dhursheni Baglung  10 2.34 Broadleaf 0.00 20.00 0.00 1550.51 
9     Jhangali Baglung  9 3.00 Conifer 0.00 0.00 137.21 357.51 
11     Chutreni  Baglung  11 5.10 Mixed 0.00 30.00 0.00 235.10 
28     Chhaharedhara Kailampokhari Baglung   4 5.54 Mixed 0.00 1000.00 0.00 250.28 
26     Chitepani Baglung  9 6.32 Mixed 0.00 234.00 0.00 125.72 
3     Bhimara Sigana 3,4 6.50 Conifer 0.00 5227.50 0.00 196.14 
19     Dhandh Malika 2,3 6.75 Conifer 0.00 250.00 283.50 362.97 
15     Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 7.37 Mixed 0.00 530.00 0.00 713.80 
10     Bancharedunga Baglung  9 8.25 Conifer 0.00 120.00 0.00 1068.00 
23     Mauribhid Malika 5 8.70 Conifer 650.00 550.00 59.45 497.20 
2     Doyapragasti 10.50 Conifer 500.00 500.00 0.00 143.33 
14     Gobneri Painyopata 6 11.17 Broadleaf 0.00 315.00 0.00 110.63 
4     Chamere Tityang, 5 12.30 Mixed 0.00 312.00 0.00 0.00 
6     Simal pata Titang 6,7,9 15.89 Mixed 86.00 840.00 53.46 215.60 
21     Slyanipakha, Malika 1,3,4 16.75 Mixed 170.00 1350.00 0.00 580.08 
7     Chhipchhipepale Baglung 11 17.60 Broadleaf 0.00 564.00 856.98 26.79 
22     Chyangrekharga Baglung 8 18.71 Mixed 1200.00 120.00 0.00 248.72 
5     Bhagawat ChisapaniTitang 1 21.10 Broadleaf 0.00 121.00 0.00 363.99 
31     
30     
Jograni Painyopata 3 
Shakhinichaur Paiyopata 2 
22.50 
22.75 
Broadleaf 
Conifer 
100.00 
0.00 
450.00 
220.00 
0.00 
0.00 
540.50 
280.22 
16     Rani bhumi Sigana 1 2 3  25.50 Broadleaf 500.00 1100.00 0.00 165.20 
13    Dhoreni Baglung  10,11 28.23 Conifer 0.00 760.00 0.00 470.00 
1     Byaldhara Baglung  7 29.72 Conifer 0.00 0.00 232.15 499.50 
8     Daha Bhakunde 6,7 36.24 Mixed 90.00 1500.00 0.00 2245.03 
25     Ramrekha Baglung  1 41.00 Mixed 0.00 1325.00 361.26 1601.90 
27     ReshBuchhung salleri Resh 3 46.06 Mixed 283.00 250.00 518.40 829.42 
29     Dhadhkarka Bhakunde 9 49.00 Mixed 30.00 435.00 283.50 92.71 
20     Titaure Palakot 7-9 74.73 Conifer 800.00 220.00 0.00 1286.31 
24     Sunakhari Malika 7,8,9 75.75 Conifer 5000.00 700.00 243.00 371.80 
18     SanghukholaRatopahara Resh 3,4 141.00 Broadleaf 402.00 1389.00 189.05 718.20 
17     Malukapatal Resh 1, 2 291.15 conifer 552.00 3547.00 226.80 1452.10 
 Average 34.44  334.29 773.53 111.12 586.64 
 Maximum 291.15  5000.00 5227.50 856.98 2245.03 
 Minimum 2.34  0.00 0.00 0.00 26.79 
 
Source: CFUG data
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The broadleaf forest of Chhipchhipepale Baglung CFUG of 17.60 ha produced 857 Bhari of 
fodder whereas Malukapatal with 291.15 ha of forest collected only 227 Bhari of fodder. The 
possible reason is that the broadleaf forest contains more fodder species suitable for fodder 
collection compared with conifer forest in other CFs. The collection of leaf litter also depends 
on whether the forest is conifer or broadleaf. It appears that a broadleaf forest could produce 
higher amounts of leaf litter than conifer forest. For example, Dhursheni Baglung had 2.34 ha 
of broadleaf forest, the lowest area of the surveyed CFs, but 1550 Bhari of leaf litter was 
collected. This amount of leaf litter is considerably higher than 29 CFUGs that had a higher 
forest area.  
5.8.5 Income of CFUG 
The CFUG income obtained from the CF is one of the main attractions for the management 
and utilisation of forests by CFUGs. The main sources of income from the CF are selling 
firewood, timber, fodder and leaf litter. They also obtain income from the levy on households 
that are involved in the utilisation of the forest. The CFUGs that had higher income were able 
to operate several development activities, such as drinking water schemes, small tracks/roads, 
support to schools and other activities for enhancing the livelihood of the poor and 
disadvantaged households. Figure 5.4 shows the income per household of CFUGs in the 
survey compared to forest area per household. 
 
Out of 31 CFUGs, 30 CFUG received income from the distribution and selling of forest 
products. Of these 30 CFUGs, 5 CFUGs are removed from the Figure 5.4 because of either 
very large area or high income per household. These of the CFUGs were located close to the 
headquarter area and earned significant timber income. The forests with large area have 
degraded forest. So they have very small income from selling of forest products. For 
example, CFUGs with 0.10 ha area per household has income per household ranging from at 
least nothing to 70.00 USD
12
. Figure 5.4 shows that there is weak relation between area per 
household and income per ha. When area per household increases generally the income per 
household also increases. 
                                                 
12. NPR 72.00 is equal to USD 1 
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Figure 5.4 Total Income of the Surveyed CFUGs from CF 
 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the reasons for selecting the Baglung district, gives an overview of 
the research site and the household survey and describes the instruments and data used. 
Baglung district is one of the middle hill districts of Nepal where the CF programme has been 
conducted since 1991. The survey instruments used were a survey of household heads, a 
survey of the members of the EC and secondary sources. The household survey included 
information about household attributes and private endowments. The households were 
selected as representative of community social structures, ethnic caste composition and 
income group. The factors determining the segregation of households were landholding size, 
sufficiency of food grains, livestock holding, occupation of household head, household size, 
employment in public or I/NGO, remittances from overseas and India, off-farm income, 
physical properties such as house, machinery, tractors buses, trucks and social status gained 
due to wealth and ethnic status. Data about the rich, medium, poor and poorest households 
were also collected. Household data were randomly collected from 10 households in each 
CFUG representing rich, medium, poor and poorest households. There were 310 household 
surveyed from 31 CFUGs. The respondents were asked about the past and present 
representation of EC members from households in the CFUG and NGO membership. The EC 
members were also asked about the total income of the CFUGs obtained from selling CF 
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products and other sources like levies, donations and the punishment of members who 
collected CF products against the rules of the CFUG. This data provides the basis for an 
analysis of the research hypotheses.  
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     Chapter 6 
ATTRIBUTES OF LEADERSHIP 
6.1 Introduction 
The household attributes determining leadership in CFUGs are presented in this chapter. It is 
hypothesized that the social structural characteristics of households determine the probability 
of a household member being in a leadership position. To evaluate this hypothesis a selection 
of household attributes was analysed. The results are divided into two sections. The first 
section provides the descriptive statistics of the surveyed households and CFUGs. The 
purpose of this section is to assist in the selection of variables for the regression analysis. The 
descriptive statistics include landholding size, income, food sufficiency category and 
livestock units. The results of the logistic binary regression for the selection of leadership are 
presented in the second section. This model was described in Chapter 4 (equation 4.1). 
Different attributes of households are used as the explanatory variables.  
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The data relating to leadership are described in this section. The results are given as simple 
summaries in the form of tables and graphs along with t-tests for statistical difference. A 
descriptive statistical method is also used to examine the data for variables suitable to use in 
the logistic regression model. Two aspects of the household’s economic and social attributes 
are studied to identify whether they are correlated with the selection of leaders.  
 
In terms of economic attributes, the income and wealth of households are believed to 
influence the selection of EC members of CFUGs. The economic criteria are food 
sufficiency, landholding, livestock holding and off-farm income, including remittances from 
foreign countries such as serving in the British and Indian armies, income from public service 
and from other sources. Food sufficiency is divided into five categories: over 12 months food 
sufficiency, 12 months food sufficiency, 9 months food sufficiency, 6 months food 
sufficiency and 3 months and less food sufficiency.  
 
The social attributes considered are wellbeing (income class), ethnic caste group and NGO 
membership. The ethnic castes include elite (high caste), Dalit (lower and untouchable caste) 
and Janjati (middle caste). The hypothesis is that the elite are more likely to be represented 
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on the EC whereas the Dalit and Janjati groups will have a lower representation on the ECs. 
The wealth related variables considered in this category are locally-determined “wellbeing” 
categories in which households are categorised as rich, medium, poor and poorest. The 
hypothesis is that a rich household member is more likely to be selected as an EC member. 
Another variable is whether households have an NGO member, which is based on the belief 
that households with an NGO member are more likely to be selected as EC members. The 
hypothesis is that if poor and lower castes are empowered by NGOs through training, study 
tours and workshops about their rights, there may be increased representation of those people 
on the EC. 
6.2.1 Leadership and Wellbeing Category  
Table 6.1 shows the percentage of households by wellbeing category and on the EC in each 
CFUG. The CFUG level data show the distribution of different households by wellbeing 
categories as determined by the CFUG. In the Shakhinichaur Paiyopata CFUG, 68% of 
households are classed as being rich, which is the highest of the 31 surveyed CFUGs. As 
observed by the researcher, the reason for the high proportion of rich households is because 
Shakhinichaur Paiyopata is located a short distance from the Baglung and Parpat district 
headquarters. This produces a community with more opportunity to conduct business 
including selling farm products in a market.  
 
The first seven CFUGs with a high proportion of rich households are located around the 
headquarters of Baglung. These communities have more opportunity to access markets. The 
next 10 CFUGs are in valley areas where there is plain land cultivated for agricultural 
products but which are further from markets. As a consequence, these communities have a 
large proportion of medium income households. The remaining 13 CFUGs are generally 
located in remote areas where there is limited ability to produce agricultural products because 
of steeper slopes, which are less suitable for agriculture, as well as the difficulty in accessing 
markets. This accounts for the higher proportion of poor households in these CFUGs.   
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Table 6.1 The relative proportion of Nepalese households at the CFUG and EC level by wellbeing category 
 
Sn 
 
CFUG name 
 
Proportion of Households by wellbeing  Proportion of households on EC by wellbeing 
RichHh (%) MedHh (%) Poor Hh (%) PoorestHh (%) RichHh % MedHh% PoorHh %  PoorestHh % 
30 Shakinichaur, Paiyopata 2 0.68 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.70 0.00 0.30 0.00 
21 Slyanipakha, Malika 1,2,3 0.47 0.26 0.22 0.04 0.70 0.00 0.30 0.00 
2 Doyapragati 0.44 0.24 0.28 0.00 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.00 
9 Jhangali, Baglung 9 0.44 0.23 0.21 0.13 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.00 
3 Bhimara, Sigana 0.43 0.36 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.00 
15 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 0.33 0.55 0.10 0.02 0.50 0.20 0.30 0.00 
8 Daha, Bhakunde 6,7 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.00 
7 Chhipchhipepale Baglung 11 0.32 0.42 0.10 0.16 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.10 
14 Gobneri,Paiyopata 6 0.26 0.47 0.26 0.00 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.00 
1 Byaldhara Baglung 7 0.26 0.61 0.13 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.00 
29 Dhadhakarka Bhakunde 9 0.23 0.48 0.28 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 
12 Dhursheni Baglung 10 0.23 0.45 0.27 0.05 0.60 0.30 0.00 0.10 
31 Jograni Paiyopata 3 0.20 0.65 0.11 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 Chutreni Baglung 11 0.19 0.29 0.35 0.16 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 
18 Sanghukhola Rato Resh 3, 4 0.18 0.65 0.14 0.02 0.50 0.20 0.30 0.00 
23 Mauribhid Malika 5 0.18 0.55 0.18 0.18 0.60 0.30 0.10 0.00 
20 Tittaure Palakot 7, 8,9 0.18 0.25 0.54 0.03 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.10 
17 Malukapatal Resh 1,2 0.18 0.20 0.55 0.07 0.20 0.50 0.30 0.00 
10 Bancharedhunga Baglung 9 0.15 0.19 0.63 0.03 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.10 
5 Bhagwati Chisapani,Titang 1 0.13 0.76 0.08 0.03 0.80 0.10 0.10 0.00 
4 Chamere Titang 5 0.13 0.36 0.38 0.13 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.10 
6 Simal Pata Titang, 6,7,9 0.12 0.73 0.12 0.03 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.00 
19 Dhandha Malika 2,3 0.10 0.33 0.45 0.12 0.20 0.60 0.10 0.10 
22 ChyangreKharga Baglung,8 0.09 0.30 0.35 0.26 0.70 0.00 0.20 0.10 
16 Ranibhumi, Sigana, 1,2,3 0.09 0.32 0.47 0.09 0.70 0.00 0.20 0.10 
13 Dhoreni Baglung 10,11 0.08 0.27 0.56 0.04 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.00 
26 Chitepani baglung 9 0.08 0.17 0.41 0.35 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.10 
24 Sunakhari,Malika 7,8,9 0.07 0.65 0.21 0.04 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.00 
25 Ramrekha, Baglung 1 0.07 0.55 0.15 0.22 0.70 0.20 0.00 0.10 
28 Chhaharedhara, Baglung 4 0.05 0.81 0.02 0.12 0.70 0.00 0.30 0.00 
27 Reshbuchung, Salleri 0.02 0.63 0.35 0.00 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.00 
 Maximum 0.68 0.81 0.63 0.35 1.00 0.60 0.40 0.10 
 Minimum 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Average 0.22 0.43 0.28 0.09 0.59 0.21 0.17 0.04 
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Table 6.1 also shows the representation on the current EC of each CFUG by wellbeing 
category. The rich household group constitutes 22% of CFUG households on average, but 
about 59% of the membership of the EC. The medium household group constitutes 43% of 
the CFUG households, on average, but represents only 21% of the membership of the EC. 
The poor household group constitutes 28% of the CFUG households, on average, and 17% of 
the membership of the EC. The poorest household group constitutes 9% of the CFUG 
households, on average, but only 4% of the membership of the EC. The results indicate that 
rich households are over represented in CFUG leadership and the other groups are generally 
under represented.  
 
In order to evaluate whether the wellbeing attributes of a household may be one factor in the 
selection of leaders, a two sample t-test assuming unequal variances was conducted to 
analyse whether the mean of these wellbeing groups is statistically different between each set 
of wellbeing groups. Table 6.2 shows the results for the relationship between household 
wellbeing characteristics and leadership status by household category in each CFUG. The t-
test analysis result shows that there is a significant negative difference between rich and 
medium households. The t-test values also show a significant positive difference between 
medium and poor, medium and poorest households. Hence, the overall results indicate that 
wellbeing category could be a suitable variable for the econometric analysis. 
 
Table 6.2  The t-test ratio matrix of wellbeing and position on the Executive Committee 
of community forests in Nepal (N=310)  
 
Wellbeing 
category 
Rich 
 
Medium 
 
Poor 
 
Poorest 
 
Critical two-
tail value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Rich           
Medium -3.38*    2   520   
Poor -1.2 4.37*   2 2  510 560  
Poorest 1.92 6.65* 2.15*  2 2 2 560 530 530 
 
* Statistically significant. The critical two-tail value at 5% significance is 1.96. 
Source: Household survey 
6.2.2 Leadership and Ethnic Caste  
It is believed that people belonging to elite caste households are more likely to be leaders of 
CFUGs. To test this, Table 6.3 compares the caste representation at the CFUG and EC levels. 
The relative representation of castes on the EC compared with the CFUG is one way to verify 
whether a caste was over, or under, represented. This is calculated as the proportion of a caste 
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on the EC divided by its proportion of the CFUG population. Table 6.3 shows the 
representation on the current EC of each CFUG by caste category. The elite caste household 
group constitutes 67% of CFUG households, on average, but about 79% of the membership 
of the EC. The Dalit household group constitutes 16% of the CFUG households, on average, 
but represents only 10% of the membership of the EC. The Janjati household group 
constitutes 17% of the CFUG households, on average, and 11% of the membership of the EC.  
 
Table 6.3 also shows that the average relative representation of elite households on the EC is 
greater than representation in the community (1.27), whereas Dalit (0.43) and Janjati (0.40) 
are underrepresented. A value of 1 means that representation on the EC is proportionate to the 
share of the population, greater than 1 means over represented and less than 1 means under 
represented.   
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Table 6.3 The proportion of Nepalese households at the CFUGs and EC levels by ethnic caste 
 
   Percent of households in CFUG Percent of Households on EC Relative Representation 
Sn CFUGs name Elite Dalit Janjati Elite Dalit Janjati Elite Dalit Janjati 
1 Byaldhara Baglung 7 0.80 0.20  0.70 0.30  0.88 1.50  
10 Bancharedhunga Baglung 9 0.80 0.20  0.70 0.30  0.88 1.50  
24 sunakhari,Malika 7,8,9 1.00   1.00   1.00   
19 Dhandha Malika 2,3 1.00   1.00   1.00   
31 Jograni Paiyopata 3 0.30  0.70 0.30  0.70 1.00  1.00 
11 Chutreni Baglung 11 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.25 
25 Ramrekha, Baglung 1 1.00   1.00   1.00   
23 Mauribhid Malika 5 1.00   1.00   1.00   
30 Shakinichaur, Paiyopata 2 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.70 0.10 0.20 1.00 0.50 2.00 
16 Ranibhumi, Sigana, 1,2,3 1.00   1.00   1.00   
5 Bhagwati Chisapani,Titang 1 0.90  0.10 1.00  0.00 1.11  0.00 
3 Bhimara, Sigana 0.90  0.10 1.00  0.00 1.11  0.00 
29 Dhadhakarka Bhakunde 9 0.80 0.20  0.90 0.10  1.13 0.50  
7 Chhipchhipepale Baglung 11 0.80 0.20  0.90 0.10  1.13 0.50  
28 Chhaharedhara, Baglung 4 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.80 0.00 0.20 1.14 0.00 2.00 
27 Reshbuchung, Salleri 0.60 0.40  0.70 0.30  1.17 0.75  
15 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 0.50 0.50  0.60 0.40  1.20 0.80  
4 Chamere Titang 5 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.60 0.30 0.10 1.20 0.75 1.00 
2 Doyapragati 0.70 0.30  0.90 0.10  1.29 0.33  
18 Sanghukhola Rato Resh 3, 4 0.70 0.30  0.90 0.10  1.29 0.33  
9 Jhangali, Baglung 9 0.70  0.30 0.90  0.10 1.29  0.33 
21 Slyanipakha, Malika 1,2,3 0.70 0.30  0.90 0.10  1.29 0.33  
8 Daha, Bhakunde 6,7 0.60 0.30 0.10 0.80 0.10 0.10 1.33 0.33 1.00 
6 Simal Pata Titang, 6,7,9 0.60 0.30 0.10 0.80 0.00 0.20 1.33 0.00 2.00 
13 Dhoreni Baglung 10,11 0.60 0.10 0.30 0.80 0.10 0.10 1.33 1.00 0.33 
14 Gobneri,Paiyopata 6 0.60 0.40  0.90 0.10  1.50 0.25  
22 ChyangreKharga Baglung,8 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.80 0.10 0.10 1.60 1.00 0.25 
17 Malukapatal Resh 1,2 0.60  0.40 1.00  0.00 1.67  0.00 
12 Dhursheni Baglung 10 0.40 0.10 0.50 0.70 0.20 0.10 1.75 2.00 0.20 
26 Chitepani baglung 9 0.40 0.10 0.50 0.70 0.10 0.20 1.75 1.00 0.40 
20 Tittaure Palakot 7, 8,9 0.10  0.90 0.30  0.70 3.00  0.78 
  Average proportion (%) 0.67 0.16 0.17 0.79 0.10 0.11 1.27 0.43 0.40 
 
Source: Household survey 
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It can be seen that, generally, the elite caste is never underrepresented on the EC. The relative 
representation of elite caste households is 1.27, which is much higher than Dalit caste 
households at 0.43 and Janjati caste household at EC 0.40.  
 
To examine whether caste-based representation on the EC is statistically different, a t-test 
assuming unequal variances was conducted. Table 6.4 shows that the t statistic value is 
greater than the critical two tail value for the elite, Dalit and Janjati castes, which indicates 
that the elite castes are statistically positively different from the Dalit and Janjati castes and 
Janjati is negatively different from the Dalit. This shows that caste could be a suitable 
variable for econometric analysis. 
 
Table 6.4 The t statistics of the ratio of ethnic caste representation on EC of CFUGs  
  
  t-Test: two-sample assuming unequal variances for ratio of ethnic caste 
 
ElitHh 
 
Dalit 
 
Janjati 
 
Critical two-
tail values 
DF 
 
Numbers of 
Observation 
Elite            
Dalit 4.26*   1.96  429  310 310   
Janjati 4.43* -3.99*  1.96 1.96 616 444 310 310 310 310 
 
* Statistically significant, critical two-tail value at the 5% significance level is 1.96. 
 
The results indicate that with many castes or ethnic groups in a community, the poor have to 
overcome issues related to their caste as well as wealth, meaning the organisational elite 
model B (Figure3.1) becomes important. When the poor are of the same caste as the rich, 
then the only issues they have to overcome to participate on the EC is their wealth status, 
meaning the organisational elite model A (Figure 3.1) becomes important. 
 
6.2.3 Food Sufficiency  
Most households in rural areas depend on agricultural products they produce themselves, 
particularly for food. Access to food is a key factor in becoming involved in social activities 
including leadership at the local level, especially in the hill and mountain districts. 
Households with food sufficiency of more than 9 months in a year have high social prestige 
and are consistently more represented in decision-making units of CF than the low food 
sufficiency households (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 2009; J. R. Campbell, 2005). In order to 
evaluate whether food sufficiency may be one of the attributes for leadership selection, 
households surveyed in each CFUG were asked about their food sufficiency status and 
whether they currently held, or had at any time in the past held, leadership positions on the 
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EC. Table 6.5 shows the proportion of households surveyed in each CFUG by food 
sufficiency category and EC leadership position.  
  
The proportion of EC members in each food sufficiency category was calculated by dividing 
the total number of EC members in the each food sufficiency category by the total number of 
households surveyed in that food sufficiency category. On average, households with a food 
surplus and 12 month food sufficiency have a higher representation in EC than others. Care 
must be taken in interpreting too much more into this result, since it is developed from a 
stratified random sample in each CFUG rather than being based on a sample of all 
households in a CFUG. As discussed in Chapter 5, 10 households covering different wealth 
categories were interviewed in each CFUG. 
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Table 6.5 EC membership and food sufficiency of Nepalese households  
 
 CFUG Name Food Surplus 12month Sufficiency 9month Sufficiency 6 month Sufficiency 3 month Sufficiency 
Sn CFUG name EC 
member 
Total 
HH 
% EC 
member 
EC 
member 
Total 
HH 
% 
member 
 
 
EC 
member 
Total 
HH 
% EC 
member 
 
 
EC 
member 
Total 
HH 
% EC 
member 
EC 
Member 
Total 
HH 
% EC 
member 
 
 
1 Byaldhara Baglung Municipality  7 3 3 1.00 2 2 1.00      1 5 0.20  0 0  
2 Doyapragasti 0 1 0.00 3 3 1.00    2 3 0.67 2 3 0.67 
3 Bhimara Sigana    6 6 1.00    1 3 0.33 0 1 0.00 
4 Chamere Tityang, 5 3 3 1.00 1 1 1.00    4 5 0.80 0 1 0.00 
5 Bhagawat ChisapaniTitang 1          2 3 0.67 1 7 0.14 
6 Simal pata Titang 6,7,9 1 1 1.00 0 1 0.00    2 4 0.50 1 4 0.25 
7 Chhipchhipepale Baglung  11          2 6 0.33 2 4 0.50 
8 Daha Bhakunde 6,7 1 1 1.00 1 2 0.50 1 1 1.00 2 4 0.50 1 2 0.50 
9 Jhangali Baglung  9 1 2 0.50 1 1 1.00 0 1 0.00 2 3 0.67 1 3 0.33 
10 Bancharedunga Baglung  9    5 4 1.25    2 5 0.40 0 1 0.00 
11 Chutreni  Baglung  11 2 2 1.00 2 2 1.00    1 1 1.00 3 5 0.60 
12 Dhursheni Baglungy 10 2 2 1.00       1 4 0.25 0 4 0.00 
13 Dhoreni Baglung  10,11 0 2 0.00       2 5 0.40 1 3 0.33 
14 Gobneri Painyopata 6 2 2 1.00 1 1 1.00    1 4 0.25 1 3 0.33 
15 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 1 1 1.00 1 1 1.00 0 2 0.00 0 1 0.00 1 5 0.20 
16 Rani bhumi Sigana 1 2 3  2 4 0.50 0 2 0.00    0 1 0.00 1 3 0.33 
17 Malukapatal Resh 1, 2 3 3 1.00 0 1 0.00    2 3 0.67 1 3 0.33 
18 SanghukholaRatopahara Resh 3,4 2 2 1.00 3 1 3.00 2 2 1.00 1 1 1.00 1 4 0.25 
19 Dhandh Malika 2,3 0 3 0.00 2 2 1.00    1 2 0.50 3 3 1.00 
20 Titaure Palakot 7-9 2 2 1.00 2 3 0.67    0 1 0.00 0 4 0.00 
21 Slyanipakha, Malika 1,3,4 2 3 0.67 2 3 0.67       1 4 0.25 
22 Chyangrekharga Baglung 8 0 3 0.00 0 1 0.00    0 1 0.00 1 5 0.20 
23 Mauribhid Malika 5 0 1 0.00       1 3 0.33 3 6 0.50 
24 Sunakhari Malika 7,8,9 0 1 0.00 2 2 1.00    0 1 0.00 1 6 0.17 
25 Ramrekha Baglung  1    1 2 0.50    2 3 0.67 0 5 0.00 
26 Chitepani Baglung  9 1 1 1.00 2 5 0.40    2 2 1.00 1 2 0.50 
27 ReshBuchhung salleri 1 3 0.33 2 2 1.00    1 1 1.00 3 4 0.75 
28 Chhaharedhara Kailampokhari Baglung   4 1 4 0.25       1 2 0.50 2 4 0.50 
29 Dhadhkarka Bhakunde 9 2 3 0.67 1 1 1.00    2 3 0.67 2 3 0.67 
30 Shakhinichaur Paiyopata 2 2 2 1.00 1 1 1.00    3 4 0.75 2 3 0.67 
31 Jograni Painyopata 3 2 2 1.00       4 5 0.80 0 3 0.00 
 Total 36 57 0.63 43 50 0.86 3 6 0.50 45 89 0.50 36 108 0.33 
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A two tail t-test, assuming unequal variances, was conducted to analyse whether the paired 
groups’ means were statistically different. Table 6.6 shows the test results evaluated at the 
5% significance level. The value of the t test statistic (t= 3.43) indicates that there is a 
significant difference between greater than 12 months and 12 months food sufficiency 
households and it is also more likely that they will be selected for CFUG leadership. 
Similarly, the t test value (t = 2.39) indicates that there is also a significant difference 
between greater than 12 months and 6 months food sufficiency category households. 
Likewise, the t-test (t =3.27) indicates that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the greater than 12 months and the 3 months food sufficiency category households. 
For the household groups having food sufficiency of 12 months and 9 months, the t value (t = 
3.57) is significantly different. Similarly, the t value (t = 2.13) is statistically positively 
different between the 12 months and 3 months food sufficiency households. The t-statistic 
(t=3.27) between the food sufficiency categories 9 months and 6 months shows they are 
statistically significantly different. The above results indicate that the food sufficiency 
categories over 12 months, 12 months, 9 months 6 months and 3 months food sufficiency can 
be determining factors in terms of being selected as a leader in the CFUG. This requires 
further analysis in the econometric model. 
 
Table 6.6 t-Test ratio matrix of for the food sufficiency category household                                         
representation at the EC level in Nepal (N 310) 
 
 t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances for food sufficiency 
Food 
sufficiency 
Category 
>12m 
 
12m 
 
9m 
 
6m 
 
3m 
 
Critical two-tail value 
 
Degree of Freedom 
 
>12m              
12m 3.43*     1.96    597    
9m 0.49 3.57*    1.96 1.96   617 604   
6m 2.39* 0.68 3.14*   1.96 1.96 1.96  601 618 607  
3m 3.27* 2.13* 1.42 1.21  1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 609 615 607 617 
 
* Statistically significant, critical two-tail value at the 5% significance level is 1.96. 
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6.2.3 Livestock Holdings 
Livestock is one of the indicators of social power and CF is an important source of feed for 
livestock (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 2005; Sekhar, 1998). Therefore, livestock 
holdings could be a major economic variable in determining EC membership. Average 
livestock holdings by EC and non-EC households from the household survey data are 
presented in Table 6.7. On average, EC households had 3.4 livestock units and non-EC 
member households had 2.8 units, i.e., EC member households had higher numbers than non-
EC member households.  
 
The first 8 CFUGs in Table 6.7, which are located in remote areas, had less than one relative 
livestock unit to the EC member household. It means they have no good opportunity to sell 
their livestock unit, including milk, in their own village. The 16 CFUGs EC members average 
between 1.0 and 1.47 relative livestock units. They have no access to big markets but to small 
markets like townships at the centre of those CFUGs and they have higher opportunity to sell 
their livestock products than the former eight CFUGs. The five CFUGs are around Baglung 
Bazaar; the EC member households have a significant market opportunity to sell their 
livestock products thus those CFUGs have the opportunity to manage higher units of 
livestock. From the working experience of the researcher, 2 CFUGs, Chyangrekharga 
Baglung and Salyanipakha Malika with 2.65 and 3.74 relative livestock units residing a very 
shorter distance from Baglung headquarters also had  good access to pasture lands in their 
CFUG area and outside of CFUG area as well. That provided the EC member households 
with higher units of livestock.   
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Table 6.7 The average livestock units for EC and non-EC Nepalese households 
 
                                                            EC Member 
  
 
 
Non-EC Member EC livestock/Non  
EC livestock 
Sn CFUG 
Name 
Number of 
households 
Livestock 
unit/household 
 
 
Number of 
households 
Livestock 
unit/household 
 
 
31 Daha Bhakunde 6, 7 6 1.92  4 3.30  
15 Jogarani, Paiyupata 3 3 2.61  7 3.77 0.69 
3 Bhimra  Sigana 3 6 3.26  4 3.56 0.92 
19 Dhandh Malika 2, 3 6 3.44  4 3.73 0.92 
12 Resh Buchung Salleri 3 3.00  7 3.18 0.94 
26 Jhangali Baglung 9 6 3.85  4 4.06 0.95 
23 Ranibhumi Sigana 1, 2, 3 5 3.88  5 3.97 0.98 
13 Ramrekha Baglung 1 3 3.00  7 2.99 1.00 
16 Shakhini Chaur Painyupata 2 3 2.88  7 2.89 1.00 
25 SanguKhola Ratopahara, Resh 3, 4 4.00  6 3.91 1.02 
4 Chamere  Tityang 5 7 2.06  3 1.99 1.04 
2 DoyaPragati  8 2.19  2 1.99 1.10 
17 Dhandkharka Bhakunde 9 6 3.80  4 3.44 1.10 
1 ByalDhara Baglung 7 6 2.88  4 2.58 1.12 
21 Gobreni Painyupata 6 5 4.99  5 4.32 1.16 
20 Titaure Palakot 7, 9 3 3.00  7 2.56 1.17 
7 Chhipchhepale Baglung 11  4 3.27  6 2.69 1.22 
11 Sunakhari Malika 7, 8, 9 7 3.29  3 2.66 1.24 
6 Simalpata Tityang 6, 7, 8 5 3.58  5 2.72 1.32 
22 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 1 3.00  9 2.17 1.38 
24 Maluka Patal Resh 1, 2 5 3.92  5 2.78 1.41 
5 Bhagwati Chisapani Tityang 1 3 3.00  7 2.06 1.46 
10 Mauribhid Malika 5 6 3.52  4 2.40 1.47 
28 Dhurseni Baglung Balung 10 4 4.00  6 2.62 1.53 
29 Dhoreni Baglung 10, 11 7 4.48  3 2.71 1.65 
27 Chutreni Baglung 11 7 5.03  3 2.99 1.68 
14 Chitrepani Baglung 9 6 4.16  4 2.40 1.73 
30 Bancharedhunga Baglung 9 8 3.65  2 1.99 1.83 
9 Chyangrekharga Baglung 8 5 3.45  5 1.30 2.65 
8 Salyanipakha Malika 1,8, 9 8 3.29  2 0.88 3.74 
18 Chhaharedhara Baglung 4 10 3.28     
    Total 166 Average      3.40  Total 144 Average           2.80 1.27 
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It can be seen that EC member households with an average of 3.4 livestock units have more 
units than non-EC member households that have an average 2.8 livestock units.  
 
To examine whether the differences in livestock holdings between EC and non-EC members 
was statistically significant, a t-test was conducted. The t-statistic was 10.49 with a critical 
two-tail value of 1.96 (Table 6.8). This indicates that the difference in livestock holdings is 
statistically significant between EC and non-EC households. Higher livestock units are also 
linked to wealth (rich households). Hence, livestock holdings could be included as a variable 
to be tested in the econometric analysis.   
 
Table 6.8 t-Test ratio matrix of livestock numbers of households on EC and non-EC 
member households in Nepal 
 
Category of 
household 
member 
EC member 
livestock 
unit 
Non-EC 
member 
livestock unit 
Critical two-
test value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
EC member 
livestock unit    
 
Non-EC member 
livestock unit 
10.49* 
  
1.96 
 
581 
 
 
* Statistically significant, critical two-tail value at the 5% significance level is 1.96. 
6.2.4 Landholding 
Access to land is believed to be a source of social power for selection to a leadership position 
in Nepalese society (Bennet, 2005; Bistha, 1991; Bode, 2009). Table 6.9 shows the EC and 
non-EC members’ landholdings by CFUG as well as relative land holding.  
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Table 6.9 Landholding (ha)for EC and non-EC members  
 
SN Name CFUG EC member Non-EC 
member 
Relative landholding 
(EC/Non-EC) 
22 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 0.43 0.41 1.05 
17 Dhandkharka Bhakunde 9 1.21 1.02 1.19 
5 Bhagwati Chisapani Tityang 1 1.02 0.84 1.21 
27 Chutreni Baglung 11 1.15 0.95 1.21 
29 Dhoreni Baglung 10, 11 1.11 0.88 1.26 
18 Chhaharedhara Baglung 4 0.57 0.45 1.27 
2 DoyaPragati  0.91 0.71 1.28 
24 Maluka Patal Resh 1, 2 0.98 0.73 1.34 
16 Shakhini Chaur Painyupata 2 0.68 0.48 1.42 
9 Chyangrekharga Baglung 8 0.88 0.62 1.42 
19 Dhandh Malika 2, 3 1.28 0.88 1.45 
26 Jhangali Baglung 9 1.38 0.92 1.50 
30 Bancharedhunga Baglung 9 1.41 0.93 1.52 
10 Mauribhid Malika 5 1.52 0.95 1.60 
23 Ranibhumi Sigana 1, 2, 3 2.88 1.78 1.62 
7 Chhipchhepale Baglung 11  2.81 1.72 1.63 
15 Jogarani, Paiyupata 3 2.29 1.38 1.66 
1 ByalDhara Baglung 7 2.51 1.51 1.66 
25 SanguKhola Ratopahara, Resh 3, 2.63 1.58 1.66 
12 Resh Buchung Salleri 2.77 1.66 1.67 
4 Chamere  Tityang 5 2.61 1.55 1.68 
6 Simalpata Tityang 6, 7, 8 2.73 1.62 1.69 
8 Salyanipakha Malika 1,8, 9 1.63 0.96 1.70 
28 Dhurseni Baglung Balung 10 2.45 1.43 1.71 
3 Bhimra  Sigana 3 2.21 1.28 1.73 
31 Daha Bhakunde 6, 7 1.71 0.98 1.74 
11 Sunakhari Malika 7, 8, 9 1.77 1.02 1.74 
21 Gobreni Painyupata 6 2.18 1.25 1.74 
13 Ramrekha Baglung 1 2.01 1.13 1.78 
14 Chitrepani Baglung 9 1.96 1.09 1.80 
20 Titaure Palakot 7, 9 2.09 1.15 1.82 
  Average 1.73 1.09 1.54 
                                                           
Table 6.9 shows that the average landholding for EC members is 1.73 ha and non-EC 
members it is 1.09 ha, or a 50% larger landholding size for EC members. In the entire sample, 
in 30 of 31 CFUGs EC members had at least 20% larger landholdings than non-EC members. 
To examine whether the differences in relative land holding size between EC and non-EC 
members is statistically significant, a t-test was conducted (Table 6.10). The t-statistic (2.52) 
is higher than that of the critical two-tail value (2.00). This indicates that the difference in 
land holding size is positively statistically significant. Thus land holding could be correlated 
with the selection of leadership in EC. Hence, land holding size will be included as variable 
for the econometric analysis.  
 
  
 102 
Table 6.10 t-Test of relative the comparison of own land between EC and non-EC 
members in Nepal 
 
 
EC 
members  
own land 
Non-EC 
members 
own land 
Critical 
two tail 
value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
 
No of 
observations 
 
      
EC member  own land      
Non-EC member own land 2.52*  2.00 60 31,31 
 
* Statistically significant, critical two-tail value at the 5% significance level is 1.96. 
6.2.5 Off-Farm Income   
Off-farm income is also believed to be an important factor in determining leadership positions 
in developing countries like Nepal (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 2009; A. Agrawal & Gupta, 2005). 
It is hypothesised that for off-farm income, higher income households are more likely be in 
leadership positions because higher income households get more social respect. It is also 
expected that low income households will have the lowest representation in leadership 
positions. Table 6.11 shows the relative off-farm income of EC and non-EC households by 
CFUG. The relative off-farm income was calculated by dividing the individual household 
income by average off-farm income of the particular group. Average relative income of EC or 
non-EC member households was calculated by averaging the income of the households in the 
EC and non-EC groups.   
 
The results indicate that across the 31 CFUGs. There were different off-farm relative incomes. 
The average of both EC and non-EC member households of relative off-farm income were 
1.05 and 0.98, respectively. It seems that EC member households had 5% higher off farm 
income, on average. This indicates that the EC member households with relative off-farm 
income could also be directly associated with wealth status. Hence, it also supports the 
hypothesis that wealth is one of the assets in being selected for leadership positions of the 
CFUGs under both the consensually integrated elite model and the plural elite model of 
organisational elite model in Figure 3.1.   
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Table 6.11 Average relative off farm income of EC and Non-EC member households by 
CFUG 
 
SN 
 
 
Name of the CFUG       Average  
relative off farm 
income of EC 
member household 
      Average 
relative off farm 
income of Non-EC 
member household 
EC/Non EC 
 
 
 
9 Chyangrekharga Baglung 8 1.43 
  23 Ranibhumi Sigana 1, 2, 3 0.07 1.10 0.06 
15 Jogarani, Paiyupata 3 0.25 2.13 0.12 
6 Simalpata Tityang 6, 7, 8 0.37 1.41 0.26 
14 Chitrepani Baglung 9 0.58 1.63 0.36 
30 Bancharedhunga Baglung 9 0.78 1.92 0.41 
8 Salyanipakha Malika 1,8, 9 0.58 1.28 0.45 
5 Bhagwati Chisapani Tityang 1 0.82 1.72 0.48 
2 DoyaPragati  0.89 1.47 0.54 
13 Ramrekha Baglung 1 0.84 1.38 0.61 
26 Jhangali Baglung 9 0.77 1.23 0.63 
7 Chhipchhepale Baglung 11  0.86 1.33 0.65 
17 Dhandkharka Bhakunde 9 0.79 1.14 0.69 
12 Resh Buchung Salleri 0.79 1.14 0.69 
16 Shakhini Chaur Painyupata 2 0.85 1.21 0.71 
3 Bhimra  Sigana 3 0.85 1.15 0.74 
22 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 0.97 1.04 0.93 
20 Titaure Palakot 7, 9 1.04 1.03 1.01 
10 Mauribhid Malika 5 1.31 0.91 1.24 
25 SanguKhola Ratopahara, Resh 3, 1.14 0.86 1.33 
27 Chutreni Baglung 11 1.16 0.76 1.53 
28 Dhurseni Baglung Balung 10 1.29 0.07 1.71 
18 Chhaharedhara Baglung 4 1.21 0.69 1.75 
1 ByalDhara Baglung 7 1.52 0.87 1.75 
31 Daha Bhakunde 6, 7 1.72 0.69 2.49 
29 Dhoreni Baglung 10, 11 1.33 0.05 2.66 
4 Chamere  Tityang 5 1.78 0.67 2.66 
21 Gobreni Painyupata 6 1.99 0.58 3.43 
24 Maluka Patal Resh 1, 2 1.99 0.58 3.43 
19 Dhandh Malika 2, 3 1.21 0.17 7.12 
11 Sunakhari Malika 7, 8, 9 1.39 0.19 7.32 
 Average 1.05 0.98 1.07 
     
Source: Household survey 
 
To examine whether the off-farm income per household was statistically different, a t-test 
assuming two unequal variables was conducted. The t-statistic mean was 1.38 and the critical 
two-tail value is 1.36 (Table 6.12), so there is a statistically significant difference between EC 
and non-EC member household in off-farm income. This indicates that the mean off-farm 
income between EC and non-EC member households is statistically positively significantly 
different and is likely to be a factor in determining leadership positions. Therefore it will be 
included as a factor in the econometric model. 
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Table 6.12 t-Test of relative off farm income of Nepalese EC and Non-EC member 
households 
 
 
EC 
member 
Non-EC 
member 
Critical two-
test value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
No of  
observations 
EC member      
Non-EC 
member 
1.38* 
  
1.36 
 
576 
 
310310 
 
 
* Statistically significant, critical two-tail value at the 5% significance level is 1.96. 
6.2.6 Occupation of Household Head   
The occupation of the household head could also be a factor determining EC leadership 
positions. It was theorised that households where the occupation was a farmer had a greater 
intention for EC positions than households with other occupations, such as teachers and 
public servants. Table 6.13 shows the household occupation by farmer, public service 
including  ex-army and teacher. The result shows that of the 310 households surveyed, 220 
households were farmers and 134of these were EC members. 45 household were public 
service and 21 were EC members. Among the 45 teachers, 11 were EC members. It seems 
that 80% of EC members are farmers that is more important. Thus, it seems that there could 
be a relationship between the occupation of farmer and EC membership of the CFUG. 
 
Table 6.13 The occupations of household head and EC positions in Nepal 
 
 
Farmer Service 
13
 Teacher Total 
EC 134 21 11 166 
Non-EC 86 24 34 144 
Total  220 45 45 310 
 
A two tail t-test assuming unequal variances was conducted to analyse whether these paired 
groups of occupations meant they are statistically different between each set of groups. Table 
6.14 shows the test results evaluated at the 5% significance level. The results of the t-test by 
occupation of the household were farmer (2.68), public service (0.96) and teacher (0.20); the 
critical two tail value is 1.96. The results indicate that the farmer occupation is statistically 
positively significantly different and could be a determining factor in terms of being selected 
for EC positions of CFUGs. Hence, the occupation of the household as a farmer will be 
included in the econometric analysis. 
                                                 
13 Public servants including NGOs and the ex-army service people in CFUGs. 
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Table 6.14 The t-Test ratio matrix of Nepalese households head’s occupation and EC 
position  
 
Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances  of Occupation of Household head 
Category 
of 
Occupation 
Farmer 
 
 
Public 
Service 
 
Teacher 
 
 
Critical 
two-tail 
values 
DF 
 
 
No Of 
Observation 
 
Farmer          
PubServ 2.68*   1.96  616  310  
Teacher 0.96 0.20  1.96 1.96 482 377 310 310 
 
* Statistically significant, critical two-tail value at the 5% significance level is 1.96. 
6.2.7 NGO Membership  
NGOs build the capacity of people and can increase one’s potential to be selected for a 
leadership position in CFUGs. It is hypothesised that households with members of an NGO 
have more social empowerment to receive training in leadership and management and are thus 
more likely to be selected for the EC. Table 6.15 shows the breakdown of EC membership 
and NGO membership across the households surveyed. The results show that, of the 310 
households surveyed, 203 households were NGO members and 166 of those households were 
EC members. All EC member households were NGO members. Thus, there appears to be a 
relationship between membership of an NGO and a position in the EC. 
 
 Table 6.15 NGO experience and EC position in Nepal 
 
 NGO Non NGO Total 
EC 166  0       166   
Non-EC 37    107  144  
Total 203 107  310  
 
It seems that more experience in NGO membership means a greater opportunity to be a 
member of the EC. The possible reason could be that NGOs empower the individual through 
training workshops and study tours (A. K. Singh & Stevens, 2007).  
6.2.8 Conclusions from the Descriptive Statistics 
The economic and social variables that were statistically significant by various descriptive 
and t-test analyses, were selected for econometric analysis. The economic variables wellbeing 
category, land holding, off farm income, livestock holdings, food sufficiency over 12 months 
and occupation were statistically significant. Similarly, the elite caste and Janajati ethnic 
caste households were statistically different. Thus, these variables correlated with the 
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selection for leadership positions of CFUGs and could be suitable factors for econometric 
analysis. The definitions and descriptions of the variables for analysing the research questions 
hypotheses described in Chapter 1 are explained in next section.  
6.3 Definitions of the Econometric Variables 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the variables included in the leadership analysis of the research are 
related to social structure, land resources, livestock and income. These variables are outlined 
in Table 6.16. The dependent variable is whether any household member is currently or has 
been a member of the EC. The value of the variable is 1 if a person is or has been a member 
of the EC and 0 if not. 
 
Table 6.16 Independent variables for the econometric analysis 
 
Social variables              
ELITEHH If household is caste elite (Bahun, Chhetry, Newar and Thakuri) 1, otherwise 0. 
NGOMEM If any household member is a member in an NGO 1, otherwise 0. 
PPRSTHH  If the household is poor or poorest 1, otherwise 0. 
OCCUFRM 
OCCUPUBS 
Occupation of household head as a farmer 1, otherwise 0. 
If any household head is a public service 1, otherwise 0. 
TEACHER If household head is teacher 1, otherwise 0 
Economic variables 
FOOD12M If sufficient food from own land for 12 months or more in a year 1, otherwise 0. 
RINCOME Relative off-farm income.  
ROWNLAND Relative own land. 
RLIVSTOC Relative livestock units. 
6.4 Leadership Regression Result 
The regression analysis was conducted based on the conceptual model in Figure 4.1. The 
potential explanatory factors determining leadership (dependent variables), as recommended 
from the descriptive analysis for further analysis in a regression model, were examined in a 
binary logit model. The explanatory variables were examined in different functional forms 
(e.g. log or raw) as well as in their interactions. A multicollinearity test was also conducted to 
find out whether there was any collinearity problem with the explanatory variables.  This was 
done using the multicollinearity test in SPSS. As can be seen in matrix of Table 6.17, all the 
values are less than 3, confirming there was no multicolinearity. 
 
The model building process took several steps. First, non-significant variables were deleted 
from the model in a step-by-step process until the model was stable. Since variable deletion 
creates a nested model, the model stability was examined by using the Chi-square test for 
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significant difference of -2log likelihood ratios, as suggested by  Agresti and Finlay (2009) 
and Kleinbaum (1994). Univariate analyses were conducted, regressing each predictor 
separately against the dependent variable. Variables found to be significant in the univariate 
analyses (p <0.25) were then entered into a multivariate backward-stepwise logit model. At 
this stage, only cases with values for all the predictors considered were used in the analysis. 
The McFadden, goodness-of-fit statistic was used to confirm the statistical goodness-of-fit of 
the final model.  
 
Part of the leadership model looks at the relationship between leadership and the demographic 
characteristics of individual households. The independent variables entered in the first step of 
the logistic regression for determining selection as a leader were NGO membership 
(NGOMEM), poor and poorest household (PPRSTHH), household with food sufficiency of 
12 months (FOOD12M), relative livestock holding units of households (RLIVSTOC), 
occupation of household head as farmer (OCCUFRM), relative of own land of households 
(ROWNLAND), occupation of household head as a public servant (OCCUPUBS), elite caste 
household (ELITEHH) and relative own off-farm income of households (RINCOME). The 
variables found to be significant after deleting the non-significant variables from the model in 
a step-by-step process until the model was stable are shown in Table 6.17. The expected signs 
of the variables are consistent with assumptions. 
 
Table 6.17 The results of the binary logit model for binary choice 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error B/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant         .66940* .3517 -2.063 .0543 
NGOMEM 
PPRSTHH 
.97945*** 
-.40817*** 
.2211 
.1982 
3.747 
-2.061 
.0001 
.0001 
OCCUFRM  .92313*** .2355 3.919 .0145 
FOOD12M  .34356*** .1865     1.846 .0002 
RINCOME           .34596** .1869      1.854 .0342 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
 
 Multi Colinearity test matrix  
 
 NGO Mem PPRSTHH OCCUFRM FOOD 12M RINCOME 
NGO Mem  1.086 1.167 1.020 1.100 
PPRSTHH 1.012  1.109 1.025 1.094 
OCCUFRM 1.001 1.006  1.007 1.109 
FOOD 12M 1.007 1.087 1.147  1.105 
RINCOME 1.008 1.676 1.094 1.025  
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McFadden Pseudo R
2
 =0.52, Ben /Lerman R
2 
was 0.57. Chi-squared=107.1848, Significance 
level .00009. The correct prediction successes: concordant 79.79 %. It means the correct 
prediction = actual 1s and 0s correctly predicted was 79.79% and discordant 20.21% 
 
There is no widely-accepted direct analogy to OLS regression's R
2 
(Hoetker, 2007; Long, 
1997). This is because the R
2
 measure seeks to make a statement about the percentage of 
variance explained, but the variance of a dichotomous or categorical dependent variable 
depends on the frequency distribution of that variable. R
2
 in an OLS regression model 
commonly provides a measure of how well the model fits the data. However, there is no direct 
equivalent to R
2
 for the logistic regression model (Hoetker, 2007). Scholars state that Pseudo 
R
2
 measures have been proposed for a wide range of binary data. These measures have 
different formulae for Pseudo R
2
 and take different values for the same model (Long, 1997). 
For example, Veall and Zimmermann (1996) described a model in which McFadden’s Pseudo 
R
2
 was 0.25 and the McKevey- Zavina Pseudo R
2
 was 0.50. Hence, one cannot compare this 
model with the OLS R
2
 or similar models in other research. Another possible reason that 
some researchers misinterpret the meaning of the measures that corresponds to the % of 
variance explained as R
2
 does in OLS. The MacFadden’s Pseudo R2 and MacFadden’s 
Adjusted
 
R
2
 are calculated as: 
MacFadden’s Pseudo R2 =1- 
     
     
 where ĵu and ĵr are the likelihoods of the model 
with and without regressors, respectively. 
MacFadden’s Adjusted R2 =1-
      
       
 where K is the number of regressors. 
 
Most Pseudo R
2
 measures have no unintended interpretation for values other than 0 or 1. The 
Pseudo R
2 
statistic is a well-known R
2
 statistic that measures the variability in the dependent 
variable that is explained by a linear regression model, but cannot be computed by binary 
choice regression models because the dependent variable is dichotomous rather than 
continuous (Cox & Snell, 1989; Hoetker, 2007). Binary regression does not have an 
equivalent to the R
2
 that is found in OLS regression but many researchers have tried to 
produce one (Azzalini, 2007). There is a wide variety of Pseudo R
2 
statistics that can give 
contradictory conclusions. Because these statistics do not mean what R
2
 means in OLS 
regression (the proportion of variance for the response variable explained by the predictors), it 
is suggested that they need to be interpreted with great caution (Azzalini, 2007; Scott & 
Freese, 2006).hence, binary dichotomous variable is generally lower R
2 
value than OLS 
regression.   
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The likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-square test determines that at least one of the predictors' 
regression coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. The LR Chi-Square statistic is 
calculated by -2*L (null model) - (-2*L (fitted model)) = -206.27036 -99.08552= 107.1848, 
where L (null model) is from the log likelihood with just the response variable in the model 
(Iteration 0) and L (fitted model) is the log likelihood from the final iteration (assuming the 
model converged) with all the parameters. Goodness-of-fit statistics assess the fitting of the 
logistic model against the factual classification such as low, medium and high level of 
attributes.  
 
The variable NGO member (NGOMEM) is positively significant at the 1% level. This implies 
that a household involved in an NGO has a higher probability of being selected as a leader on 
an EC. NGO membership might have developed leadership capacity or motivated someone to 
be a leader. The policy implication of this finding is that if the poor and oppressed lower 
castes are given the opportunity to develop their leadership capacity such as an NGO, they 
could be represented more on ECs. This result is similar to those of Agrawal and Gupta 
(2005) and Maskey et al. (2006) who stated that being an NGO member increases the chance 
of being selected for a position of leadership. 
 
The variable poor and poorest household (PPRSTHH) is negatively significant at the 1% 
level. This means that the poor and poorest households are less likely to be selected as EC 
members of CFUGs. It shows the strong correlation with the hypothesis that the poor and 
poorest households are less likely to get opportunities to be on the EC of CFUGs. One reason 
could be the economic constraints for the poorest households who could not get opportunities 
to participate in decision-making positions (Maskey, et al., 2006). They might also be 
discouraged from taking leadership due to their socially vulnerable position. Adhikari and Di-
Falco (2009) and Lachapelle et al. (Lachapelle, et al., 2004) found that poor households have 
been excluded from leadership positions due to their social status embedded by poverty. 
 
The variable for occupation of household head as a farmer (OCCUFRM) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Households with farmers are involved in the collection 
of forest products particularly firewood, fodder and leaf litter, and have an incentive to be 
involved in CF decisions. Therefore, being a farmer increases the probability of selection for 
membership on the CFUG executive committee. This result is similar to those of Adhikari 
and Di-Falco (2009) and Baland et al. (2007)  who argued that farmer households have used 
of votes for selecting leadership positions of the CFUG.  
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The variable food for 12 months food sufficiency (FOOD12M) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that households with sufficiency of food for 12 
months are more likely to be selected as EC members. This result is similar to the results of 
A. Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) and Adhikari et al. (2004) who found that households with 
food sufficiency for 12 months are more represented on the EC. 
 
The variable for relative off-farm income (RINCOME) is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. This result indicates that the probability of being a leader on the EC is higher for a 
household with relatively higher off-farm income. Off-farm income is a source of household 
income that provides economic power. This result is similar to those of Adhikari et al. (2004) 
and A. Agrawal (2007) who stated that richer households that have large sources of off-farm 
income have a higher probability of being in leadership positions. 
6.5 Conclusions  
This study draws several conclusions about Nepalese social structural factors that provide 
opportunities for poor households to be in leadership positions in ECs of CFUGs. The 
purpose of this chapter was to determine whether there are factors that would enable the poor 
and disadvantaged to gain membership of the EC of CFUGs. The factor found to be related to 
the leadership positions is NGO membership.  
 
The results also show the usual factors that favour the traditional elite, including 12 month 
food sufficiency, relatively good off-farm income and other wealth attributes. Specifically it is 
the wealth attributes of the households that increases the probability of being selected for EC 
positions. These findings are in line with a number of studies have found that the wealthier 
and powerful local wealth elite tend to have more opportunity to be selected as leaders on the 
ECs of CFUGs (Adhikari & Di-Falco, 2009; Adhikari, et al., 2004; A.  Agrawal, 2007; A. 
Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; A. Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Dhakal & Bhatta, 2010; Ostrom, 
2005).   
 
The poorer and disadvantaged ordinary members who get the opportunity to become a 
member of a NGO also get the opportunity become skilled in leadership and decision-making 
and this attribute makes them more likely to be selected for a leadership position on an EC. 
NGOs could train people for leadership positions on the ECs of CFUGs. NGOs, as social 
mobilisation service providers, are generally responsible for a wide range of service 
provision; they build capacity, provide study tours and workshops for group members of 
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community institutions to strengthen their capacity, make local institutional arrangements, 
help in record keeping, leadership and communication skill development in programmes 
implemented for rural development including community forestry user groups in Nepal. The 
policy implications of this finding are that if the poor and disadvantaged, the low 
socioeconomic groups of Nepalese society, could have the opportunity to develop their 
leadership capacity, they could be better represented on ECs and so influence the decisions in 
their favour. Thus, the key finding is that the poor can become part of the decision-making 
process, entering the EC on the basis of external leadership skills they have gained through 
NGOs.   
 
In the theoretical model, depending on the mix of castes in a community, the poor and 
disadvantaged households gain power through the CFUG in line with the organisation elite 
model A or organisational elite model B (Figure 3.1). In a community of only one caste, 
organisational elite model A applies and where there are many castes, organisational elite 
model B works. However, caste was not a significant variable the in results. These results 
suggest that caste is not a factor linked with leadership selection. 
 
In summary, households that have experience with on an NGO are more likely to be in 
leadership. This means that the organisational elite models A and B provide an opportunity 
for the poor and disadvantage households to become part of the EC. This answers the first 
hypothesis of this research that there are factors not related to wealth or caste that increase the 
likelihood of being on the EC. This is an important outcome and provides an opening for 
policy initiatives that encourage the development of leadership skills for the poor and 
disadvantaged. 
 
Therefore the results of this chapter suggest that wellbeing category is a significant factor for 
selection of leadership, so the proportion of poor and disadvantaged households on the EC is 
should be used as variables important for analysing the distribution of CF products and the 
distribution rules for the next chapters. In this way, the effect of the organisational elite 
models where there are proportions of poor and disadvantaged households on the EC can be 
studied. 
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     Chapter 7 
RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY FOREST 
PRODUCTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to answer the research question: Does the composition of the EC affect 
who gets benefits from the community forest? Specifically, if the poor and disadvantaged 
groups have representation on the EC does it increase the distribution of benefits from CF to 
them? It is hypothesised that when organisational elite models exist, either when the 
community is homogenous in caste (organisational elite A) or where the community in 
heterogeneous in caste (organisational elite model B), opportunities are created to ensure 
greater benefits flow to the poor and disadvantaged members of society. The analysis is 
concerned with whether the distribution attributes and practices developed, or implemented, 
by ECs have any bearing on the distribution of CF products. This is empirically examined in 
the context of the average relative distribution of timber, firewood, fodder and leaf litter. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the descriptive characteristics of the data are 
presented. The descriptive statistics are used to analyse the data collected from the research 
site. Secondly, the results of the econometric analysis are explained. The conclusions from the 
major findings end the chapter. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics   
Descriptive methods were used to examine the data for the variables suitable for analysis in a 
regression model. In this section, the relevant data sets are explained and examined in relation 
to the dependent variables average relative distribution of firewood, timber, fodder and leaf 
litter. The average relative distribution to households is used as the dependent variable 
because of different forest endowments between CFUGs. 
  
The independent variables include institutional factors such as the frequency of EC and 
assembly meetings, the discussion time in EC and assembly meetings, the involvement of EC 
and assembly meetings in the preparation of the operational plan, and the agenda items raised 
by various members in EC and assembly meetings, and the forest attributes including the CF 
area per household, the CF type and forest crown cover class.  
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In the context of CF, it is expected that non-timber forest products (NTFPs) would be 
collected. However, only five CFUGs collected NTFPs from their CF. The maximum was 
7.91 kg per household in the Ramrekha CFUG. This was the only CFUG that cultivated 
NTFPs in their CF as part of a pro-poor programme activity. Because so few CFUGs 
produced NTFPs, further analysis of NTFP data is excluded from this study.   
7.2.1 Average Relative Distribution and Forest Area  
The dependent variables are the average relative distribution of firewood, timber and fodder 
and the leaf litter. The average relative distribution CF products to a household were 
calculated by taking the average distribution for all households surveyed in the CFUG and 
dividing each household’s amount by this value. For example, in each CFUG, 10 households 
were surveyed. The average distribution of firewood to the 10 sampled households was 
calculated. The distribution to each household was then divided by the average of the 10 
households. After doing this, the average relative amount was derived for each wellbeing 
category household (rich, medium, poor and poorest). Similarly, the average relative 
distribution was also calculated for each ethnic caste household, where applicable. Using this 
method, the average relative distribution was calculated for each CF product  in each CFUG. 
 
Average relative distribution was used because of unequal forest endowments among CFUGs 
which means that actual distribution amounts are very different between CFUGs, irrespective 
of wellbeing category or ethnic caste. If the average relative distribution is 1 it means that the 
household gets the average (good distribution). If it is more than 1 then it means that the 
household gets more than the average (over distribution) and if it is less than 1 it means that 
the household gets less than the average (low distribution). Table 7.1 shows the average 
relative distribution of forest products per household by wellbeing category and per household 
forest area.  
 
Firewood is a significant source of household energy, particularly for cooking and heating in 
Nepalese society (National Planning Commission, 2007). Table 7.1 shows that the poor and 
poorest households received relatively less firewood than rich and medium households. The 
average relative amount of firewood distributed to the poor and poorest households generally 
increases as the area of the forest per household increases. This means poor households are 
relatively worse off when the forest area per household is smaller. 
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Table 7.1  The average relative distribution of CF products per Nepalese household by 
forest size 
  Average relative distribution per household type 
Forest Size 
(ha) 
Number of  
households  
Rich 
 
Medium 
 
Poor 
 
Poorest 
 
 Firewood 
0.07 and less 50  1.54 1.51 0.48 0.46 
0.08-0.13 70  1.31 1.29 0.72 0.68 
0.14-0.18 70  1.14 1.21 0.94 0.72 
0.19-0.32 60 1.11 1.18 0.97 0.73 
0.33 and above 60 1.05 1.15 1.02 0.78 
             Fodder and grass  
0.07 and less 50  1.38 1.23 0.65 0.74 
0.08-0.13 70  1.25 1.20 0.74 0.82 
0.14-0.18 70  1.16 1.14 0.84 0.85 
0.19-0.32 60 1.05 1.11 0.94 0.88 
0.33 and above 60 0.95 1.04 0.99 1.04 
  Leaf litter  
0.07 and less 50  0.98 1.15 0.75 1.11 
0.08-0.13 70  0.89 1.05 0.91 1.15 
0.14-0.18 70  0.88 0.99 0.95 1.19 
0.19-0.32 60 0.85 0.94 1.01 1.21 
0.33 and above 60 0.31 0.82 1.32 1.53 
 Timber  
0.07 and less      
0.08-0.13 30 1.50 1.20 0.77 0.53 
0.14-0.18 30 1.53 1.22 0.74 0.51 
0.19-0.32 10 1.65 1.31 0.65 0.38 
0.33 and above 40 1.65 1.35 0.61 0.37 
 
Tree fodder and grass are important to supply the feed required for livestock to promote milk, 
butter and fat production in lactating animals, rapid live weight gain and animal health 
(Sekhar, 1998). Fodder can be green food but can be dried food like hay, straw and the 
material for stall feeding to cattle. In a mixed farming system like the middle hills of Nepal, 
all of fresh grass and herbage, ferns, and foliage from trees, which are lopped for feeding 
purposes to cattle, are classed as fodder (Mahat, Griffin, & Shepherd, 1987). Fodder has been 
collected since the introduction of CF in the hills of Nepal (Malla, et al., 2005). Leaves of 
trees and grass are important constituents of CF for livestock feed and serve as supplements to 
private residues. The average relative amount of fodder and grass distributed to the poor and 
poorest households increased as per household area of the forest increased.  
 
Leaf litter is an important CF product and is used as bedding for livestock and as compost 
with animal manure (Food & Agriculture Organisation, 2005; Malla, et al., 2005; Sekhar, 
1998; Shepherd & Gill, 1999). The average relative distribution to the poor households is 
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generally higher than for rich households and increases as the forest area per household 
increases. This is the only CF product where the poor are never relatively worse off in terms 
of distribution. 
 
In Nepal, timber is widely used for house construction, shelter for animals, agricultural tools, 
furniture and other domestic uses. The average relative distribution of timber to the poor and 
poorest households showed that they were much worse off than the rich although the 
difference decreased as the forest area per household increased. 
 
In summary, the analysis of per household forest area and the average relative distribution of 
firewood, fodder timber and leaf litter provided a clear case for forest area per household to be 
used for the regression analysis. The amount of firewood, fodder and leaf litter distributed per 
household is generally less to the poor than to rich households but increased to the poor and 
poorest household as per the household forest area increased. For timber, the disparity in 
average relative distribution remains large irrespective of per household forest area.  
7.2.2 Average Relative Distribution and Forest Type 
Broadleaf forests produce multiple products such as firewood, timber, leaf litter and fodder. It 
is expected that poor households are likely to benefit more in CFUGs with mixed or broadleaf 
forests than with conifer forests because the conifer forest is acidic and there is little chance to 
grow fodder. It can be seen in Table 7.2 that the average relative distribution of fodder and 
leaf litter to the poor and poorest was higher in broadleaf and mixed forests than conifer 
forest. It is known that conifer forest does not produce fodder but, in this survey, the data on 
fodder and grass were collected together. Therefore, the distribution of fodder and grass 
appears in the conifer forest results. Based on this analysis, broad leaf and mixed forest types 
will be used in the regression analysis. 
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Table 7.2 The average relative distribution of CF products per household by forest type 
  Average relative distribution per household type 
Forest type 
Number of 
households  
Rich 
  
Medium 
  
Poor 
  
Poorest 
  
                                                     Firewood  
Conifer 120  1.30 1.25 0.84 0.61 
Broad leaf 50  1.25 1.15 0.92 0.68 
Mixed 140  1.32 1.08 0.87 0.74 
                                                Fodder and grass 
Conifer 120  1.20 1.30 0.81 0.71 
Broad leaf 50  1.35 1.10 0.81 0.78 
Mixed 140  1.25 0.78 0.86 1.10 
                                                 Leaf litter  
Conifer 120  1.37 1.21 0.84 0.58 
Broad leaf 50  0.77 0.65 1.42 1.49 
Mixed 140  0.71 0.68 1.21 1.41 
                                            Timber  
Conifer 60  1.88 0.88 0.85 0.37 
Broad leaf 10  1.01 1.28 0.88 0.81 
Mixed 40  1.53 1.05 0.55 0.88 
 
7.2.3 Average Relative Distribution and Forest Crown Cover Class  
As described in Chapter 4, crown cover is defined as the percentage of crown area projected 
on to total land area. It is hypothesised that the denser the crown covers the better the 
availability of and distribution of CF products to the poor and poorest households.   
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Table 7.3 Average relative distribution of CF products in Nepal by crown cover class 
 
  
Average relative distribution per 
household type 
Crown cover class 
Number of 
households 
Rich 
 
Medium 
 
Poor 
 
Poorest 
 
  Firewood 
30 to 50 % 
30 1.59 1.54 0.51 0.36 
50 to 70 % 
130  0.99 0.88 1.02 1.11 
above 70 % 
150 0.42 0.58 1.47 1.53 
  Fodder and grass  
30 to 50 % 
30 1.57 1.54 0.48 0.41 
50 to 70 % 
130  0.94 1.03 1.02 1.01 
above 70 % 
150 0.49 0.43 1.50 1.58 
  Leaf litter  
30 to 50 % 
30 1.25 1.52 0.62 0.61 
50 to 70 % 
130  0.92 0.93 1.10 1.05 
above 70 % 
150 0.83 0.55 1.28 1.34 
  Timber  
30 to 50 % 
30 1.47 1.51 0.52 0.50 
50 to 70 % 
30  0.96 0.92 1.10 1.02 
above 70 % 
50 0.57 0.57 1.38 1.48 
 
Note: NO forest had less than 30% crown cover and timber was distributed from only 14 
CFUGs. 
 
Table 7.3 shows that the average relative distribution of firewood, fodder, leaf litter and 
timber to the poorer and poorest households increased as the crown cover increased. Based 
on this, crown cover should be included as a variable in the regression analysis. 
7.2.4 Average Relative Distribution and Agenda Items Raised in Meetings 
The setting of a meeting agenda is a roadmap for the decisions to be made in a meeting. It lets 
decision makers become acquainted with where they are headed so they are not side tracked. 
It directs the participants to move in a particular direction or to a particular place. Most 
significantly, the meeting agenda offers a sense of purpose and direction to the meeting. It is 
hypothesised that the higher the proportion of agenda items per meeting raised by the 
disadvantaged (lower caste and marginalised) members, the greater the opportunity to address 
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their needs for CF products. Table 7.4 shows the proportion of agenda items raised by 
disadvantaged members at assembly and EC meetings.  
 
Table 7.4 The proportion of agenda items raised by various members per EC and 
assembly meetings 
 
  Assembly meetings EC meetings 
SN CFUG name EC 
members 
Disadvantaged 
members 
Other 
members 
EC 
members 
Disadvantaged 
members 
Other 
members 
        
1 Byaldhara Baglung  7 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.88 0.08 0.04 
2 Doyapragasti 0.57 0.14 0.29 0.56 0.25 0.19 
3 Bhimara Sigana 0.38 0.10 0.52 0.39 0.56 0.06 
4 Chamere Tityang, 5 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.70 0.05 0.25 
5 Bhagawat ChisapaniTitang 1 0.88 0.13 0.00 0.92 0.04 0.04 
6 Simal pata Titang 6,7,9 0.79 0.05 0.16 0.88 0.06 0.06 
7 Chhipchhipepale Baglung 11 0.56 0.00 0.44 1.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Daha Bhakunde 6,7 0.68 0.00 0.32 0.96 0.00 0.04 
9 Jhangali Baglung 9 0.96 0.04 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.48 
10 Bancharedunga Baglung 9 0.93 0.00 0.07 0.86 0.03 0.10 
11 Chutreni  Baglung 11 0.92 0.08 0.00 0.43 0.09 0.49 
12 Dhursheni Baglung 10 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.14 0.00 
13 Dhoreni Baglung 10,11 0.84 0.05 0.11 0.90 0.00 0.10 
14 Gobneri Painyopata 6 0.63 0.00 0.38 0.47 0.07 0.47 
15 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 0.65 0.12 0.24 0.63 0.11 0.26 
16 Rani bhumi Sigana 1 2 3  0.58 0.00 0.42 0.64 0.00 0.36 
17 Malukapatal Resh 1, 2 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.32 0.00 0.68 
18 SanghukholaRatopaharaResh 3,4 0.89 0.00 0.11 0.58 0.08 0.33 
19 Dhandh Malika 2,3 0.75 0.13 0.13 0.74 0.00 0.26 
20 Titaure Palakot 7-9 0.71 0.12 0.18 0.60 0.20 0.20 
21 Slyanipakha, Malika 1,3,4 0.77 0.15 0.08 0.86 0.08 0.06 
22 Chyangrekharga Baglung 8 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.40 
23 Mauribhid Malika 5 0.85 0.08 0.08 0.57 0.10 0.33 
24 Sunakhari Malika 7,8,9 0.82 0.14 0.04 0.74 0.07 0.19 
25 Ramrekha Baglung  1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.05 
26 Chitepani Baglung  9 0.71 0.14 0.14 0.41 0.14 0.46 
27 ReshBuchhung salleri 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.47 0.00 0.53 
28 Chhaharedhara Baglung 4 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.10 0.19 
29 Dhadhkarka Bhakunde 9 0.64 0.14 0.21 0.53 0.12 0.35 
30 Shakhinichaur Paiyopata 2 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.92 0.08 0.00 
31 Jograni Painyopata 3 0.46 0.23 0.31 0.47 0.18 0.35 
 Average 0.76 0.13 0.15 0.68 0.12 0.26 
 
 
 
The average proportion of agenda items raised by EC members is higher in both EC and 
assembly meetings than agenda items raised by disadvantaged members. This shows the 
importance of EC membership for the poor and disadvantaged. 
 
The average relative distribution of CF products was analysed based on the proportion of 
agenda items raised by the EC members and disadvantaged households in EC and assembly 
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meetings. The average relative distribution of CF products based on the proportion of agenda 
items raised by disadvantaged members in the EC meetings is shown in Table 7.5. The 
hypothesis is that when the proportion of agenda items raised by disadvantaged member 
increases, the poor and poorest households will receive relatively larger amounts of CF 
products. As can be seen in Table 7.5, the average relative distribution of the CF products for 
the poor and poorest households generally increased as the proportion of the agenda items 
raised by disadvantaged members in EC meetings increased. 
 
Table 7.5 The average relative distribution and proportion of agenda items raised by 
disadvantaged members in EC meetings 
 
 Average relative distribution per household  
Proportion of agenda 
items raised by  
disadvantaged members  
No of 
CFUGs 
 
Rich 
 
 
Medium 
 
   
Poor 
 
 
Poorest 
 
 
  Firewood   
0  10 1.63 1.18 0.75 0.45 
0.03-0.08 10 1.35 1.14 0.97 0.54 
0.09-0.14  7 1.12 1.11 1.15 0.62 
0.18-0.56  4 1.05 1.02 1.21 0.71 
  Fodder and grass 
0  10 1.26 1.07 0.76 0.89 
0.03-0.08  10 0.76 0.95 1.05 1.25 
0.09-0.14  7 0.42 0.92 1.28 1.37 
0.18-0.56  4 0.22 0.90 1.35 1.53 
  Leaf litter  
0   10 0.77 0.92 1.05 1.28 
0.03-0.08 10 0.66 0.89 1.31 1.15 
0.09-0.14 7 0.66 0.68 1.32 1.35 
0.18-0.56 4 0.55 0.61 1.38 1.49 
  Timber  
0  3 1.54 1.21 0.77 0.48 
0.03-0.08 3 1.42 1.19 0.78 0.61 
0.09-0.14  4 1.32 0.92 0.81 0.94 
0.18-0.56  4 1.14 0.73 0.99 1.15 
 
The CFUG has the authority to set objectives of conducting an assembly meeting where there 
are legal entities to formulate rules, regulations and they could maintain autonomy in 
decision-making for benefit distribution and sharing forest products obtained from CF 
because there is full participation of CFUG members. Again, the average relative distribution 
of firewood, fodder, leaf litter and timber to the poor and poorest households generally 
increased as the proportion of agenda items raised by disadvantaged members in assembly 
meetings increased (Table 7.6). 
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Table 7.6 The average relative distribution and proportion of agenda items raised by 
disadvantaged members per assembly meeting 
 
 
Average relative distribution per household 
type 
Proportion of 
agenda raised by 
disadvantaged 
members  
Number 
of 
CFUGs 
 
Rich  
 
 
 
Medium 
 
  
 
Poor 
 
  
 
Poorest 
 
  
 
  Firewood  
0 10 1.24 1.12 1.08 0.55 
0.04-0.12 9 1.11 0.98 1.21 0.68 
0.13-0.14  8 1.02 0.89 1.27 0.81 
0.15-0.33  4 0.63 0.65 1.31 1.41 
  Fodder and grass 
0 10 1.61 0.86 0.79 0.73 
0.04-0.12 9 1.47 0.87 0.85 0.81 
0.13-0.14  8 1.05 0.89 0.95 1.09 
0.15-0.33  4 0.78 1.05 0.96 1.21 
  Leaf litter  
0 10 0.68 0.71 1.62 0.99 
0.04-0.12 9 0.81 0.79 1.41 1.00 
0.13-0.14  8 1.03 0.98 0.94 1.04 
0.15-0.33  4 1.11 0.99 0.71 1.18 
  Timber  
0 3 1.50 0.34 1.05 1.12 
0.04-0.12 3 1.41 0.64 0.88 1.08 
0.13-0.14  4 0.83 0.68 1.11 1.38 
0.15-0.33  4 0.53 0.85 1.21 1.41 
 
In summary, the results of this section show that the average relative distribution of CF 
products for the poor and poorest households increased when the number of agenda items 
raised by them increased. The effect is greatest when there is an assembly meeting. This is a 
greater opportunity for the disadvantaged (poor, lower caste) members to raise their needs 
and voices in terms of agenda items compared with EC meetings. This result is similar to that 
of  R. Pokharel (2009) who found that user assembly meetings provided a reflective, 
democratic and interactive knowledge interface that allowed poor households to raise more 
agenda items and, in turn, gain more benefits. As a result of this analysis, the proportion of 
agenda items raised by disadvantaged members in EC and assembly meetings is to be used in 
the regression analysis. 
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7.2.5 Average Relative Distribution and Annual Frequency of Meetings 
Decisions about CF management and benefit distribution are usually made in meetings. It is 
hypothesised that if the meetings are held more frequently, the poorer households would have 
more opportunity to present their demands for CF products and thus increase the average 
relative distribution. As can be seen in Table 7.7, the average relative distribution of 
firewood, fodder and timber to the poor and poorest household increased as the number of EC 
meetings per year increased. This result supports the hypothesis that if the frequency of 
meetings increased the poor and poorest households would get more opportunity to raise their 
needs for discussion. 
 
Table 7.7 The average relative distribution of CF products by annual frequency of EC 
meetings 
 
 Average relative distribution per household  
Frequency of 
EC meetings per 
year 
Number 
of CFUGs 
 
Rich 
 
  
 
Medium 
 
  
  
Poor  
 
 
 
Poorest 
 
 
  
  Firewood 
6-8 7 1.35 1.21 0.75 0.69 
9-10 7 1.08 1.06 0.92 0.94 
10-12 12 0.85 1.11 1.05 0.99 
13 and Above  5 0.77 0.96 1.21 1.06 
  Fodder and grass 
6-8 7 1.43 1.19 0.77 0.61 
9-10 7 1.18 1.03 0.92 0.87 
10-12 12 0.88 0.96 1.04 1.12 
13 and Above  5 0.75 0.85 1.19 1.21 
  Leaf litter  
6-8 7 2.25 0.74 0.77 0.24 
9-10 7 1.52 0.85 0.85 0.78 
10-12 12 1.14 0.93 0.95 0.98 
13 and Above  5 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 
  Timber 
6-8 3 2.01 1.59 0.11 0.29 
9-10 3 1.41 1.39 0.48 0.72 
10-12 4 1.25 1.26 0.58 0.91 
13 and Above  4 0.98 1.02 1.03 0.97 
 
The average relative distribution CF products per household by wellbeing category and 
annual frequency of assembly meetings are shown in Table 7.8. Again, the average relative 
distribution of firewood, fodder, leaf litter and timber to the poor and poorest households 
generally increased as the number of assembly meeting increased. The findings indicate that 
the poor and poorest households can increase their average relative benefits when more 
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assembly meetings are held. This supports the hypothesis that more meetings will benefit the 
poor. 
 
Table 7.8 The average relative distribution of CF products and annual frequency of 
assembly meetings  
 
Average relative distribution per household  
Annual requency 
of assembly 
meetings 
Number 
of CFUGs 
 
Rich  
 
 
Medium 
  
 
Poor  
 
 
Poorest 
 
  
  Firewood  
1 4 1.47 1.25 0.81 0.45 
2 22 1.13 1.15 0.89 0.82 
3  2 1.12 0.98 0.99 0.92 
4  or more  3 1.01 0.74 1.32 0.93 
  Fodder and grass  
1 4 1.11 1.09 0.78 1.02 
2 22 0.92 0.98 0.99 1.11 
3  2 0.85 0.68 1.23 1.24 
4  or more  3 0.74 0.65 1.30 1.31 
  Leaf litter  
1 4 0.97 0.86 1.15 1.01 
2 22 0.95 0.82 1.19 1.04 
3  2 0.43 1.10 1.21 1.26 
4  or more  3 0.33 1.11 1.29 1.28 
  Timber  
1 3 2.18 1.57 0.15 0.11 
2 3 1.58 1.44 0.78 0.19 
3  4 1.02 1.08 1.12 0.78 
4  or more  4 0.95 1.01 1.15 0.88 
  
As a result of this analysis, the annual frequency of EC and assembly meetings will be used 
in the regression analysis. 
7.2.6 Average Relative Distribution and Discussion Hours in Per Meetings 
The length of discussion significantly influences problem solving and decision-making 
(Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Banjade, et al., 2006). Longer discussion time enables 
participants to produce their views in a meeting for consideration. The discussion time 
enables the process of debate on agenda items in the CFUG decision forum to occur, 
particularly in assembly meetings. The hypothesis is that the longer the discussion time the 
greater the average relative CF product distribution to poor and poorest households. Table 7.9 
shows that the average relative distribution of firewood, fodder and timber to the poor and 
poorest is either not affected by discussion hours or is negatively affected. The results support 
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the conceptual model approach where representation of poor and poorest on the EC or 
through agenda items is most important, not the length of meetings.  
 
Table 7.9 The average relative distribution of CF products and average discussion 
hours in EC meetings 
 
  Average relative distribution per household  
Discussion hours  
per EC meeting 
Number 
of CFUGs 
Rich  
 
Medium  
 
Poor  
 
Poorest  
 
  Firewood  
0.5-1  7 1.15 0.95 1.00 0.89 
2-3 18 1.16 0.99 0.98 0.88 
3.1-4  5 1.22 1.02 0.91 0.85 
above 4  4 1.52 1.32 0.38 0.77 
  Fodder and grass  
0.5-1  7 1.15 0.72 1.11 1.02 
2-3 18 1.32 0.86 1.03 0.79 
3.1-4  5 1.61 1.00 0.74 0.77 
above 4  4 1.84 1.15 0.58 0.72 
  Leaf litter  
0.5-1  7 0.98 0.88 0.99 1.15 
2-3 18 0.94 0.75 1.09 1.25 
3.1-4  5 0.87 0.73 1.11 1.29 
above 4  4 0.85 0.69 1.15 1.31 
  Timber 
0.5-1  3 1.14 0.71 1.02 1.13 
2-3 3 1.41 1.18 0.80 0.61 
3.1-4  4 1.53 1.24 0.71 0.52 
above 4  4 1.81 1.29 0.51 0.40 
 
The average relative distribution of CF products per wellbeing catogory by discussion time in 
assembly meetings is shown in Table 7.10. Again, the underlying assumption is that the poor 
and poorest households have the opportunity to raise their needs if there are more hours of 
discussion in assembly meetings. Unlike EC meetings, the average relative distribution of 
firewood, fodder leaf litter and timber to the poor and poorest households increased as the 
discussion time in assembly meeting increased.  
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Table 7.10 The average relative distribution of CF products per household and 
discussion hours per assembly meetings  
 
   Average relative distribution per household  
Discussion hours in 
assembly meetings  
Number 
of CFUGs 
Rich  
 
Medium  
 
Poor  
 
Poorest 
  
  Firewood  
1-2  hours  7 1.33 1.25 0.83 0.59 
>2.-3 hours  11 1.11 1.09 0.95 0.85 
>3.-5 hours  8 0.98 0.91 1.07 1.04 
>5-7 hours 5 0.58 0.75 1.15 1.51 
  Fodder 
1-2  hours  7 1.21 1.42 0.74 0.61 
>2.-3 hours  11 1.13 1.32 0.80 0.76 
>3.-5 hours  8 1.09 1.07 0.99 0.86 
>5-7 hours 5 0.75 1.05 1.10 1.09 
  Leaf litter 
1-2  hours  7 0.78 1.15 1.09 0.99 
>2.-3 hours  11 0.64 1.11 1.03 1.22 
>3.-5 hours  8 0.61 1.02 1.15 1.23 
>5-7 hours 5 0.58 0.91 1.19 1.30 
  Timber 
1-2  hours  3 2.15 1.52 0.31 0.02 
>2.-3 hours  3 1.89 1.38 0.45 0.29 
>3.-5 hours  4 1.38 0.72 1.21 0.70 
>5-7 hours 4 1.28 0.60 1.29 0.81 
 
 
The results show that additional discussion time in assembly meetings, where the poor and 
poorest can attend, has a positive effect on the average relative distribution, but in EC 
meetings, where representation is limited to EC members, there is no effect on average 
relative distribution to the poor and poorest. As a result of this analysis, the discussion time in 
assembly meetings could be used in the regression analysis.  
7.2.7 Average Relative Distribution and EC or Assembly Meeting Involvement in the 
Operation Plan (OP) 
The involvement of the EC or assembly meetings in the preparation of the OP is a possible 
factor explaining the distribution of CF products. The CFUG develops the OP, which 
includes activities such as forest protection, management strategies, production of CF 
products and distribution to the households. The involvement of the CFUG members in the 
preparation of the OP is in two ways: (a) involvement in EC meetings where only EC 
members participate in the preparation of the OP, and (b) involvement in assembly meetings 
where all CFUG members participate. The underlying assumption is that EC involvement in 
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the preparation of the OP is less accountable and, depending on the membership of the EC, 
may not favour poor households in the distribution of CF products, whereas assembly 
meeting involvement in the preparation of the OP is more likely to be favourable to the poor 
households because all households can participate (Kanel, 2006; Kanel, et al., 2005). Table 
7.11 shows that the average relative distribution of CF products to poor and poorest 
households is higher when the assembly meeting was involved in the preparation of the OP 
rather than just the EC. 
 
Table 7.11 The average relative distribution of CF products by involvement of EC or 
assembly meetings in the preparation of the OP  
 
 Average relative distribution per household  
Involvement in 
preparation of OP 
Number 
of CFUG 
Rich  
 
Medium  
 
Poor  
 
Poorest  
 
 Firewood  
EC meetings  16 2.11 1.25 0.41 0.24 
Assembly meeting  15 0.71 0.48 1.51 1.31 
 Fodder and grass  
EC meetings  16 1.23 1.21 0.73 0.84 
Assembly meeting  15 0.85 0.98 1.05 1.13 
 Leaf litter  
EC meetings  16 1.05 1.06 0.84 1.05 
Assembly meeting  15 0.92 0.78 1.05 1.25 
 Timber 
EC meetings  6 1.33 1.21 0.68 0.78 
Assembly meeting  8 0.85 0.72 1.05 1.38 
 
This fact confirms the hypothesis that the greater representation of general users in assembly 
meetings where the OP was prepared would be more likely to favour the poor. In contrast, EC 
meetings are conducted by only EC members and, depending on the membership of the EC, 
this may not favour the poor. Kanel et al. (2005) suggested that the development of an 
appropriate mechanism is required to avoid the dominance of EC members in the preparation 
of the OP and in decision-making to make them accountable towards poorer households and 
general users. The result indicates that the involvement of an assembly meeting in the 
preparation of the OP of the CFUG is a better mechanism for the distribution of CF products 
to get more benefits to the poorer households. As a result of this analysis, the involvement of 
assembly meetings in the preparation of OP is to be used in the regression analysis. 
 
  
 126 
7.2.8 Average Relative Distribution, the Share of EC Positions and Wellbeing 
Category  
The average relative distribution of CF products by share of EC positions held by poor and 
poorest households is shown in Table 7.12. The share of EC positions is separated by 
wellbeing category and by caste. The average relative distribution of CF products to the 
poorer household increased when the proportion of EC positions held by these households 
increased.  
 
Table 7.12 The average relative distribution by proportion of poor and poorest 
households on the EC  
  
Average relative distribution per household type 
Number of poor and 
poorest households on EC 
Number 
of CFUGs 
Rich 
 
Medium 
 
Poor 
 
Poorest 
 
  
Firewood 
0  2 1.54 1.29 0.59 0.58 
1-10 8 1.18 1.19 0.88 0.75 
11-20  9 1.08 1.08 0.97 0.87 
21-30  10 0.67 0.78 1.21 1.34 
31- 50  2 0.53 0.66 1.35 1.46 
 
Fodder 
0  2 1.32 1.28 0.72 0.68 
1-10 8 1.22 1.15 0.84 0.79 
11-20  9 1.14 1.11 0.93 0.82 
21-30  10 0.78 0.89 1.04 1.29 
31- 50  2 0.54 0.57 1.47 1.42 
 
Leaf litter 
0  2 1.34 1.28 0.71 0.67 
1-10 8 1.11 1.14 0.87 0.88 
11-20  9 0.89 1.11 0.99 1.01 
21-30  10 0.88 0.88 1.07 1.17 
31- 50  2 0.78 0.59 1.36 1.27 
  
Timber 
0 1 1.51 1.48 0.52 0.49 
1-10 2 1.35 1.29 0.68 0.68 
11-20  3 0.99 0.85 1.05 1.11 
21-30  7 0.64 0.81 1.28 1.27 
31- 50  1 0.51 0.57 1.47 1.45 
 
This finding supports the hypothesis that when poor households have the opportunity to hold 
an EC position they can influence the distribution of CF products in their favour. This result 
is reflected in organisational elite models presented as one of the components of the 
conceptual framework (Figure 3.1). Hence, from the results of this analysis, the share of poor 
and poorest households on the EC could be a variable for the econometric analysis. 
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7.2.9 Average Relative Distribution and the Share of EC positions held by 
Lower Caste 
 
Table 7.13 shows the proportion of lower castes holding positions on the EC. It can be seen 
that the average relative distribution of firewood, fodder, timber and leaf litter to the lower 
caste (Janjati and Dalit) households increases as their representation on EC increases. 
 
Table 7.13 The average relative distribution by share of disadvantaged caste on the EC  
 
 
Average relative distribution per caste household 
Proportion of disadvantaged 
households on EC 
Number of 
CFUGs 
Elite 
  
Dalit 
 
Janjati 
 
  
Firewood 
0 8 1.45 0.79 0.76 
1-25  12 1.01 0.98 1.01 
26-50 9 0.88 1.03 1.09 
51- 75  2 0.66 1.20 1.14 
Fodder 
0 8 1.52 0.75 0.73 
1-25  12 1.42 0.80 0.78 
26-50 9 0.65 1.21 1.14 
51- 75  2 0.41 1.28 1.31 
 
Leaf litter 
0 8 1.45 0.84 0.71 
1-25  12 1.24 0.78 0.98 
26-50 9 0.71 1.15 1.14 
51- 75  2 0.62 1.21 1.17 
Timber 
0 3 1.42 0.75 0.83 
1-25  3 1.11 0.99 0.90 
26-50 4 0.78 1.11 1.11 
51- 75  4 0.69 1.15 1.16 
 
The finding shows that when the EC has more disadvantaged castes represented there are 
more benefits distributed to the disadvantaged. When the EC includes a large proportion of 
disadvantaged/lower castes this reflects the organisation elite model B in the conceptual 
framework (Figure 3.1). As a result of this analysis, the share of EC positions held by 
disadvantaged castes is a potential variable in the econometric analysis.  
7.3 Conclusions from the Descriptive Statistics 
The variables that affect the CFUG in the average relative distribution of CF products were 
analysed and considered for the econometric analysis. The results also addressed the 
question: does the greater participation of poor households mean they obtain greater benefit 
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from community forestry? The findings show that a number of factors increased the average 
relative distribution of timber, firewood, fodder and leaf litter increased to the poor and 
poorest households. The findings also supported the hypothesis that the organisational elite 
models, where the poor and disadvantaged households have a greater role in decision-
making, are relevant to the way CFUGs operate. This supports the organisation elite A and B 
models. Increased participation means more effective voice for the poor and poorest. 
 
The variables that appeared to affect the average relative distribution of CF products were 
frequency of assembly meetings, discussion time in EC and assembly meetings, involvement 
of assembly meetings in the preparation of the OP, the number of agenda items raised by 
poor and disadvantaged members for EC and assembly meetings, and proportion of 
disadvantaged households on EC. The forest attributes that affected average relative 
distribution to the poor included CF area per household, CF type and forest crown cover 
class. The education of the household head, age of the household head and household size 
(number of family members) were also included as variables but these variables have no 
significant impact on the distribution of CF products. Hence, these variables are excluded in 
descriptive analysis descriptive and the econometric analysis. 
 
The explanatory variables for the regression are presented in Table 7.14. The dependent 
variable is relative distribution. Three regressions were done, one each for firewood, fodder, 
and timber. Leaf litter was not included for regression analysis because it is not a problem for 
poor and disadvantaged households. They can collect this product in free of cost from the CF. 
Moreover, there are no strict rules and regulations for the collection of leaf litter. 
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Table 7.14 Variables for the regression analysis 
Dependent 
Variables 
Descriptions of variables 
Relative amount 
of firewood  
Average relative quantity of firewood collected by poor households  
Relative  amount 
of Timber  
Average relative quantity of timber collected by poor households 
Relative amount 
of fodder 
Average relative quantity of fodder collected by poor households 
Independent 
Variable 
Description of variables 
DISHREC The average hours of discussion per  EC meeting for collection of timber, firewood 
and fodder   
DHRASS 
 
The average hours of discussion in per assembly meeting for the collection of timber, 
firewood, and fodder 
CONIFER If forest type of CF Conifer 1, otherwise 0 
CNOVER70 If more than 70 % forest crown cover 1, otherwise 0 
CFAREA CF area  per household (hectare) 
NECMEET Number  of EC meetings per year 
NASSMEET Number of assembly meetings per  year  
PPPRHEC If  proportion of poor and poorest household on EC 1, otherwise 0 
PDSHEC If proportion of   disadvantaged household, on EC 1, otherwise 0 
PGNDISEC Proportion of agenda items raised per EC meeting by disadvantaged (poor and lower 
caste) members 
PGDISASS Proportion  of  agenda items raised per assembly meeting by disadvantaged (poor and 
Lower Caste) members  
ASSOP If there is involvement of assembly meeting in preparation of  OP 1, otherwise 0 
 
7.4 Regression Results 
 
The research problem was to identify the factors that determine the relative distribution of CF 
products to poor and disadvantaged households. The dependent variables are continuous. 
Under these conditions, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression can be used for a dummy 
for the poor and poorest that is significant (Agresti, 1990; McFadden, 1981). The linear 
regression was done using on LIMDEP. For each CF product, explanatory variables were 
loaded in the first step of the linear regression analysis. The least significant explanatory 
variable was deleted in a step-by-step process until the model was stable as suggested by 
Agresti and Finlay (2009), Kleinbaum (1994) and Agresti (1990). Since variable deletion 
creates a nested model, model stability was examined by using the Chi-square test for 
significant difference of the t and F values.  
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7.4.1 Relative Distribution of Firewood 
 
The final model for the relative distribution of firewood to poor and poorest household is 
shown in Table 7.15. The goodness of fit shows the relationships in the specified model are 
robust. The R
2
 is 0.69 and the adjusted R
2
 is 0.65. The diagnostic Log likelihood ratio = -
232.6189, restricted (b=0) = -250.7535 and Chi-square (prob) =36.27 (.0000). These values 
indicate that the model explains a high proportion of the observed variance. The unrestricted 
model contained the variables in Table 7.15. The variables are significant in the stabilised 
(restricted) model as presented in Table 7.15. A multicollinearity test was also conducted to 
find out whether there was any collinearity problem with the explanatory variables.  This was 
done using the multicollinearity test in SPSS. As can be seen in matrix of Table 7.15, all the 
values are less than 3, confirming there was no multicolinearity. 
 
Table 7.15 The regression results for the  relative distribution of firewood per household  
 
Variable|       Coefficient  Standard Error  t-ratio P[|T|>t]|  
Constant            3.5476** 1.4614 2.4274 .0214 
AREAHH 2.6973*** 1.6872 1.5984 .0000 
CONIFER -2.1327*** 1.8586 -1.1472 .0001 
NASSMEET 2.8478*** 1.1836 2.4064 .0004 
PPPRHEC 2.7863*** 1.9345 1.4403 .0004 
ASSOP 2.0458*** 1.8866 1.0851 .0005 
 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
 
               R
2
 =0.69 and Adjusted R
2
 =0.65 
 
Multicolinearity test matrix by SPSS  
 
 AREA HH CONIFER NASSMEET PPPRHEC ASSOP 
AREA HH  1.021 1.128 1.061 1.182 
CONIFER 1.261  1.172 1.110 1.323 
NASSMEET 1.261 1.172  1.110 1.323 
PPPRHEC 1.246 2.255 1.215  1.327 
ASSOP 1.209 1.199 1.208 1.062  
 
Area of CF per household (AREAHH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The greater per household area of CF, the greater the relative distribution of firewood from 
the CF. This result is similar to those of Adhikari and Di-Falco (2009) and Agrawal (2005) 
who found that the larger the area of CF, the higher was the quantity of firewood that could be 
extracted. 
 
Conifer forest (CONIFER) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Forests 
with conifer species produce less firewood. This result supports the hypothesised relationship 
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that conifer forest produces less firewood than mixed and broadleaf forest. This result is 
similar to that of Adhikari and Lovett (2006).  
 
Number of assembly meetings (NASSMEET) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The greater the number of assembly meetings the greater the relative distribution to the 
poor and poorest household  of firewood extracted from the CF. This illustrated one of the 
major arguments advanced by mass movement theories that involving all user households 
frequently in a number of assembly meetings resulted in the better decisions that favour the 
extraction of more firewood than when there are fewer assemblies with lower representation 
of all users (A. Agrawal, 2001; Branney, Malla, Bhattrai, Tamrakar, & Neupane, 2001).  
 
Proportion of poor and poorest households on the EC (PPPRTEC) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The greater the proportion of poor and poorest households on the 
EC, the higher the relative distribution of firewood to the poor and poorest household. The 
poor and poorest households have no other assets such as landholdings and other sources of 
income. Therefore, the likelihood gaining a firewood benefit is higher when they appear more 
often in EC positions. This result is similar to the findings obtained by Lebel et al. (2008), 
Lebert and Rohde (2007), Jones (2007), Larson and Ribot (2007) and Lachapelle et al. (2004) 
who argued that the poor and poorest households could obtain higher benefit when they had 
the opportunity to be selected for decision-making positions.  
 
Assembly meeting involvement in the preparation of the operation plan (ASSOP) is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The positive sign indicates that the greater the 
involvement of households in the preparation of OP in assembly meetings the greater the 
relative distribution of poor and poorest household of firewood collected from the CF. The 
higher household involvement in the preparation of the OP, the better the opportunity to 
develop an OP that could increase the amount of firewood available to the poor. This result is 
similar to that of Mansuri and Rao (2004)  in their work on Community Based Driven 
Development (CBDD) for joint forest management in India  Maharjan, Dhakal, Thapa, 
Schreckkenberg and Luitell (2009) found there was an improved benefit from CF in Nepal. 
They argued that the involvement of a large number of people in decision-making could 
favour general users, including the poor and lower castes, resulting in higher firewood 
extraction from CF. 
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7.4.2 Relative Distribution of Timber 
 
The regression for the relative distribution of timber has an R
2
 is
 
0.72 and adjusted R
2 
of 0.69. 
The diagnostic Log likelihood ratio = -2.868510, the restricted (b=0) = 0-22.09813 and Chi-
square (prob) = 38.46 (.0001). These values indicate that the model explains a high proportion 
of the observed variance. The significant variables in the stabilised (restricted) model are 
presented in Table 7.16. A multicollinearity test was also conducted to find out whether there 
was any collinearity problem with the explanatory variables.  This was done using the 
multicollinearity test in SPSS. As can be seen in matrix of Table 7.16, all the values are less 
than 3, confirming there was no multicolinearity 
 
Table 7.16 Regression results of the factors determining the  relative distribution of 
timber per household  
 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio P[|T|>t]| 
Constant           -1.4273** .5853   -2.4342 .0315 
AREAHH 2.3495*** .9495 2.4745 .0004 
CONIFER           .9154*** .3067  2.9839    .0001 
FCOVER70 2.6356*** .8345 3.1558 .0001 
PDSHEC     -2.1345*** .7315 -2.9180 .0021 
NASSMEET            .1908** .0787 2.4232 .0430 
  
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
R
 2
 =0.72 and Adjusted R 
2
 =0.69 
 
Multicolinearity test matrix of Table 7.16     
    
 AREAHH CONIFER FCOVER70 PDSHEC NASSMEET 
AREAHH  1.117 1.239 1.100 1.131 
CONIFER 1.127  1.150 1.065 1.169 
FCOVER70 1.207 1.111  1.052 1.091 
PDSHEC 1.209 1.160 1.186  1.193 
NASSMEET 1.131 1.159 1.119 1.086  
 
Area of CF per household (AREAHH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As expected, the greater the area of the CF, the larger the relative distribution of timber 
extracted compared with small community forest holdings. Nilsson et al. (20011) found that 
5.66 % higher yield per unit area in a large area compared with a small area when they 
applied four equal scenario treatments under Intensive Forest Management (IFM) in Sweden. 
Similarly, Cai and Zeng (2011)  found that a large area of forest was one of the factors for 
farmer’s willingness to obtain mortgage loans from the bank. They argued that if there is large 
area of forest it could provide large amount of yield and it makes easier for the farmers to pay 
mortgage loans after selling the large amount of forest products.  
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Conifer forest type (CONIFER) has a positive correlation with the relative distribution of 
timberto the poor and poorest household. This is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. The larger the CF with conifer species, the higher amount of timber extracted. From 
field observations, it was seen that most forests are in good condition in the sample plots 
whereas broadleaf forests were of degraded forest cover with Schima and Castonopsis species 
that often provide lower amounts of timber. This indicates that conifer forest area increases 
the likelihood of the extraction of timber compared with conifer forest, particularly in the hill 
region of Nepal.   
 
Forest crown cover class over 70% (FCOVER70) is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This indicates that the better the coverage of the forest, the more likely is that the 
CF is in good condition and provides higher timber yield. This result is similar to that of 
Gautam et al. (2004) who argued that as the crown cover class increased, the yield of timber 
decreased. The underlying assumption is that under good crown cover shrubs are lost and the 
forest converts into high forest that, in turn, yields more timber via natural succession.  
 
Proportion of disadvantaged households on the EC (PDALTEC) is negatively correlated with 
the relative distribution of timber. This variable is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. The greater the proportion of disadvantaged households as member of ECs, the 
lower amount of timber extracted from CF. The possible reason behind this could be that 
disadvantaged households do not own higher standard buildings and they require less timber 
than high caste and wealth status households. This result is similar to the findings of Adhikari 
and Di-Falco, (2009), Kanel and Dahal (2008), Thoms (2008), Agrawal et al. (A. Agrawal, et 
al., 2008), Larson and Ribot (2007), Hansen (2007), Jones (2007), A. Agrawal & Chhatre 
(2006), Iversen et al. (2006)  and Adhikari el al. (2004)  who argued that disadvantaged caste 
households used less timber than wealthy and caste elite with wealth status households. 
 
Number of assembly meetings (NASSMEET) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This indicates that the greater the number of assembly meetings, the greater the relative 
distribution timber to the poor and poorest household. The higher the number of assembly 
meetings the more time for discussion they have, which results in larger amounts of timber 
extracted from the forest. This result is similar to the result of A. Agrawal (2001) who argued 
that a higher number of assembly meetings provided maximum opportunity for users to 
discuss their timber requirements, which results in higher amounts of timber extracted from 
the forest. 
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7.4.3 Relative Distribution of Fodder 
 
The following section explains the final model for the relative distribution of fodder to the 
poor and poorest household from the CF. The goodness of model fit for the result for average 
relative distribution of fodder as the dependent variable is robust. The R
2 
is 0.68 and adjusted 
R
2 
is 0.67. The diagnostic log likelihood ratio = -4.792821, restricted (b=0) = -24.147042 and 
Chi-square (prob) = 38.25 (.0001). These values indicate that the model explains a high 
proportion of the observed variance. The significant variables in the stabilised (restricted) 
model are presented in Table 7.17. A multicollinearity test was also conducted to find out 
whether there was any collinearity problem with the explanatory variables.  This was done 
using the multicollinearity test in SPSS. As can be seen in matrix of Table 7.17, all the values 
are less than 3, confirming there was no multicolinearity. 
Table 7.17 The regression results of the factors determining the average relative 
distribution of fodder per household   
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio |P[|T|>t]| 
Constant         3.1349** 2.1478 1.4595 .0513 
PPPRHEC         -2.1785*** 1.5638 -1.3931 .0020 
CONIFER -2.8345 *** 1.7345 -1.6342 .0043 
ASSOP         2.5187*** 1.3249 1.9009 .0022 
 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
                    R
 2
 =0.68 and Adjusted R 
2
 =0.67 
 
Multicolinearity test matrix of Table 7.17 
 
 PPPRHEC CONIFER ASSOP 
PPPRHEC  1.150 1.300 
CONIFER 1.123  1.310 
ASSOP 1.059 1.159  
 
Proportion of poor and poorest households on EC (RPPPRTEC) is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The greater than proportion of the poor and poorest households on 
EC, the lower amount of fodder extracted from the CF. The poor and poorest households 
potentially have less livestock, which results in less fodder being needed. This result is similar 
to the findings obtained by Naidu (2009), Lebel et al. (2008) Jones (2007), Larson and Ribot 
(2007)  and Chhetry (2004) who argued that poor households holding less livestock resulted 
in less fodder being taken from the CF. This is the consequence of poor households on the EC 
influencing the decision not in the favour of rich households obtaining larger amounts of 
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fodder. They could reflect on the condition of the forest and consider the sustainable use of 
fodder from the CF. 
 
Conifer type of forest (CONIFER) has a negative correlation with the extraction of fodder 
from the CF. It is statistically significant at the 1% level. Conifer forest produces needles that 
are not suitable for fodder whereas broadleaf forest species provide palatable leafs and twigs 
that are very suitable for the collection and production of fodder from CF. This result is 
similar to those of Adhikari and Di-Falco (2009)  and Adhikari et al. (2007) who found that 
broadleaf forest produced more palatable leaf and twigs as a very good fodder for cattle than 
conifer forests. 
 
Assembly involvement in the operation plan (ASSOP) is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This indicates the greater the proportion of household involvement in the 
preparation of the OP, the greater the relative distribution of fodder to the poor and poorest 
household of fodder produced from the CF. More household involvement in the preparation 
of the OP, the better the development of the OP that  increased the production of fodder. This 
result is similar to that Mansuri and Rao (2004) who worked on community forestry 
management and Community Based Driven Development (CBDD) in India. They argued that 
the involvement of larger numbers of people in decision-making provided more emphasis on 
improving forest conditions for fodder species by increasing household contributions for 
better management and extraction of trees for fodder. 
 
7.5 Chapter Conclusions 
 
The results of analysis, based on the elements of the conceptual model of elite in CFUGs, 
looking at the distribution of benefits from CF, were presented in this chapter. The variables 
used for descriptive analysis for the distribution of CF products were: area of CF per 
household, type of forest, crown cover class, agenda items raised by disadvantaged members 
in EC and assembly meetings, frequency of EC meetings, frequency of assembly meetings, 
average discussion hour in EC and assembly meetings, involvement of EC and assembly in 
preparation of the OP, relative proportion of poor and poorest households on EC and the 
relative proportion of Dalit households on EC. The variables were used for descriptive 
analysis and the analysis showed there was negative effect of firewood, fodder, leaf litter and 
timber distribution particularly to the poor and poorest households. Similarly, the result of 
average discussion hours in EC per meeting was also negatively linked for the distribution of 
CF products to poor and poorest household. 
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The determining factors used in the regression analysis for the relative distribution of 
firewood that were very positive and statistically significantly correlated were the forest area 
per household, frequency of assembly meeting, relative proportion of poor and poorest 
household on EC and assembly involvement in the preparation of the OP. In contrast, conifer 
forest type was negatively statistically correlated with the relative distribution of firewood.  
  
The variables that were positive and statistically significant in the regression analysis used as 
determining factors for relative distribution amount of timber were forest area per household, 
crown cover class over 70%, conifer forest type and frequency of assembly meeting. 
However, the proportion of disadvantaged households on the EC was negative and 
statistically significant for the relative distribution of timber. 
 
The involvement of assembly meetings in the preparation of the OP and relative distribution 
of fodder per household were positively correlated. In contrast, the proportion of poor and 
poorest households on the EC was significant and negatively correlated with the relative 
distribution of fodder. The reason behind this may be that more fodder is used by better-off 
households since they have greater needs of fodder due to having more units of private 
livestock and in assembly there could be higher proportion of poor and poorest household 
since they have less needs of fodder due to having less units of private ivestock. 
 
The distribution of firewood, fodder, timber and leaf litter increased comparatively for the 
poor and poorest households when the proportion of poor and poorest households on the EC 
and relative proportion of the disadvantaged households on EC increased. Similarly, the 
relative distribution of CF products increased to the poor and poorest household with 
increased frequency of assembly meetings, if the assembly was involved in the preparation of 
the OP and discussion hours in assembly meeting increased. Both the findings of the 
descriptive and regression analyses indicated that the relative amounts of timber, firewood, 
fodder and leaf litter to poor and lower caste households could increase from CF where those 
households had the opportunity to raise their demands for forest products by participating in 
decision-making. These findings are reflected in organisation elite model of the conceptual 
models of elite in CFUGs (Figure 3.1) where the poor and poorest households’ presence on 
the EC of the CFUG with a large proportion votes from one caste, the poor were able to 
dominate the EC to favour the poor and poorest households in distribution of benefits from 
CF.  
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The CFUG, will be established as an organisational elite model A and B where external 
agencies like NGOs and CBOs empower the poor and lower caste households to participate 
on the EC in a higher proportion. Moreover, a mechanism should be developed to allow 
poorer households to make their shares of benefits from CF, which could be by increasing the 
membership of poorer and low socioeconomic groups in decision-making specifically on the 
EC, which has greater accountability for policy implications. Thus, making these 
organisations more accountable and responsible towards poor and disadvantaged groups is the 
main existing challenge in the CFUGs.  
 
When there is greater security by the representation of local poorer and disadvantaged lower 
caste households on the EC and they have an active role in decision-making, it has a very 
positive influence on making CF programmes successful. As poorer households depend more 
on forests for their basic forest products than rich and caste elite households embedded with 
wealth status, it will be possible to meet the objectives of distributing benefits in a more 
equitable and needs-based fashion by promoting good governance in the forestry sector in 
Nepal. 
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     Chapter 8 
DISTRIBUTION RULES 
8.1 Introduction 
The rules, regulations and practices relating to the extraction and distribution of CF products 
are analysed in this chapter. This chapter is done in the context of social and CFUG 
organisational structures and other factors that influence the distribution rules of CF. The 
organisational elite models A and B (Figure 3.1) reflect a situation where the poor have a 
greater ability to influence the outcomes of decision-making processes, and can influence the 
formulation and implementation of organisation rules, regulations and practices. In the 
context of this chapter, rules, regulations and practices are reflected in the distribution period 
(dependent variable). The main aim of this chapter is to answer the research question: when 
the poor are able to influence decisions, do the distribution rules for CF products favour the 
poor? The research hypothesis is that when the organisational elite models apply decisions 
regarding the formulation of rules, regulations and practices for the distribution of forest 
products will be more likely to provide benefits to the poor. In particular, it is believed that if 
the extraction and distribution period is longer, poor and marginalised households will benefit 
more because this eases the constraints on their labour force availability.  
 
To answer the research question and hypothesis, the selection of open periods of CF for the 
extraction as the dependent variable was analysed in two phases. First, the descriptive 
characteristics of the data were used to determine the potential regression variables. 
Secondly, the results of the regression analysis are presented.  
8.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The results of the analysis of the data collected from the research site are presented in the 
form of summaries and tabulations with associated dependent variables. The dependent 
variables are the open periods for the harvesting, extraction and collection of timber, 
firewood, fodder and grass and leaf litter. The explanatory variables are wellbeing category, 
forest area per household, forest type, crown cover class and relative proportion of EC 
positions for poor and disadvantaged households.  
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8.2.1 Open Periods for Collecting CF Products 
The open period is the dependent variable. The hypothesis is that low social status and poor 
households will benefit more if there is a longer open period for collecting CF products from 
the CF. (Springate-Baginski, et al., 2000) and (Spiteri & Nepal, 2008) found that low 
socioeconomic groups in Nepal are mostly engaged 12 months of the year in collecting 
products including firewood, fodder and grass, tubers, edible green leaves, fruits and berries, 
mushrooms and green leaves for food, dry leaves for use as fuel, bamboo, small timber, 
medicinal herbs, creepers for rope-making and seeds for making oil. This study concentrates 
the distribution period for the major forest products timber, firewood, fodder and grass and 
leaf litter.  
 
The open periods for the extraction and collection of timber, firewood, fodder and grass and 
leaf litter from the survey are presented in Table 8.1. If there was no production and 
distribution, this is denoted by a blank. Open periods are separated into fewer than 7 days 
(A), 7 days to 1.5 months (B), more than 1.5 months to 3 months (C),  more than 3 months to 
6 months (D) and over 6 months (E). These were the categories used in the survey. 
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Table 8.1 The open periods for the extraction and collection of CF products  
 
 
Sn CFUG name Timber Firewood Fodder and grass Leaf litter 
1 Byaldhara Baglung  7 A A A C 
2 Doyapragasti  A A C 
3 Bhimara Sigana A A A C 
4 Chamere Tityang, 5 A A A D 
5 Bhagawat ChisapaniTitang 1  A A D 
6 Simal pata Titang 6,7,9 B B B D 
7 Chhipchhipepale Baglung 11  B B D 
8 Daha Bhakunde 6,7 B B B D 
9 Jhangali Baglung 9 B B B D 
10 Bancharedunga Baglung 9  B B D 
11 Chutreni  Baglung 11  B B D 
12 Dhursheni Baglung 10  B B D 
13 Dhoreni Baglung 10,11  C C D 
14 Gobneri Painyopata 6  C C D 
15 Kuledanda Bhakunde 8  C C E 
16 Rani bhumi Sigana 1 2 3   C C E 
17 Malukapatal Resh 1, 2 C C       C E 
18 SanghukholaRatopaharaResh 3,4 C C C E 
19 Dhandh Malika 2,3 C C D E 
20 Titaure Palakot 7-9 C E D E 
21 Slyanipakha, Malika 1,3,4  E D E 
22 Chyangrekharga Baglung 8  E D E 
23 Mauribhid Malika 5  E D E 
24 Sunakhari Malika 7,8,9  E D E 
25 Ramrekha Baglung  1  E D E 
26 Chitepani Baglung  9  E E E 
27 ReshBuchhung salleri  E E E 
28 Chhaharedhara Baglung 4 D E E E 
29 Dhadhkarka Bhakunde 9 D E E E 
30 Shakhinichaur Paiyopata 2 D E E   E 
31 Jograni Painyopata 3 D E E E 
 
 
Note: Blank = no distribution, A<7days, B =7 days to 1.5 months, C= more than 1.5 months to 3 months, 
 D= more than 3 months to 6 months and E= above 6 months 
 
As can be seen in Table 8.1, the opening period selected by a CFUG was generally applied 
across all products, with leaf litter tending to be longer. First, five CFUGs opened their CF 
for fewer than 7 days for most products. The forests of these five CFUGs are generally more 
than 50% in juvenile stages. Therefore, they had less potential output. The rest of the CFUGs 
that had open periods for over 3 months and over 6 months generally have mixed forests that 
have a greater availability of most products. The open period of CFs for leaf litter was 
generally longer, over 3 months, and as leaf litter is a minor forest product for the open 
period and distribution was not considered a problem for rich and elite households. 
Therefore, the study of leaf litter is included in only the descriptive analysis and excluded 
from the regression analysis.  
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8.2.2 Relative Distribution of CF Products by Wellbeing Category and Open 
Period 
The relative distribution of CF products by wellbeing category and open periods is presented 
in Table 8.2. The poor and poorest households collected a relatively higher amount of 
firewood, fodder and grass, leaf litter and timber when the open period of the CF increased. 
CFUGs do not usually have fixed open periods for the use of leaf litter, which does not have 
a market value except as thatching material for houses and bedding material for livestock. 
Most CFUGs in the surveyed area allowed free collection of grass and leaf litter.  
  
Table 8.2 The relative distribution by wellbeing category and open period 
 
 
Relative Distribution per household 
 
Open period 
 
Number 
of CFUGs 
Rich  
 
Medium  
 
Poor  
 
Poorest 
  
  
Firewood  
<7 days 5 1.26 1.25 0.78 0.71 
>7days to 1.5 months 7 1.15 1.11 0.89 0.85 
>1.5 to 3 months 7 1.05 0.95 0.98 1.02 
>3  to 6 months 
     >6 months  12 0.88 0.62 1.26 1.24 
  
Fodder and grass  
<7 days 5 1.29 1.36 0.71 0.64 
>7days to 1.5 months 7 1.15 1.12 0.78 0.95 
>1.5 to 3 months 6 1.09 1.02 1.11 0.98 
>3  to 6 months 7 0.85 0.88 1.15 1.12 
>6 months  6 0.62 0.62 1.25 1.51 
  
Timber  
<7 days 3 1.68 0.72 0.89 0.71 
>7days to 1.5 months 3 1.22 0.55 1.12 1.11 
>1.5 to 3 months 4 1.08 0.51 1.23 1.18 
>3  to 6 months 4 0.69 0.46 1.44 1.41 
>6 months  
     
  
Leaf litter  
<7 days 0 0 0 0 0 
>7days to 1.5 months 0 0 0 0 0 
>1.5 to 3 months 3 0.68 0.55 1.54 1.23 
>3  to 6 months 11 0.54 0.54 1.51 1.41 
>6 months  17 0.46 0.45 1.58 1.51 
  
Note: Timber was distributed by only 14 CFUGs 
 
It is concluded that poorer households obtain relatively more CF products when the collection 
period was increased. This confirms that it is important to understand the factors that 
determine the open period.  
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8.2.3 Open Periods and Forest Type  
Forest type can be a factor in determining the open period. Common forest types in the study 
area include broadleaf, conifer, and mixed conifer and broadleaf. In broadleaf forest, grass 
growth is often very vigorous. In particular, katus-Chilaune and oak forests produce a higher 
amount of leaf litter than pine or other conifer forests. Broadleaf forests produce more and 
better quality firewood (e.g. oak) compared with conifers. Both broadleaf and conifer forests 
produce timber. However, better quality timber is produced by conifer forest in the hills of 
Nepal and India (Branney, et al., 2001; Shylajan & Mythili, 2003; Spiteri & Nepal, 2008). 
Given this, it might be expected that broadleaf and mixed forest would be open for longer 
periods for firewood. Table 8.3 shows that the number of open days for the distribution of 
firewood and fodder and grass is comparatively higher for CFUGs with broadleaf and mixed 
forests. For timber, conifer forest has a comparatively higher open period in a number of 
CFUGs. For leaf litter there is not an obvious difference in the open period between CFUGs.  
 
Table 8.3 Forest type and open period (Number of CFUGs) 
 
 
  Open periods for distribution of CF products 
Forest 
 type 
Total number 
of CFUGs 
<7 
days 
7 days to 1.5 
months 
>1.5 to 3 
months 
> 3 to 6 
months > 6 months 
 
 
Firewood 
Conifer 12 3 3 4 0 2 
Mix forest  12 1 2 2 0 7 
Broadleaf 7 1 2 1 0 3 
 
 
Fodder and grass 
Conifer 12 2 3 3 4 0 
Mix forest  12 2 3 2 2 3 
Broadleaf 7 1 1 2 1 2 
 
 
Leaf litter 
Conifer 12 0 0 0 6 6 
Mix forest  12 0 0 0 4 8 
Broadleaf 7 0 0 3 1 3 
 
 
Timber 
Conifer 8 3 2 3 0 0 
Mix forest  4 0 1 1 2 0 
 Broadleaf 2 0 0 0 2 0 
 
Note: Only 14 CFUGs distributed timber 
 
8.2.4 Open Period and Forest Area (ha) per Household  
The open period for extracting CF products is likely to be higher when there is a large forest 
area per household (Iversen, et al., 2006; Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 2007). As can be 
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seen in Table 8.4, the open period for collecting firewood and fodder and grass increased as 
the area of CF per household increased. There is no clear link between open period for timber 
and leaf and forest area per household. For timber, this is likely due to the small amounts 
being produced and the fact that it is used for building rather than subsistence. 
 
Table 8.4  Open period and forest area per household (ha) (Number of CFUGs)  
 
  Open periods for distribution of CF products 
Forest area 
per household  
(ha) 
 Total 
number of 
CFUGs  
<7 
days 
 
7 days to 1.5 
months 
 
>1.5 to 3 
months 
 
> 3 to 6 
months 
 
 > 6 
months 
 
  Firewood  
0.07 and less 3 3 0 0 0 0 
0.08-.013 4 0 3 1 0 0 
0 0.14-0.18 5 0 1 4 0 
0.19-0.32 7 2 3 2 0 0 
0.33 and above 12 0 0 0 0 12 
  Fodder and grass 
0.07 and less 3 3 0 0 0 0 
0.08-.013 4 0 4 0 0 0 
0.14-0.18 5 2 1 2 0 0 
0.19-0.32 7 0 2 4 1 0 
0.33 and above 12 0 0 0 6 6 
  Leaf litter 
0.07 and less 3 0 0 3 0 0 
2 0.08-.013 4 0 0 0 2 
0.14-0.18 5 0 0 0 2 3 
0.19-0.32 7 0 0 0 3 4 
8 0.33 and above 12 0 0 0 4 
  Timber 
0.07 and less 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0.08-.013 0 0 0 0 0 
0.14-0.18 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0.19-0.32 4 2 1 1 0 0 
0.33 and above 9 0 2 3 4 0 
 
Note: Only 14 CFUGs distributed timber 
 
The results support the hypothesis that larger areas of CF per household increase open 
periods although just for the collection of firewood and fodder but not for timber. The finding 
of Nagendra and Gokhale (2008) support  these results. Hence, the area of CF per household 
could be a determining factor for open periods in the regression model.  
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8.2.5 Forest Crown Cover Class of CF and Open Period  
Table 8.5 shows that, as the percentage of crown cover increased, the length of the open 
period also increased. This is not surprising since the crown cover is correlated with forest 
quality and the ability of the forest to produce outputs. Hence, crown cover could also be one 
of the attributes for determining the number of open days in the regression analysis 
 
Table 8.5 Open periods and Forest Crown Cover Class (Number of CFUGs) 
 
Forest 
Crown Cover 
Number of 
CFUGs 
CF open periods for distribution of CF products 
 
 
 <7 
days 
7 days to 
1.5 months 
>1.5 to 3 
months 
> 3 to 6 
months 
> 6 
months 
  Firewood 
30-50 % 4 1 3 0 0 0 
51-70 % 11 0 0 4 0 7 
71 and over 16 4 4 3 0 5 
  Fodder and grass 
30-50 % 4 2 2 0 0 0 
51-70 % 11 3 3 2 3 0 
71 and over 16 0 2 4 4 6 
  Leaf litter 
30-50 % 4 0 0 3 0 1 
51-70 % 11 0 0 0 4 7 
71 and over 16 0 0 0 7 9 
  Timber 
30-50 % 3 3 0 0 0 0 
51-70 % 5 0 3 1 1 0 
71 and over 6 0 0 3 3 0 
 
 Note: Only 14 CFUGs distributed timber 
 
8.2.6 Open period and the Proportion of EC Positions by Poor and Poorest  
Table 8.6 shows the relationship between the relative share of EC positions held by the poor 
and poorest and open periods. The hypothesis is that the higher the relative share of EC 
positions held by the poor and poorest households, the longer the open periods. The results 
show that, as the share of EC positions held by the poor and poorest households increased, 
the open period tended to increase. This indicates that when poor and poorest households 
access EC positions they able to influence decisions for a longer open period. This result is 
similar to the finding of  R. Pokharel (2009) and Gauli and Hauser (2011) who argued that 
when poor and low socioeconomic households get the opportunity to make decisions, they 
will increase the open periods of CF. Hence, the relative share of EC positions held by poor 
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and poorest households could be one of the determining factors for the number of open days 
in the regression analysis.  
 
Table 8.6 Open period and proportion of  EC positions hold by the poor and poorest 
(Number of CFUGs)  
 
  Open period for distribution of CF products 
Percentage of poor 
and Poorest 
households on EC 
Total 
number of 
CFUGs 
<7 
days 
 
7 days to 
1.5 months 
 
>1.5 to 3 
months 
 
> 3 to 6 
months 
 
 > 6 
months 
 
  Firewood 
0  2 1 1 0 0 0 
1-10 8 1 1 1 0 5 
11-20  9 2 1 2 0 4 
21-30  10 1 3 4 0 2 
31-50  2 0 1 0 0 1 
  Fodder and grass 
0  2 1 1 0 0 0 
1-10 8 1 1 1 3 2 
11-20  9 2 1 2 1 3 
21-30  10 1 3 2 3 1 
31-50  2 0 1 1 0 0 
  Leaf litter 
0  2 0 0 0 2 0 
1-10 8 0 0 0 5 3 
11-20  9 0 0 1 2 6 
21-30  10 0 0 1 2 7 
31-50  2 0 0 1 0 1 
  Timber 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1-10 3 0 1 1 1 0 
11-20  3 1 0 1 1 0 
21-30  6 1 1 2 2 0 
31-50  1 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Note: Only 14 CFUGs distributed timber 
 
8.2.7 Conclusions from the Descriptive Analysis 
The economic and social structure related variables that appeared to be related to the open 
periods in the various descriptive analyses were selected for econometric analysis. The area 
and open period of the forest, the crown cover class and open period, and forest type by open 
period were also analysed and it seemed that crown cover class, area of CF and type of forest 
also influenced the distribution period of CF products. Lastly, the proportion of EC positions 
hold by poor and poorest households appeared to increase the open period. The EC position 
link to open period is reflected in the organisational elite model where poor households’ 
  
 146 
representation on the EC influenced EC decisions regarding open period. Independent 
variables used in the regression analysis are shown in Table 8.7 
 
Table 8.7 Variables used in the econometric analysis  
Dependent 
Variables 
Descriptions of variables 
Firewood Open period for firewood collection (0 is open 0 to 1.5 months, 1 is 
1.5 to 3 months, 2 is  3 to 6 months and 3 is more than 6 months) 
Timber Open period for timber  collection (0 is open 0 to 1.5 months, 1 is 1.5 
to 3 months, 2 is  3 to 6 months and 3 is more than 6 months) 
Fodder Open period for fodder collection (0 is open 0 to 1.5 months, 1 is 1.5 
to 3 months, 2 is  3 to 6 months and 3 is more than 6 months) 
Independent Variables 
CONIFER If forest type conifer, otherwise 0 
PRCROWN Proportion of crown cover class by number of CFUGs 
FAREAHH      Community forestry area per household in hectares 
PRDISEC Proportion of disadvantaged households on EC 
RPPPRTEC Proportion of poor and poorest households on EC  
8.3 Regression Findings 
Regression analysis was conducted to examine the research problem of identifying the factors 
that determine the length of the open period. The dependent variable is the open period, 
which could assume only four discrete values 0, 1, 2, or 3 for timber, firewood and fodder 
distribution, respectively. It means when the open period was 0 to 1.5 months is 0, more than 
1.5 months to 3 months 1, more than 3 months to 6 months 2 and more than 6 months 
denoted 3 of discrete choice. Under this condition, the discrete choice ordered probability 
regression model (ordered logistic model) is the best model to analyse the problem (Agresti 
& Finlay, 2009; McFadden, 1974, 1981). The LIMDEP econometric programme was used to 
analyse the model (Greene, 2000; Scott & Freese, 2006; Wart, 1996). Multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables was tested before running the model. As discussed earlier, 
there are three major products: (a) timber (b) firewood (c) fodder and grass. For each 
dependent variable, the explanatory variables were loaded into the discrete choice ordered 
probability regression model. As explained by Agresti and Finlay (2009) and Maddala 
(Maddala, 1983), with a linear term, the least explanatory variables were deleted in a step by 
step process until the model was stable. Thus, the variable deletion creates a stable 
(restricted) model.  
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(a) Factors determining the open periods for timber extraction 
 
The result for the open period for timber is shown in Table 8.8. The R
2
 is 0.21. The R
2
 for 
the discrete choice model at the upper bound is 0.22 (R. Shrestha & Alavalapati, 2006). 
Hence, the R
2
 value of 0.21 suggests that the discrete choice ordered model has reasonable 
explanatory power. The Likelihood Ratio test shows that regression model explains a high 
percentage of the observed variance. A multicollinearity test was also conducted to find out 
whether there was any collinearity problem with the explanatory variables.  This was done 
using the multicollinearity test in SPSS. As can be seen in matrix of Table 8.8, all the values 
are less than 3, confirming there was no multicolinearity. 
 
Table 8.8 Ordered logistic regression results showing determination of open period for      
timber distribution for 14 CFUGs  
 
TIMBER Coefficient Standard Error Z Prob z>|Z| 
Variables Index Function for  Probability 
Constant 0.0843***             0.0294 2.87 0.0041 
AREAHH               0.0765** 0.1860 0.41 0.0307 
PRPPSTEC 6.2335*** 3.1674 1.97 0.0091 
CONIFER               1.1293** 0.5258 2.15 0.0317 
PRCROWN -2.9605*** 1.1110 -2.66 0.0077 
 
Threshold parameter for Index 
Mu (1) 1.1814*** 0.3811 3.1 0.009 
 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Multicolinearity test matrix of Table 8.8 
 
 AREAHH PRPPSTEC CONIFER PRCROWN 
AREAHH  1.063 1.001 1.062 
PRPPSTEC 1.074  1.061 1.013 
CONIFER 1.012 1.062  1.074 
PRCROWN 1.061 1.001 1.060  
        
McFadden Pseudo R-squared =0.213.The Chi-square value is 12.07778. Log likelihood = -
22.28966, the restricted Log likelihood -28.32855 and p< 0.0001).The explanatory variables 
of the model have the expected signs.  The area of CF per household (AREAHH) is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. The greater per household area of CF, the longer the open 
period for timber.  
 
The proportion of EC positions held by the poor and poorest households (RSPPRTEC) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. As the proportion of poor and poorest households on 
the EC increases, the open period for timber increased. This indicates that when the poor and 
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poorest households have the opportunity to make decisions as EC members, they are able to 
increase the open period.  
 
Conifer forest type (CONIFER) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. With 
conifer forest, the open period for extraction of timber is longer. By field observation, it was 
seen that most broadleaf forests are degraded with Castenopsis species and Schima wallichii 
with other associated species and do not produce better quality timber used for construction. 
This result is similar to those of K. K. Shrestha & McManus (2007), A. Agrawal and Chhatre 
(2006), Uprety (2006) and Adhikari (2005) who found that conifer forests were opened for 
longer periods than broadleaf. They argued that in hills of Nepal there are degraded broadleaf 
forests with Castonopsis spp. and Schima wallichii, which are less suitable for timber, 
particularly for building construction and furniture, compared with good quality of the hills 
area’s conifers and hence have shorter open periods than conifer forest. 
 
The proportion of crown cover class (PRCROWN) is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. As the proportion of crown cover class closed asbeing more mature forest that 
would require less time to harvest the desired timber (fewer trees need to be cut, or easier to 
find). It is the expected result because crown cover class is a function of the volume 
production of timber wood and when the degree of canopy closure increases individual trees 
has to struggle for higher trunk (stem) growth and length because of higher completion for 
light (IUFRO, 1997; Nilsson, Fahlvik, Johansson, Lundström, & Rosvall, 2011). 
 
(b) Factors determining the open period for firewood extraction 
 
Table 8.9 shows the relationships for the open period for firewood extraction in a Discrete 
Choice ordered (Ordered Logistic model) regression. The McFadden Pseudo R
2 
is 0.49. As 
the Log likelihood function is =-12.71474 and restricted Log likelihood function is -
23.80177. The F-statistic value for the log likelihood ratio test for firewood extraction = 
p<.00113. Chi-square Prob = 22.17406. The explanatory variables of the ordered model have 
expected signs. A multicollinearity test was also conducted to find out whether there was any 
collinearity problem with the explanatory variables.  This was done using the 
multicollinearity test in SPSS. As can be seen in matrix of Table 8.9, all the values are less 
than 3, confirming there was no multicolinearity. 
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Table 8.9 Ordered logistic regression results showing determination of open period for      
firewood distribution for 31 CFUGs in Nepal 
 
FIREWOOD Coefficient Standard Error Z Prob z>|Z| 
Variables Index Function for  Probability 
Constant         -4.9807** 3.4372     -1.45 .0167 
AREAHH           6.8463** 3.2610      2.09 .0392      
PRPPSTEC           2.8641**       1.2264      2.33 .0209 
CONIFER           6.1988**      3.1590      1.96 .0497      
PRCROWN 3.4907***      1.7983      2.09 .0066 
PRDISEC            2.8639**       1.2264      2.30 .0216 
 
Threshold parameter for Index 
Mu (1) 2.1284***       .4714      4.51   0.0000 
Mu(2) 3.0093***       .4451      6.76   0.0000 
Mu(3) 4.5792***       .8599      5.32   0.0000 
 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
 
Multicolinearity test matrix of Table 8.9 
 
 AREAHH PRPPSTEC CONIFER PRCROWN PRDISEC 
AREAHH  1.012 1.013 1.061 1.074 
PRPPSTEC 1.029  1.035 1.065 1.032 
CONIFER 1.004 1.091  1.076 1.063 
PRCROWN 1.038 1.071 1.051  1.013 
PRDISEC 1.043 1.081 1.038 1.005  
 
The area of CF per household (AREAHH) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. As the area of the CF increases, the open period for firewood increases. This result is 
similar to those of  B. Agrawal (2009) and Iversen et al. (2006) who found that CFUGs with a 
larger area of CF per household had longer open periods for extracting firewood from the CF. 
 
The proportion of EC positions held by poor and poorest households (RPPPSTEC) is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. As the proportion of poor and poorest households 
on the EC increases, the open period for firewood collection increases. Again, the poor and 
poorest households have small private landholdings and depend on CF for firewood. That, in 
turn, leads to a longer open period when they are able to influence EC decisions. 
 
Conifer forest type (CONIFER) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. With 
conifer forest, the open periods for extraction of firewood were longer. The proportion of 
forest crown cover (PRCROWN) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. As 
forest crown cover increases, the open period for firewood extraction increases. This result is 
similar to that of Gautam et al. (2004) who analysed the relationship between forest crown 
cover class and distribution period. They argued that if there is a higher percentage of crown 
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cover, there is a richer of stock of trees, saplings and shrubs, which provide a greater yield to 
the CF users that, in turn, results in longer open periods of CF for collecting firewood.  
 
The proportion of disadvantaged (lower caste) households on the EC (PRDISEC) is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. As the proportion of the disadvantaged households 
increased the open period for firewood collection increased. As with the poor, it is likely 
based on the fact that disadvantaged (lower caste) households have limited amount of land 
holdings. It means, they are unable to collect firewood from their own land. They depend 
solely on CF for the collection of firewood. Hence, if they have the opportunity on the EC as 
decision-makers, they increase the open period of the CF. 
 
 (c) Factors determining the opening period for fodder and grass 
 
The variables significant in the restricted (stable) model are shown in Table 8.10. These 
numbers indicate that the model explains a high percentage of the observed variance. Multi-
Collinearity test was also conducted to find out whether there was any collinearity problem 
with the explanatory variables.  This was done using the multi-collinearity test in SPSS. As 
can be seen in matrix of Table 8.10, all the values are less than 3, confirming there was no 
multicolinearity 
Table 8.10 Regression results of the factors that determine open periods for collecting 
fodder and grass in 31 CFUGs in Nepal 
 
FODDER Coefficient Standard Error Z Prob z>|Z| 
Variables Index Function for Probability 
Constant -1.7182** .8290     -2.07   .0382      
CONIFER     .8521* .4501     -1.89 .3609 
AREAHH   2.9564*** .8824 3.35 .0008      
PRDISEC   2.2086*** .7756      2.85 .0044      
 
Threshold Parameter for Index 
Mu (1) 2.3099***       .3241      7.13   .0000 
Mu(2) 2.4729***       .3297      7.50 .0000 
Mu(3) 4.0733***       .8605      4.73   .0000 
 
Note: ***, **, * ==> Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Multicolinearity test matrix of Table 8.10 
 
 CONIFER AREAHH PRDISEC 
CONIFER  1.004 1.034 
AREAHH 1.013  1.000 
PRDISEC 1.060 1.061  
 
Table 8.10 shows that the McFadden Pseudo R
2
 is 0.39 for the open period of CF for 
extracting fodder and grass. The model significance level is p<.00022. The Log likelihood 
function is -25.5224 and restricted Log Likelihood function is -35.2603 with a Chi- Square 
19.4758. 
 
The area of CF per household (AREAHH) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. As the area per household of the CF increases, the open period for fodder and grass 
increases. This result is similar to those of B. Agrawal (2009) and Iversen et al. (2006) who 
found that CFUGs with a larger area per household of CF were open for longer periods for 
extracting fodder and grass. 
 
The proportion of disadvantaged household (PRDISEC) is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. As the proportion of disadvantaged households on the EC increases, the open 
period for fodder and grass increases.  The logic is that disadvantaged households do not have 
large enough private land endowments and are heavily dependent on CF for fodder and grass. 
Hence, when they have an opportunity to express their needs on the EC, they can influence 
the decision to be favourable for them. 
 
Conifer forest (CONIFER) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. With a 
conifer forest, there was a shorter open period of the CF for collecting fodder and grass. The 
fodder obtained from a conifer forest is not palatable for livestock and this is likely to be 
linked to the shorter period. This result is similar to the results of G. Joshi and Negi (2011) 
(2011) and Adhikari (2005)  who found that conifer forests do not provide livestock food in 
terms of tree leaf fodder. On the other hand, G. Joshi and Negi (2011), A. Agrawal and 
Chhatre (2006) and Adhikari (2005) found that broadleaf forest is very useful since it 
provides better quality palatable fodder for ruminants.  
8.4 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter examined the factors determining the open period for CF product distribution. 
The descriptive analysis showed that this is an important factor for the poor since the relative 
amount they receive increased as the open period increased. 
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The results from the regression equations show that the factors that are important for the open 
period for the distribution of timber and firewood are forest type, CF area per household, 
crown cover class and proportion of poor and poorest households on the EC. In addition, the 
open period for firewood distribution was linked to the proportion of poor and poorest 
households on the EC and the proportion of disadvantaged households on the EC. For the 
open period for only fodder and grass distribution, the area of CF per household and forest 
type was important. In general it seems that as the relative participation of poor and 
disadvantaged household increases on the EC, the distribution period is likely to favour those 
households.  
 
The findings of both the descriptive and regression analyses support the conceptual model 
(Figure 3.1) where the EC was structured on the basis of organisational elite model. The 
higher proportion of the poor and poorest households on the EC favoured a longer open 
period.Thus, the findings answer the research question: Does the structure of the EC affect the 
formulation of rules in a way that impacts on CF benefit distribution to the poor and 
disadvantaged?  The results show that when the poor and disadvantaged households can 
influence decisions for the formulation of rules, regulations and practices through the EC 
positions, the rules were favourable to them. It means that leadership experience provided by 
external agencies to enable election to the EC and discussion by the poor brings fundamental 
changes in the CFUGs and the effects on the poor.   
 
Finally, the policy implications are that the thinking, behaviour and approaches of policy 
makers need to change to place more emphasis on enabling the poor and lower caste segments 
of Nepalese society to be involved in EC positions that have an influence in developing the 
rules, regulations and practices that, in turn, benefit them.  
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     Chapter 9 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine the opportunities for the poor and disadvantaged in 
leadership and the effect this has on distribution of CF products and rules governing 
distribution from CF. The study focused on three research questions: (1) Are there factors that 
facilitate the poor and disadvantaged being represented on the EC?; (2) Does the composition 
of the EC affect in distribution of benefits of CF to the poor and disadvantaged members?; 
and, (3) Does the composition  of the EC affect the distribution rules of CF products in a way 
that impacts on benefits, particularly for the poor and disadvantaged?  
 
Studies have shown that the CF programme has been successful in increasing forest stocks, 
including conservation and regeneration. However, it has not been as successful in the 
distribution of benefits and alleviating poverty as was expected. Some scholars suggested that 
central government policies might have constrained the use of forests under CF in a way that 
limits the pool of benefits. The principles underpinning CFUGs mean that power is intended 
to be shared among all groups. However, it is believed that, in practice, the poor have been 
largely left out of decision-making. Forest policy does not dictate how forest users should 
organise in terms of sharing power. This is left to circumstance. In addition, it is not well 
understood how social structures, including the organisation of forest user groups, affects CF 
benefit distribution to poor households. This study attempted to examine how the social and 
organisational structure of CFUGs affects benefit sharing from CFs. The findings of the study 
in answer to the research questions are summarised in this chapter. Both the theoretical and 
policy implications of the study are explained, as well as some recommendations for further 
studies. 
9.2 Conceptual Model 
The literature review showed that, among the elite models, the consensually integrated, plural 
elite and organisational elite models had the potential to explain the formation of decision-
making structures and benefit distribution of CF. Specifically, the models explain decision-
making power in different organisational and social structures. These models provided the 
basis for developing a conceptual model of elite behaviour in CFUGs (Figure 3.1 reproduced 
here).  
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Figure 3.1  Conceptual Model 
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Organisational elite  
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The main features of the conceptual model are: (i) in a community where the EC has only one 
caste and is dominated by the rich, it functions as the consensually integrated elite model; (ii) 
in a community with many castes where the EC is dominated by the rich, it functions as the as 
plural elite model; (iii) in a community with one caste where EC members include both rich 
and poor households, it functions like the organisational elite model A; and (iv) in a 
community with many castes where the EC includes a mix of rich and poor households, it 
functions like the organisational elite model B. The key feature of the conceptual model is 
that it provides a mechanism for the poor and disadvantaged to be in power in a CFUG, and 
thereby influences decisions about CF benefit distribution. Based on the conceptual model, an 
empirical model was developed to test the following hypotheses:  
 
1. There are factors not related to the wealth or caste that increase the likelihood of being 
on the EC.   
2. When the EC has more disadvantaged groups represented there are more benefits 
distributed from CF, and more benefits to the poor.  
3. When the EC has more disadvantaged groups represented, decision rules are more 
favourable to the poor.  
 
The empirical model was outlined in Figure 4.1 and is reproduced below. The leadership 
attributes deals with hypothesis 1, the distribution amount deals with hypothesis 2, and the 
rules of distribution deals with hypothesis 3. The link between leadership attributes and 
benefits from CF is in the EC structure. If the EC structure is the Organisational elite model A 
or B this reflects a structure that has representation by poor and disadvantaged households. 
This in turn provides opportunity for the amount produce for CF and rules for distribution to 
be influenced by poor and disadvantaged in a way that benefits them. 
 
  
 155 
 
Figure 4.1  The empirical framework for modelling community forest decisions in Nepal 
 
 
9.3 Leadership Opportunities for Poor and Disadvantaged 
Households 
EC members are the main leaders in decision-making for forest management and benefit 
distribution in CFUGs. Therefore, it is important to understand what attributes are important 
for selection as a leader. This was tested in a regression. The results show the following key 
conclusions: 
 
 The likelihood of being a leader (executive committee member) of the CFUG is 
negatively correlated with attributes of the poor and poorest households.  
 The likelihood of being a member of the EC is higher for the households who are NGO 
members.  
 
These findings suggest that when the poor and disadvantaged have access to the leadership 
skills and training in NGOs they have the potential to be become CFUG leaders. This means 
hypothesis 1 is true. The assumption is that NGOs build up ability and strengthen the 
leadership capabilities of poorer people or encourage/empower someone to be a leader 
through training, workshops and study tours. This means there is a potential pathway for the 
poor and disadvantaged households to become members of the EC through opportunities 
linked with NGOs. This also means that the organisational elite models outlined in the 
conceptual framework can explain decision-making in CFUGs and form a way for poor and 
disadvantaged households to become part of the elite in decision-making. 
EC Structure 
(Conceptual Model) 
CF amount distributed 
(Hypothesis 2) 
Rules of distribution 
(Hypothesis 3) 
CF resource attributes 
Leadership attributes 
(Hypothesis 1) 
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9.4 Effect of EC Membership on Relative Distribution of CF 
Products 
The analysis in Chapter 7 suggests that the greater the proportion of poor and disadvantaged 
households on the EC, the more frequently assembly meetings are held, and the greater the 
involvement of assembly meetings in the preparation of operation plans, the larger the relative 
distribution of CF products to poor and disadvantaged households. The reason for larger the 
distribution to poor and disadvantaged households is believed to be that these factors result in 
a greater input of the poor and disadvantaged households into the decision-making. The 
findings support the hypothesis that when the poor and disadvantaged have the opportunity 
for input in decision-making about CF product distribution they obtain greater benefit from 
CFs. These findings again reflect the positive effect of the organisational elite model on 
decisions that affect the poor. 
9.5 Effect of EC Membership on Distribution Rules 
There are a number of conclusions from the analysis of distribution rules of the CF products 
(Chapter 8). The effect of EC membership on distribution rules depends on the products being 
considered. The open period for firewood and timber distribution was linked to the proportion 
poorer and disadvantaged households on the EC. In addition, area per household, forest type 
and proportion of crown cover were also important and correlated with the open period for 
firewood and timber. In general, as the proportion of poor and disadvantaged households 
increased on the EC, the distribution period is likely to longer and favoured those households. 
The forest area per household was positively and conifer forest type negatively correlated 
with the open period. The findings support the hypothesis that representation of the poor and 
disadvantaged groups on the EC allows them to influence the distribution period that, in turn, 
increases the benefits they receive from CF. Again, the findings support the positive effect of 
the organisational elite model on outcomes for the poor and disadvantaged segments of 
Nepalese society. 
9.6 Policy Implications  
Based on the above findings, this study draws some policy implications and makes 
recommendations for policy makers. The study raised important concerns regarding 
community-level decision-making for the management of community forestry. The main 
concerns are how to involve poor and low socioeconomic groups in decision-making. As the 
study results have shown, when this happens community forestry turns into a stepping stone 
to alleviate poverty and to achieve MDGs. Some of the policy implications are as follows: 
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An interesting result of this study is that the involvement of NGOs is a determinant of a 
household’s ability to participate in the EC and so influence decisions. Therefore, it is 
essential to create opportunities for NGOs to provide training and education to poor 
households. 
 
The main policy implications relate to actions that will eventually change the composition of 
the EC so that the poor and disadvantaged households have an opportunity to participate in 
decision-making. In this way, CF will help to alleviate poverty and to achieve the millennium 
goal of poverty reduction. 
9.6.1 Contribution to knowledge  
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature on community forestry:  
 First, the study has extended the literature on models of elite behaviour to a 
community-based context in a developing country. By extending the concept of the 
organisational elite model, the study has been able to capture the decision-making 
behaviour of the EC where the traditional elite share power with the poor and lower 
caste households. By becoming empowered through an EC position, the poor and 
disadvantaged are able to obtain a greater share of benefits from community forests. 
As predicted by the consensually integrated and plural elite models, when the rich 
hold most of the key positions on the EC, they capture most of the benefits. The model 
of elite developed in this research has the potential to be extended to other examples of 
community-based resource management in the developing world.  
 Secondly, the study shows that while leadership opportunities for the poor and 
disadvantaged are constrained by socially constructed factors that favour the elite. If 
they are able to link with an NGO/CBO, there is a greater chance of access to 
decision-making positions in the CFUG because NGO/CBO experience develops their 
leadership capacity. This shows the important role that NGOs can play in community 
development, apart from the particular focus of the NGO, through the organisational and 
leadership skills they create.  
 Thirdly, the study has shown that the intended outcomes of the participatory approach 
inherent in the structure of CFUG assembly meetings can be successful when they 
operate under the right conditions. 
9.7 Recommendations for Future Research and Work 
Some recommendations for future research are as follows: 
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 First, this study is based on data from only one district. Some of the social problems 
associated with exclusions could be different in different districts. In addition, 
organisational factors can change with time. Therefore, this type of study needs to be 
done in many districts and should be repeated from time to time to update our 
understanding of the effect of social factors.  
 Second, due to time and resource constraints, this study sampled only 10 households 
in each CFUG. A more complete study that sampled all households in a number of 
CFUGs would provide a more complete picture of what was happening in CFUGs. 
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     Appendix A 
Household survey 
1. What is the name and address of your CFUG? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
2.  Could you please provide me your livestock holding and required food (fodder, lawn grass 
and Corn in kg) in last 12 months? 
Category 
of 
livestock 
Number Fodder needed for 
livestock  
   Lawn grass          
needed      for livestock 
   
Amount of corn used  
For livestock in NRs 
 
 
 From own 
land  
From 
CF  
From 
own land  
from 
CF  
 
From   
own land  
Purchased 
from Market  
Buffalo M        
 K        
Cows        
Goats        
Horse        
Sheep        
Pigs        
Gross total        
                           Note: 1 Bhari = 40 kg, M=Male, K =Kalf 
3. Who should set the agenda for the following in an EC meeting? 
 
Activities Only CP only ECM Any CFUG 
member 
Firewood distribution □ □ □ 
Fodder distribution □ □ □ 
Timber distribution □ □ □ 
CF income distribution □ □ □ 
CF land allocation  □ □ □ 
Appointed of EC members □ □ □ 
                         Note: CP =Chairperson, ECM =Executive Committee Member  
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4. Who should decide to get agenda setting for the following in User assembly meeting? 
Activities Only CP Only EC M  ANY CFUG 
member 
 Firewood 
distribution □ □ □ 
Fodder 
distribution □ □ □ 
Timber 
Distribution □ □ □ 
CF income 
distribution □ □ □ 
CF land 
allocation □ □ □ 
Appointed of 
EC members □ □ □ 
 
5. Do the poor, women and lower caste always be involved in setting of agenda in EC and 
Assembly meeting of CFUG? 
                         Yes   □    No   □ if yes proceed Q no. 6 other wise Q no 7 
6. How many business items of agenda set by poor, women and lower caste in an EC and 
assembly meeting in the last 12 months? 
 EC MEETING ASSEMBLY MEETING 
ACTIVITIE
S 
 TOTAL 
BUSINESS 
ITEMS 
POOR WOMEN LOWER 
CASTE 
 TOTAL 
BUSINES
S ITEMS 
POOR WOMEN LOWER 
CASTE 
 
 Firewood 
distribution 
        
Fodder 
distribution 
        
Timber 
Distribution 
        
CF income 
distribution 
        
CF land 
allocation 
        
Appointed of 
EC members 
        
Others 
(please 
specify) ----- 
        
 
 
  
 184 
7. What is the best process to come on decision? (Please tick one only) 
BY  SIMPLE MAJORITY □ 
By 2/3 majority □ 
By unanimous □ 
 
8.  Which is the best procedure for Voting? (Please tick only one)                           
Type of  
Decision for 
Voting system type if majority 
    Show 
of hand                                                
Secured 
Ballot                     
simple 
majority
2/3majority Unanimous 
Selection of EC 
member □ □ □ □ □ 
Firewood □ □ □ □ □ 
Fodder □ □ □ □ □ 
Timber □ □ □ □ □ 
NTFPs □ □ □ □ □ 
Allocation of CF 
products and CF 
fund for poor 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Programme, 
Budget  and 
expenditure 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
9. Which members of the CFUG Executive would most likely to take consideration the needs of 
poor and marginalised group of CFUG?  (Please circle only one number for each EC member) 
 
     MOST LIKELY    UNLIKELY 
Elected 1 2 3 4 5 
Appointed 1 2 3 4 5 
Higher Caste 1 2 3 4 5 
Lower caste 1 2 3 4 5 
Rich 1 2 3 4 5 
Poor 1 2 3 4 5 
Women 1 2 3 4 5 
Member included in non-CFUG politics 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. What pecent your firewood requirement do you obtain from the CF? (Please tick only one of the 
following) 
                                                Less than 25 %                                   
                                                  25 to 50 %  
                                                   50 to 75%                                           
                                                  75% and over 
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11. Are there problems for the collecting firewood from the CF? (Please tick as apply)  
None                                                                 □ 
Lack of fair collection rule                                □ 
Available in OP but not distributed                   □ 
Insufficient of firewood                                      □ 
 
12. How much Forest products did you get from CF in the last 12 months? 
 
Products Amount Unit 
Fire wood   
Fodder     
Timber     
Lawn Grass                  
NTFPs   
Others (please 
specify) --------  
  
 
13. What is and what should be in the priority for products in OP? (Please rank on priority with 1 as 
first 2 as second and so on) 
Products What is What should be 
Firewood   
Timber   
Fodder   
Lawn grass   
NTFPs   
Others(Please specify)------   
   
14.  Do you have any experience of leadership with the CFUG or another organisation?  
 
Designation          In   CFUG In another organisation 
Present Years Past Years Present Years Past Years 
Chair person                              □ □  □  □  
Executive   
member                  □ 
 □  □  □  
Advisory 
member                      □ 
 □  □  □  
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15. Which religion and caste do you belong from? 
 
Religion      Tick Caste (Parbatiyas) Tick Caste (Terrain) Tick 
Hindu □ Brahmin □ Forward □ 
Buddhist □ Chhetry □ Backward □ 
Muslim □ Thakuri □ Schedules □ 
Christian □ Newar □ Others (Please specify) □ 
Sikh □ Rai □   
Others □ Limbu □   
  Magar □   
  Gurung □   
  Schedules □   
  Other (please specify) □   
 
16. What is your mother tongue? 
 
Parbatiyas 
  
Tick  Terrain Tick  
Nepali □ Maithili □ 
Newar  □ Bhojpuri □ 
Rai □ Abadhi □ 
Limbu □ Tharu. If Tharu please specify 
(Maithili, Bhojpuri and Abadhi) □ 
Gurung □ Others (Please specify)        -------------- □ 
Magar □   
Schedules □   
Other 
(please 
specify) 
□   
 
  17.    What is your age group? (Note for household head or respondent) 
 
18-25         □     26-35           □   36-45           □   46-55          □     
56-65         □   66-75          □     76 -85         □ 86 and over   □     
 
18. What is your gender    Male    □    Female        □   
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19. What is your marital status? 
                                          
Single/never married            
□ 
Married               
□   
Divorced/Separated             
□ 
Widowed 
□   
De facto relationship              
□ 
   
20. What is the highest level education you have attended?     
 
 
No formal education □ Primary education □ 
Middle school education □ High school education □ 
Intermediate □ Diploma Degree □ 
Mater Degree □ Other(please specify) _____ □ 
 
 
21. How much land do you cultivate? (Please tick only one of row)  
 
Holding 
of land 
size 
Unit Landless 0.1-0.5 0.6-1.0 1.1-2.0 2.1-4.0 4.1 -6.0 
 
61.- 8.0 
 
8.1- 10.0 
 
 
Over10.1 
 
Own 
land 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Rented 
land 
 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Rented 
out 
 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Sharing 
of Crops 
 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
  
22. What is your occupation?  
 
Farmer □ Teacher □ Public Service □ 
Social 
service □ 
Political leader □ Other (please specify)- □ 
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23. What is your total annual income in NRs and numbers of family members?  Tick only one in 
each row  
 
Sources 
of income 
0-19, 20-49 50-100, 101-150 151-200 201-300 301-500 501 and 
Over 
Total 
mem 
Ag+hortic
ulture  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
Livestock □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Business □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Job □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Other 
(please 
specify) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
24. Do you have any comment and particular issue that should be raised to increase the voice of 
poor in decision-making?  
 
Thanks 
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Appendix B 
Survey for Executive Committee of the CFUGs 
1.  General information  
 
Name and address of CFUG:         ____________________________ 
Total number of households in the group:  ________   
Number of rich household                         _________ 
Number of medium household                   ________ 
Number of poor household                        ________ 
Area of forest (ha)                                     ________ 
          
Forest type by %age of crown covers              
Conifer ____________ 
Mature or harvesting size__________ 
Pole size ___________ 
Below pole size including seedling________   
Broadleaf   _____ 
Mature or harvesting size__________ 
Pole size ___________ 
Below pole size including seedling________   
 Mixed ___________ 
Mature or harvesting size__________ 
Pole size ___________ 
  Below pole size including seedling________   
 
Date Forest handed over (d/m/y)             /          /        / 
     
 Date(s) forest operation plan revised (d/m/y): 
   
                  (a)         /           /        /                        (c)         /           /        / 
                  (b)         /           /        /                        (d)         /           /        / 
Distance to motor-able road (Km): ______________ 
Altitude range (meter):                   _____________ 
 
2. How do CFUG executive members be structured of EC? 
Total members in EC                  ___________ 
Number of elected member        ____________ 
Number of appointed member    ____________ 
Number of advisory member     ____________ 
Number of other member         _____________        
 
3.    How many number of executive committee members represent from the following group? 
Higher Caste (BCTN) and (BRKDH)     __________ 
Lower caste                                              __________ 
Rich members of CFUG                          ___________                                     
Poor members of CFUG                           __________ 
Poorest members of the poor                    _________ 
Local leader non-CFUG politics              __________ 
Women member                                       _________ 
Other (please specify)                              _________ 
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4. Who was involved in preparing the existing Operation Plan? Tick as apply 
EC Prepared with DFO input, assembly discussed/approved and DFO approved □ 
Assembly prepared with DFO input and DFO approved □ 
EC prepared with input from DFO and DFO approved □ 
 
 
5.     What is the production and income of this CF in last 12 months? 
 
Categories 
of products 
or income 
Unit  Internal use in 
CFUG 
Sale of products 
outside of CFUG 
Income from Sale 
(NRs) 
internal Outside 
Timber      
Firewood      
fodder      
NTFPs      
Levy    
Penalties   
Donations   
Other 
income 
  
Total   
 
6.     In the last 12 months how many agenda item were set by the following for Executive Committee 
meeting and assembly of CFUG? 
 
 E C meeting Assembly meeting 
Chair person   
EC including chairperson   
NonEC CFUG member   
Advisory member   
Poor, women and lower caste   
DFO   
District Council   
Non DFO Govt Agencies   
NGO   
Other (please specify) -----------   
                     
Note: EC= Executive committee 
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7.    In average how long does it take for the decision of the following business in EC meetings and 
user assembly in last 12 months? 
 
business Item EC meeting User Assembly 
Time in hours 
 1-2 2-4 4-6 6-12 <12  2-3 3-4 4-8 8-12 <12           
Timber 
distribution  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Firewood 
distribution                     
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Fodder 
distribution                                          
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
NTFPs 
collection                          
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribution of 
CF income 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Buying 
furnishing 
materials and 
stationary                
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
8. In last 12 months how long is the CF opened for the collection of timber, firewood, fodder and 
NTFPs for users? 
 
Periods Firewood Fodder Timber NTFPs 
Less than one month □ □ □ □ 
2 months to less than 3 
months 
□ □ □ □ 
3 months to less than 6 
months 
□ □ □ □ 
9 month to 12 months □ □ □ □ 
 
 
9.     How is firewood allocated from your CF? Please tick one 
                 
 On equal basis  
    
On need basis Others 
(please 
specify)  
per household Per person Per household per person         ----- 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
10.    What has happened to the availability of firewood in this CF since the formation of the CFUG? 
(Please tick only one) 
 
Increased □ 
Decreased □ 
Same □ 
Not sure □ 
 
11. Do you have provision in your OP to distribute firewood for making charcoal? 
                Yes   □    No □ if yes proceed 12 otherwise 13 
 
12.    What is the provision in your OP for charging firewood for making charcoal? (Please tick only 
one)  
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Free of cost □ 
Reduced rate from firewood cost □ 
Same rate as firewood  □ 
Other (please specify)------------ □ 
                  
13.      Do you have any special rule for Distribution of fire wood by poor and marginalised groups in 
your CFUG?                
Yes           □      No      □ 
14.   If yes are the rules for distribution of firewood in practices? 
 
Provision in OP  □ 
Provision in Op but practiced differently □ 
Decision by assembly □ 
Decision by EC □ 
Decision by Chairperson of EC □ 
 
15.  What proportion of total CFUG demand is met by CF? 
 
 Demand and supply 
situation  
Firewood Fodder Timber NTFPs 
less than 25 %  
 
□ □ □ □ 
 26 to  50%  □ □ □ □ 
 51 to 75%   □ □ □ □ 
76 % or more □ □ □ □ 
                     
16.   How much land is allocated to poor households from your CF? 
 
Purpose for 
allocation 
Implemented 
activities 
Allocated land 
(ha) 
No of Benefited 
households 
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17.   How much money was distributed to the targeted services for poor households from your CFUG 
fund in last 12 months? 
 
Purpose of 
distribution 
Distributed money 
(NRs) 
Implemented 
activities 
No of Benefited 
households 
    
    
    
    
    
 
18.  When do you open your CF to grazing? 
 
Periods  
Never □ 
Less than one month □ 
2 months to less than 3 months □ 
3 months to less than 6 months □ 
6 months to  less than 9 months □ 
9 month to 12 months □ 
 
19     What is the annual grazing levy? 
 
 Category of 
Livestock  
 Rate in NRs 
Other households  Poor Households 
Buffalo   
Cows   
Goats   
Sheep   
Horse   
Pigs   
Others   
  
20.  What sorts of changes have there been for poor households in last five years? 
 
 Income  Access to 
education  
Access to 
health  
Access to 
drinking water 
Access to 
road 
Others(specify) 
------------- 
More □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Same  □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Less □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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21.  How is wealth ranking done in your CFUG? (Please tick only one) 
 
CFUG members make categories themselves  □ 
DFO office  helps to categorise  □ 
An outside agency helps to categorise                       □ 
Other (please specify) -------------- □ 
 
22.   How is CFUG demand determined? (Please tick only one) 
 
EC decide after consulting each household □ 
EC decide after a hamlet meeting of households □ 
EC determines demand without  
Consulting of any household    
□ 
Determined by an assembly   □ 
Determined by DFO alone □ 
Demand not determined         □ 
                                           
23.  What should be in the priority for production in your CF? (Number in rank of priority with as first 
1, 2 as 2nd and so on) 
                        
Timber  
Fire wood  
Fodder  
NTFPs   
Other Income Generation activities except NTFPs  
 
24.     Do you have any provision in OP to change the forest composition (species) according to choice 
of users? (Please tick one) 
 
None □ 
Change OP by EC decision alone □ 
Change OP by User assembly 
decision alone 
□ 
Change OP by DFO without 
consulting any one 
□ 
Change OP by DFO on request of 
CFUG assembly 
□ 
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25.      If you have community members who are not included as members of CFUG why is that case? 
(Please tick as many as apply) 
 
They are not interested □ 
Interested but cannot afford to pay levy or fees of CFUG □ 
Executive committee members are not agree to give them membership □ 
Live to far away □ 
Other cause (please specify) -------------- □ 
 
26. Do you have any comment and particular issue that should be raised to increase the voice of 
poor in decision-making? 
 
Thanks 
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Appendix C 
Ethnic caste representation of Chairperson of CFUGs 
     
Name of CFUG Address  Ethnic caste of 
Chair person   
Maximum Education 
of Chairperson 
Occupation  
1. Doya Pragati Malika 1  Elite Literate Farmer 
2 Dadhah  Malika 2,3 Elite Literate Farmer 
3 Saghu khola Resh 3,4 Elite IA passed Student 
4 Malukapatal Resh 1,2 Janjati Literate Farmer 
5 Rani bhumi Sigana 1,2,3 Janjati Literate Farmer 
6.Kuledanda Bhakunde 8 Janjati Literate  Ex-Army (India) 
7.Gobnery Paiyu Patta 6 Elite Literate Farmer 
8.Dhoreni  Baglung Municipality 10,11 Elite S.L.C. Govt service 
9. Dhurseni  Baglung Municipality 10, Elite IA Govt service 
10. Chutreni Baglung Municipality 11 Elite Literate Farmer 
11.Bancharedhunga Baglung Municipality 9 Janjati Literate  Farmer 
12 Jhangali Baglung Municipality 9 Elite Illiterate Farmer 
13. Chittepani Baglung Municipality 9 Elite Illiterate Farmer 
14. Chyangre Kharka  Baglung Municipality 8 Elite 9 class passed Farmer 
15.Chhaharedhara Kailam  Baglung Municipality 4 Janjati IA Trader 
16. Ramrekha  Baglung Municipality 1 Elite Literate Farmer 
17.  Daha  Bhakunde 6,7 Janjati Literate Ex-Army 
18.Chhipchhipepani  Baglung Municipality  Elite SLC Farmer 
19 Bayaldhara  Baglung Municipality 7 Janjati IA Farmer 
20`. Titaure   Palakot 7,8 Elite SLC Govt service 
21.  Sallenipakho Malika 1 Elite Literate Farmer 
22. Mauribhir Malika 5 Elite SLC Teacher 
23.Sunakhari  Malika 7,8,9 Elite IA Teacher 
24. Jograni Painyo pata  8,9 Elite BA Teacher 
25. Resh Buchung Salleri  Resh 3 Elite BA Govt service 
26.Bhimarakopakho  Sigana 4,5 Elite Literate Farmer 
27. Sakhenichaur  Painyo pata   1,2 Elite Literate Farmer 
28. Dhadkharka  Bhakunde 9 Elite Literate Ex-Army 
29. Chamero  Titang 5 Dalit Literate Farmer 
30.Bhagwati Chisa pani Titang 1 Elite Literate Ex-Army 
31. Simal pata Titang 6,7,9 Elite Literate Ex-Army 
 
Note: In occupation one of these: Government service, Farmers, Teacher, Traders/Businessman, Hotel owner, 
student, NGO service holders, Affiliated to non CFUG Politics and others.  
 
